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ANGOLA: INTERVENTION OR NEGOTIATION

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BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

NINETY-NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

OCTOBER 31; NOVEMBER 12, 1985

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ANGOLA: INTERVENTION OR NEGOTIATION

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 31, 1985

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met at 2:06 p.m. in room 2200, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard Wolpe (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. WOLPE. The hearing will come to order.

At the start of this hearing, I would like to make a few observations about what has generated this hearing.

Legislation has been introduced in the Congress, and we know from reports that have been widely published that there is debate within the administration considering whether or not the United States should engage in a program of assistance to the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola [UNITA], faction inside Angola, headed up by Jonas Savimbi. The debate centers on whether or not there should be any assistance going forward to Savimbi's UNITA party and whether or not such assistance should be overt or covert.

Obviously, this is one of those subjects that has already been very bitterly contested in the media and within the Chambers of the Congress. My own committee is very divided, I am certain, on the subject of appropriate policies to pursue, and the panel of witnesses that will be before us today will be expressing a variety and diversity of viewpoints.

I must say that, in my judgment, the intensity of the debate is in part a function of how little contact the United States has with the African continent generally, and with southern Africa in particular, because I believe, that a more comprehensive understanding of both the history of the conflict in Angola and the array of forces that is struggling for liberation in southern Africa would very quickly reveal that there is probably no better way of playing directly into the hands of the Soviets and of the Cubans than the suggestion that the United States should become involved in supplying support to a dissident group operating within Angola.

Support for UNITA inside Angola, in my view, would have threefold consequences, all of which, from the standpoint of American national interest, are frankly bizarre. First, we would be creating greater dependence by the Angolan Government on the very Cubans and Soviets that we profess to want to see leave Angola. That is very simply because the very stated intention of such assistance would be to provide a greater threat to the Angolan gov-

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ernment, thereby increasing its dependence at the very time, that the Angolan Government diplomatically, both publicly and privately, has indicated a desire to draw down the Cuban combat troops the moment the threat from South Africa to Angola has been eliminated.

So we end up strengthening rather than weakening Angolan dependence upon the Cubans and the Soviets.

Second, we permit the Soviet Union to portray the United States as being allied with South Africa, that is, actively supporting Jonas Savimbi's UNITA party. There will be the United States and South Africa in combination working to destabilize the Angolan Government, all in support of Jonas Savimbi and UNITA. How that enhances American influence within southern Africa or throughout the African continent is a mystery, at least, to this observer; clearly, however, it clearly would play directly into the Soviet propaganda mill and cost the United States severely, in my judgment, in southern Africa and throughout the African continent.

And third, we would also have American tax dollars flowing directly to an individual that is portraying himself to right-wing circles in the United States as the embodiment of Western capitalistic values and as anticommunist, but who in fact is an avowed Marxist and who has indicated publicly that his preference is for the Maoist form of Marxism rather than for the Soviet model of Marxism.

Now, I do not think all of those facts and all of that history are in fact known by many of those who are advocating for support for Jonas Savimbi's UNITA. I think those who are doing so are genuinely, sincerely convinced that they have put themselves behind what they are describing as freedom fighters who are anti-Communist, and simply are not aware of Jonas Savimbi's rather unusual history. He has demonstrated enormous flexibility in terms of who he receives his assistance from, factoring the original struggle for Angolan independence when the Angolan nationalist movement divided itself into three different factions. Not only was America's CIA involved in supporting two of those factions, but in addition, the North Koreans and the Chinese were supporting some of the same individuals that the United States was supporting.

The bottom line is that the struggle inside Angola has far less to do with ideology, has far less to do with East-West conflict, has far less to do with the conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States than it has to do with the struggle for leadership among the various factions within Angola at the level of personality, and has as well to do with ethnic divisions within Angola. All of the three major factions in Angola have historically had different bases at the core of their support.

In the case of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola [MPLA], it was the Mestizo and Kimbundu populations that tended to be the dominant force. In the case of Holden Roberto's faction, it was the Bakongo people. In the case of Jonas Savimbi, there was a very heavy Ovimbundu influence.

Now, it is not surprising that Americans who are distant from that experience of Angola and southern Africa will very quickly, not knowing that history, not knowing these divisions, put themselves unintentionally in the posture of being easily manipulated

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by labels that we think we understand. Mr. Savimbi learned a long time ago that the way to secure American support is to portray himself as an anticommunist. And like Pavlov's dog, we are trotting to the stimulus.

But I just would hope that one of the purposes of the hearing today will be to widen, at least, public interest in exploring that history, widen public debate about how American national interests in southern Africa and throughout the African continent, can best be served. We have invited a very diverse segment of opinion on this panel. My own committee could not be more diverse in its own opinion and spread of views on this subject. So there will be more than enough opportunity to hear a lot of alternative arguments, and I think that is healthy.

I make a real plea, though, for all of us involved and a party in this debate to spend a little time in terms of trying to understand the cultural, political, historical context within which this debate is taking place.

I want to indicate that on this particular issue, I believe that Secretary of State Shultz has been absolutely on target when he has written, and I quote, referring to the legislation that has been introduced by my distinguished colleague from Florida:

> The suggested legislation should be discouraged. For the past several years the Administration has pursued a policy in southern Africa aimed in part at securing the independence of Namibia, and in that context provide for the withdrawal of Cuban combat forces from Angola.
>
> Dr. Savimbi, the leader of UNITA, acknowledges that his purposes are served by an agreement which produced Cuban withdrawal. A stalemate at higher levels of violence serves Moscow's interests, not his. The MPLA government, through emissaries now in the United States, has asked for our help in containing the fighting, and has said it also wishes to renew an exploration for a settlement. Our mediating effort has for some time been accepted by the key parties, our allies in Europe and Africa in general. It needs to be pursued forcefully.
>
> The legislation which Congressmen Pepper and Kemp have proposed is ill-timed and will not contribute to the settlement we seek. I feel strongly about Savimbi's courageous stand against Soviet aggression, but there are better ways to help. A determined effort on our part to pursue the negotiation is a good approach.

I am aware, as I said earlier, of the internal debate within the Congress. I earnestly hope that in this instance the State Department view will prevail in that internal debate.

The purpose of our hearing today is to contribute, then, to informed debate among proponents, opponents, and those who may be undecided in the current debate on United States policy toward Angola. We have assembled a notable panel of knowledgeable and concerned individuals, including Ambassador David Newsom, former Under Secretary of State in the Carter administration and Assistant Secretary of State for Africa in the Nixon administration. Ambassador Newsom is currently associate dean at Georgetown University School of Foreign Service.

Mr. Robert Johnson, former National Security Council staff person during the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson administrations, and presently a fellow at the Overseas Development Council. Mr. Johnson is ill today, but his prepared statement will be read by Mr. Stuart Tucker of the ODC, the Overseas Development Council.

Prof. Gerald Bender of the University of Southern California, and one of America's leading Angolan experts for more than 20 years.

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Mr. Randall Robinson, executive director of Transafrica and a leader of the Free South Africa movement.

Ambassador Jose Sorzano, formerly Deputy Ambassador of the United States to the United Nations and president of the Cuban American National Foundation.

And Mr. Richard Bissell, executive editor of Washington Quarterly, a well-known African expert, and past research director of the United States Information Agency.

I should indicate that we had a number of last-minute requests by Members of Congress to testify at this hearing and we simply, given the already extended panel, could not accommodate those requests today, so we are planning a second hearing on the subject in the very near future.

As usual, when we turn to our testimony, I will be asking the witnesses to testify for no more than 5 minutes so as to allow maximum opportunity for questions and answers. We will, of course, include your entire testimony, written testimony, in the record of the committee hearing.

[Mr. Wolpe's prepared opening statement follows:]

PREPARED OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD E. WOLPE, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA

It is nearly a decade since Congress first faced the issue of American intervention in Angola. And the history of that episode is well worth pondering today.

During the first 9 months of 1975, three Angolan political movements—FNLA (National Front for the Liberation of Angola), UNITA and MPLA—fought for control of the former Portuguese colony. Each group received foreign military support in a rapidly escalating cycle. China sent FNLA arms and 120 instructors; Zaire furnished troops and trainers as well as arms. The U.S. supplied both FNLA and UNITA with arms and advisors; South Africa armed and advised UNITA and even invaded Southern Angola. The Soviet Union armed MPLA and Cuba dispatched first 300 advisers, and then 700 troops. In late October and early November, MPLA was caught between a new FNLA/Zairian military thrust from the North and an invasion by thousands of South African regular troops and a large assortment of mercenaries from the South. However, Cuba responded by sending thousands of troops, making it possible for the MPLA forces to prevail. The U.S. Congress then cut off CIA funding for UNITA and FNLA, largely because it was convinced that the U.S. could not compete with the Soviets and Cubans without both a massive intervention and what would amount to an American-South African alliance. It judged that neither course was in our national interest.

Last summer Congress repealed the Clark Amendment which provided for special Congreasional consideration of any proposal to assist military forces in Angola. Although most of the proponents of the repeal disclaimed any intention to provide material support for UNITA, they did indicate that the repeal would have psychological importance in establishing American moral support for UNITA's resistance to a Soviet and Cuban-aided Government. In addition, some members undoubtedly favored repeal as a way of subsuming proposed covert action under the general processes established after the Clark Amendment by the Intelligence Committees.

Today, however, there are renewed calls from some quarters in the Administration and Congress for material aid to UNITA. It is argued that the U.S. should aid UNITA's "democratic resistance" to Soviet-Cuban "expansionism" in Angola. Opponents of aid to Savimbi question UNITA's democratic credentials, emphasize that U.S. intervention would result in increased rather than reduced Soviet and Cuban military involvement, as it did in 1975, and warn that an alliance with South Africa in Angola would undermine our policy of pressing the South African government to end apartheid and cease its regional aggression. Among those critical of proposals for aid to UNITA is Secretary of State George Shultz who recently wrote Republican leader Robert Michel in opposition to the Pepper-Kemp proposal for $27 million in non-lethal aid to UNITA. Shultz wrote:

"The suggested legislation should be discouraged. For the past several years, the Administration has pursued a policy in Southern Africa aimed in part at securing

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the independence of Namibia and in that context provide for the withdrawal of Cuban combat forces from Angola. . . .

Dr. Savimbi (the leader of UNITA) acknowledges that his purposes are served by an agreement which produces Cuban withdrawal . . . A stalemate at higher levels of violence serves Moscow's interests, not his.

The MPLA Government, through emissaries now in the United States, has asked for our help in containing the fighting and has said it also wishes to renew an exploration for a settlement. Our mediating effort has for some time been accepted by the key parties, our allies in Europe and Africa in general. It needs to be pursued forcefully."

The legislation which Congressmen Pepper and Kemp have proposed is ill timed and will not contribute to the settlement we seek. I feel strongly about Savimbi's courageous stand against Soviet aggression, but there are better ways to help. A determined effort on our part to pursue the negotiation is a good approach.

Mr. WOLPE. I would now like to invite my distinguished colleague from Michigan, Mr. Siljander, to make any opening remarks he might care to offer.

Mr. SILJANDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Needless to say, this is a committee with members who see the world from very, very different eyes. I am sure that might well reflect in our panel of witnesses today.

I would like to welcome all the witnesses. I am very eager to hear what you have to say. There will be other Congressmen, four or five in number, that will testify next week, about this important subject of military and humanitarian aid to the freedom fighters in Angola.

I would just like to point out, I think we have four witnesses on one side and two on the other, so while there is a 5-minute rule, that gives 10 minutes to one side and 20 to the other. While it does not seem to be overly balanced, we hope that those on the 10-minute side will make up for the difference in quality.

The real question of the whole hearing is whether we should intervene or negotiate. Negotiations have been going on now for the past 10 years, and conditions in Angola seem to be worsening.

Mr. Chairman, Senator Steve Symms has asked me to, with unanimous consent, to submit some of his testimony for the record, because he will not be attending next week's meeting.

Mr. WOLPE. Without objection, so ordered.

[Statement of Senator Symms follows:]

STATEMENT OF HON. STEVEN D. SYMMS, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF IDAHO

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to submit testimony on the vital issue of Angola, a country that for the most part has been sorely neglected by the Congress. As the Senate sponsor of the amendment repealing the Clark restrictions on aid to UNITA, and as a one-time visitor to free Angola, to Jamba, the headquarters of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola, I believe I have some unique experience with and insight into this subject.

Today, more than ever before, the American people recognize that freedom movements are the front line in America's defense around the world against Soviet-backed aggression and interventionism. It is truly a phenomenon that the Soviets and their system of Government are being rejected and challenged by armed liberation movements in countries as far away as Afghanistan, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Angola, and as close as Nicaragua. The President and the Secretary of State have on many occasions spoken with conviction about America's solidarity with freedom movements. It is time we moved beyond rhetoric, and actively supported all of these courageous democratic resistance fighters with material assistance. Funding freedom movements is not only a moral obligation, but constitutes defense dollars wisely spent. To oppose aid to UNITA is to discredit our help to groups in other parts of the world fighting against Communist aggression, and to undermine our oft-stated commitment to democratic government.

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UNITA is an extraordinary freedom movement. It is by far the best organized, most capable, and ablest guerrilla force countering Soviet expansionism on the face of the Earth today.

The UNITA people have great respect and liking for the United States, but they cannot comprehend why America offers them no assistance. As a result of our seeming indifference to their plight and to that of similar liberation struggles, our credibility in Africa is in the balance. If America does not provide her friends who share our ideals of democratic government and respect for human rights, with the means to assure their liberties and their sovereignty, America will have no friends in Africa.

There are several points I want to stress with regard to Angola. First, U.S. policy should be emphasizing the important principles of national reconciliation, building to free and fair elections. The MPLA, Angola's Communist regime, reneged on their commitment, as formalized in the 1975 Alvor Accord, to free and fair elections. The MPLA destroyed the fragile hope of Angolan independence and replaced Portuguese rule with Soviet and Cuban colonialism, and launched the country into full-scale civil war. Over the past decade, the MPLA dictatorship has savaged the Angolan economy, has aligned itself solidly in the Soviet camp, and has embraced the oppressive rule and intolerance for individual rights commonplace to Communist governments.

Despite the recent well-publicized Soviet onslaught against UNITA, it remains a powerful force, fully capable of contending with superior Soviet weapons and numbers. It is because of UNITA that the Soviet territorial appetite for Southern Africa remains stymied in Angola. It is because of UNITA that Brezhnev's pledge—to seize the mineral treasure house of Southern Africa upon which the Industrial West depends—remains unfulfilled.

Namibia, the mineral-rich territory between Angola and South Africa, has suffered Angola-sponsored Swapo terrorist raids since the MPLA grabbed power in Angola. Namibian independence is being held hostage by the Communist government of Angola. As long as Swapo continues its terrorist strikes into Namibia, the environment for free and fair elections is impossible. Swapo's only hope for electoral victory is through voter intimidation, a tactic Robert Mugabe learned well in Zimbabwe. Until Swapo is deprived of its sanctuary, true Namibian independence remains a remote prospect. Fortunately, for innocent civilians who have been the target of Swapo terrorists, 50 percent of Swapo forces have been dedicated to fighting against UNITA troops.

Negotiations with the MPLA have proved fruitless. While the MPLA bought time to entrench itself in power over the past five years of U.S.-sponsored discussions, they offered nothing in exchange for American financial largesse. Cuban troop levels surged from 20,000 to over 35,000, and according to Secretary Shultz, Angola imported sophisticated Soviet weaponry worth over $2 billion in the past 18 months.

Castro has boasted that 200,000 of his troops have served in Angola, and he is prepared to send another 200,000. What Castro doesn't say is that his men are tired of dying on Angolan soil, and that Angola has become Cuba's Vietnam. A popular Cuban song speaks of war weariness in Angola. With UNITA controlling one-third of the country, and operating in 90 percent of Angola, it is a matter of time before the MPLA will be forced to negotiate seriously with UNITA.

America can no longer afford to entertain foolish fantasies that the MPLA can be freed from the Soviet web by Exim Bank loans (of questionable legality) and promises of diplomatic recognition. The MPLA is ideologically wed to the Soviet Union, and the only hope for a negotiated settlement is through assistance to UNITA, and a consequent negotiating position of strength. The only prospect for peace in Angola is through showing the MPLA that unless they agree to dialogue with UNITA towards national reconciliation and ultimately, elections, the United States will give full suppoprt for UNITA. As long as the MPLA rules, not through the consent of the governed, but by Cuban muscle and Soviet-supplied weapons, there will be no peace and no freedom in Angola.

I would like to request that the following articles on UNITA and the freedom revolution in Angola be added to the hearing record.

Mr. SILJANDER. And if I may, also, unanimous consent for me to place additional documents in the record.

Mr. WOLPE. Without objection.[1]

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[1] See p. 63.

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Mr. SILJANDER. Thank you.

Now, last July, as we all know, we repealed the Clark amendment after 10 years of United States ambivalence toward the Cuban occupation of Angola. And the passage of the Clark amendment showed that the Congress agreed with the Reagan doctrine of support for democratic freedom fighters throughout the whole world. Angola, as much as Afghanistan, is an example of Russian and Cuban adventurism. We all know there are between 25,000 and 45,000 Cuban troops and advisers in Angola. The Cubans are not there to fight against foreign powers, instead, the Cubans are there to defend a nonelected puppet Marxist government against the Angolan people themselves.

The Russians have never negotiated themselves out of any territory they have ever controlled anywhere in the world. Certainly Poland is one example and Afghanistan is another. After 10 years of Russian domination of Angola, particularly with the help of the Cuban troops, they have shown that they will not be interested in negotiating away Angola unless it seems to be, of course, in their best interests.

There are some who like to apologize for the Soviet adventurism. They have done it in Nicaragua, and they would do it probably if Castro invaded Florida. That is probably why Mr. Pepper is so interested and concerned about aiding UNITA.

There is an alternative to the apparent State Department position of ambivalence toward the Castro domination of Angolan people. First, we must put to rest three Marxist-inspired concepts. No. 1, the Soviets would like us to believe that the government in Angola is legitimate to begin with. In fact, there has never been an election there. The fact is, the Cubans came to Angola to prevent power sharing and the process of democracy.

Second, the Soviets would like us to believe that Cubans came to Angola to prevent South African aggression. The fact is that South Africa did not go into Angola until after the Cubans arrived.

And third, that the Soviets would like us all to believe that UNITA is a South African entity; and that aiding UNITA is somehow aiding South Africa, which is, of course, is preposterous as well.

We must show the world who Castro really is. He is a racist who is using up the lives of black Cubans in Angola in order to get hard cash from that government. Clearly aiding UNITA is supporting true African liberation.

We wonder why we have allowed ourselves to believe the Soviet-Cuban propaganda all these last 10 years. The real question, I think, is whether United States ambivalence in Angola is in fact support for a Castro government and the Soviet adventurism or not. The question is whether Cubans in Angola could be considered invitees if the government which is in power took so by force with the assistance of the Cubans, and they continue to remain there against the will of the majority of the Angolan people.

It is clear that the Cubans in Angola are as invited as the Soviets are invited in Afghanistan. The fact is we are supporting Soviet foreign policy aims in Angola, we in the United States, the State Department. The Soviets are paid in hard cash for their $2 billion in military sales, and for the care and the feeding of 45,000 Cuban

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troops and advisers. Most of that cash we can thank to Chevron's generosity.

The fact is that the United States is assisting the Soviets to remain in Angola by allowing the Eximbank to provide loans to that country and to the oil industry. The fact is the State Department has allowed this to happen and refused to classify Angola as a Communist country or even a country controlled by Castro's grip.

This committee has been concerned about the democratic process in Zaire and Liberia. The majority committee members have severely criticized those Governments and severely restricted U.S. aid. The fact is the United States has imposed sanctions against South Africa, limited assistance to Zaire, and conditionally to Liberia on the success of the recent election.

It seems that the only difference between Liberia, Zaire, and South Africa and the Cuban domination of Angola is that Liberia, Zaire, and South Africa are United States allies and Angola is Marxist. Has anyone asked why there has not been an election in Cuba since Castro took power? How about Russian democracy? South Africa does not look like such a villain after all in terms of the democratic process.

I have never heard a member of the majority party on this subcommittee call for democratic elections in Angola with such vigor and interest as in other issues, or in Mozambique, for that matter, or even raised the question why the Eximbank can freely operate in those countries.

I am not prepared to stick it to our own democratic friends while accepting, aiding, and abetting the Marxists in Angola. Why has not our Government, members of this committee, required free and fair elections in Angola, the removal of foreign powers from Angola, and a government of popular consent in Angola?

Jonas Savimbi, I believe, is a true liberation fighter, and he deserves U.S. support, and the Congress has agreed to that by repealing the Clark amendment. Two weeks ago, our colleagues, Senator Claude Pepper and Congressman Jack Kemp, in a bipartisan fashion, introduced legislation to provide humanitarian aid to UNITA. I have introduced a bill today for military aid in the same amount of money, $27 million, a bipartisan bill with over 41 cosponsors in less than 1 day.

Bill McCollum, our other colleague, has introduced legislation that would put restrictions on new investment and other Commercial activities in Angola. It would also require, thank goodness, that the State Department classify Angola, as it should, as a Communist-controlled government.

As long as we do not have a military option, Angola will remain a Cuban colony. Freedom in Africa will never be a reality. America, has a historical sympathy for freedom. America, therefore, must provide military and humanitarian assistance to UNITA.

I hope, Mr. Chairman, that this subcommittee will allow the full House to decide its position. Let's decide whether or not America will stand and support our allies, support freedom fighters in the southern African region, or whether we choose the road, as we have in the last 10 years, of seemingly total ambivalence.

Mr. WOLPE. Thank you, Mr. Siljander.

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I now would like to move to our panel of witnesses, and invite as our first witness Ambassador Newsom.

STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID D. NEWSOM, ASSOCIATE DEAN, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY, AND FORMER UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

Mr. NEWSOM. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee.

As I mentioned to Mr. Weissman, I have to leave at 3:30, so if I slip out, it will not be through any desire to avoid debate.

I have serious doubts about the wisdom of this country's providing assistance, whether overt humanitarian aid or covert military aid, to the UNITA movement in Angola.

First, I have spent 35 years in government and much of that time I've been disturbed by our unwillingness to face hard questions when we are going into an issue that has rhetorical appeal, and in this case I think we are up against another situation in which our objectives, if we do proceed, are not at all clear.

If we do support Savimbi what is our long-term objective. Is it to overthrow the current regime in Luanda and put Savimbi in power? Even if that is a desirable objective, are we prepared to undertake the kind of sustained support necessary?

Is our public prepared to support our involvement in what could be a prolonged confrontation of powers in that area, or is it our aim to keep the movement alive with the hope that we can ultimately force negotiations between Savimbi and the government in Luanda?

I fail to find anyone whom I value as an expert on this subject who feels that we can achieve that result. There are those who feel our support for Savimbi makes that result less rather than more likely.

I've seen recent suggestions that a vote to support Savimbi would be a good bargaining chip for us with the Soviets. When people suggest this I feel they never asked the other side of the question. If we're going to negotiate Third World conflicts with the Soviet Union what are we prepared to give up in the way of military assistance, facilities, and other support we give our friends.

The Soviets, even if they agree that negotiation of such conflicts is a valid super power subject, which they are often reluctant to do, seldom give away anything for nothing.

My second reason is that we have little support for help to Savimbi among the other black nations in that part of Africa. My recollection is that when Savimbi's movement first appeared there was broad support among black African nations. That quickly dissipated when the degree of South African support was revealed.

Whatever the truth about the South African relationship, and truth is hard to find, the fact is that in black Africa Savimbi's a politically tainted movement. Given the disarray and internal problems of the black nations of the southern region some Americans believe it is not important to pay attention to their views.

I happen to believe that we cannot in such situations ignore the prevailing attitudes of the region.

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We have made mistakes in Africa before, believing that we could support movements attractive to us, ignoring how the nations of the region felt. I was involved in African affairs during both the Katanga secession under Tshombe and the Nigerian civil war.

In both cases many in this country were persuaded to support movements against the tide of black African opinion by effective public relations campaigns and by leaders who said the things we wanted to hear. Both efforts failed.

Today, at a time of turmoil in South Africa, when the future of that entire region is so uncertain, I feel it is more important than ever that we look at what the overall affect on our position in the region is likely to be.

What kind of signals are we giving? What kind of identification are we creating if at the critical moment—at this critical moment in the history of the region we take a step that will be widely interpreted in the area as being on South Africa's side and as accepting that nation's view of the future of the region?

Third, I don't believe we have a consensus in this country for support to Savimbi. In the present atmosphere in the United States there may well be enough votes in the Congress to pass a measure that would provide some form of help. But, the list is long and may grow longer of those gestures that we have made in our foreign affairs on the basis of a simplified polarized view of a complex regional problem.

In many of these cases we have not been able to sustain the support of those we are trying to help. We have as a result left many people to cruel and uncertain fates, and I've had to deal with some of them.

We have sustained a strong effort in Afghanistan because there is a broad national consensus for such support, but I don't believe, particularly given the South African connection, that that degree of support exists for helping Savimbi.

We should not start an effort about which many in this country have serious misgivings, even if to some others the idea has merit.

I can well understand the feelings of those who want to help Savimbi. I am as frustrated as they by the fact that the Soviets seem to be able to help their friends and we do not. I am frequently disturbed, Mr. Chairman, by the implications sometimes that those who see another path to reducing Soviet influence in that part of Africa are somehow soft on the Soviets.

The story of our relationship to Angola goes back well before independence. For valid national security reasons we chose not to give strong support to any of the liberation movements in Portugese Africa with the very modest exception of Holden Roberto.

The Soviets and the Cubans had their opportunity because of decisions that we made many years ago. They benefited as we did not from the perception that they were on the side of an African consensus. In my view, we cannot fly in the face of that consensus and be successful.

The way this administration and previous ones have chosen to deal with the problem of the Cuban and Soviet influence in Angola is through strong and continuing and international efforts to resolve the broader regional question based on the future of Namibia.

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This is a compiex problem. The approach to it is time consuming, but I see little alternative to continuing this path.

To add to our complicated involvement in this area, the burden of a closer official identification with UNITA would, it seems to me, not further the only process by which our position can be preserved and that of our adversaries reduced.

Thank you.

[Mr. Newsom's prepared statement follows:]

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PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID D. NEWSOM, FORMER UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee:

I accepted the invitation of your sub-committee to appear here today because, as a citizen and taxpayer, I do not wish to see this country make mistakes. We have made too many.

For thirty-five years, I was a member of the United States Foreign Service. Much of that time was spent in active involvement in this nation's relations with Third World countries. In many of the countries in which I served, we faced the issues of how to deal with impending political change and with leftist and revolutionary movements that threatened our interests. During the first Nixon administration, I was assistant secretary of state for African affairs. I am, therefore, not unfamiliar with the question of the future of Angola.

I understand that the issue before your committee at the present time is the possibility, following the repeal of the Clark amendment, of some form of assistance to Savimbi's UNITA movement. For three reasons, I have serious doubts about the wisdom of this country's providing such assistance, whether overt humanitarian aid or covert military aid.

First, I do not believe our objectives are clear. When our objectives are not clear, we open the way to uncertain and continually controversial involvement.

Is it our aim to overthrow the current regime in Luanda and put Savimbi in power? Even if that is a desirable objective, are

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we prepared to undertake the kind of sustained support necessary? Is our public prepared to support our involvement in what could be a prolonged confrontation of powers in that area?

Or is it our aim to keep the movement alive with the hope that we can ultimately force negotiations between Savimbi and the government in Luanda? I fail to find anyone whom I value as an expert on this subject who feels that we can achieve that result; there are those who feel our support for Savimbi makes that result less , rather than more, likely.

Some suggest that a vote to support Savimbi would be a good bargaining chip for us with the Soviets - possibly at the summit meeting. When people suggest this, I feel that they never ask the other side of that question. If we are going to negotiate Third World conflicts with the Soviet Union, what are we prepared to give up in the way of military assistance, facilities, and other support we give our friends? The Soviets, even if they agree that the negotiation of such conflicts is a valid superpower subject, seldom give anything away for nothing.

Second, we have little support for help to Savimbi among the other black nations in that part of Africa. My recollection is that, when Savimbi's movement first appeared, there was support among other neighboring nations. That quickly dissipated when the degree of South African support was revealed. Whatever the truth about the South African relationship - and truth is hard to find - the fact is that in black Africa, Savimbi's is a politically tainted movement. Given the disarray and internal problems

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of the black nations of the southern region, some Americans believe it is not important to pay attention to their views. I happen to believe that we cannot, in such situations, ignore the pervailing attitudes of the region.

We have made mistakes before, believing that we could support movements attractive to us , ignoring how the nations of the region felt. I was involved in African affairs during both the Katanga secession under Tshombe and the Nigerian civil war and Biafra. In both cases, many in this country were persuaded to support movements against the tide of black African opinion by effective public relations campaigns and by leaders who said the things we wanted to hear. Both efforts failed. Had we listened to some of the more ardent supporters of either Katanga or Biafra our position in Africa would have been more damaged than it was.

Today, at a time of turmoil in South Africa, when the future of that entire region is so uncertain, I feel it is more important than ever that we look at what the overall effect on our position in the region is likely to be. What kind of signals are we giving, what kind of identification are we creating if, at this critical movement in the history of the region, we take a step that will be widely interpreted in the area as being on South Africa's side and as accepting that nation's view of the future of the region?

Third, we do not have a consensus in this country for support to Savimbi. In the present atmosphere in this country,

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there may be enough votes in the Congress to pass a measure that would provide some form of help. The list is long, however, and may grow longer, of those gestures we have made in our foreign affairs on the basis of a simplified, polarized view of a complex regional problem. In many of these cases we have not been able to sustain the support of those we were trying to help. We have, as a result, left many people to uncertain and often cruel fates. I am concious, in such cases, of the responsibilities we undertake to the men that are doing the fighting, to those that are making the sacrifices. We have demonstrated, in Viet Nam, if nowhere else, that when there is not a broad national consensus for a prolonged struggle we leave a lot of brave people stranded. I have had to deal with many of those we have left stranded; I do not want to see the number increased.

We have sustained a strong effort in Afghanistan because there is a broad national consensus for such support. I do not believe, particularly given the South African connection, that that degree of support exists for helping Savimbi. We should not start an effort about which many in this country have serious misgivings, even if, to some others, the idea has merit. The continuing public and Congressional debate that results often serves only to undermine other efforts in a region.

I can well understand the feelings of those who want to help Savimbi. I am as frustrated as they by the fact that the Soviets seem to be able to help their friends and we do not. Yet the story of our relationship to Angola goes back well before

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independence. For valid national security reasons we chose not to give strong support to any of the liberation movements in Portugese Africa. The Soviets and the Cubans had their opportunity because of decisions we made several years ago. They benefitted, as we did not, from the perception that they were on the side of an African consensus. In my view, we cannot fly in the face of that consensus and be successful as we try to regain lost ground.

The way this administration and previous ones have chosen to deal with the problem of the Cuban and Soviet influence in Angola is through strong efforts to resolve the broader regional question based on the future of Namibia. This is a complex problem. The approach to it is time consuming. I see little alternative to continuing this path. To add to our complicated involvement in this area the burden of a closer official identification with UNITA would, it seems to me, not further the only process by which our position can be preserved and that of our adversaries reduced.

Mr. WOLPE. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador.

Now I would like to invite Mr. Stuart Tucker to read Mr. Robert Johnson's statement.

STATEMENT OF ROBERT H. JOHNSON, FORMER NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL STAFF IN EISENHOWER, KENNEDY, AND JOHNSON ADMINISTRATIONS, PRESENTED BY STUART TUCKER

Mr. TUCKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I apologize for Dr. Johnson's inability to be here, and I'd like to read verbatim his statement for you.

I believe that it would be a bad mistake for the United States to resume support for the UNITA forces led by Jonas Savimbi and backed by the Government of South Africa.

First of all, some would argue that such action will demonstrate the credibility of American resolve. The credibility argument is one of several arguments regularly employed by U.S. administrations to give significance to conflicts in the areas of the globe which have little or no significance to American interests.

It was Henry Kissinger's central argument, that is the credibility argument, for continued United States involvement in Angola in 1975. In this perspective every Third World conflict involving the Soviet Union tests our willingness to respond to Soviet threats in

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areas that are of undoubted importance, such as Western Europe and Japan.

Every American interests and commitment is thus linked to every other. Careful examination of United States interests in Angola is thereby avoided. Moreover the credibility argument, since it involves estimates of the perceptions of others, is a wholly subjective argument which cannot be proven or disproven.

Since the Soviets and Cubans have regularly demonstrated a willingness to match any escalation by others of the conflict in Angola, and since it seems unlikely that the public and Congress will support continuously expanding United States involvement there, it is not a test of our resolve we should seek. It is more likely to weaken rather than strengthen U.S. credibility.

Second, as Secretary Kissinger seemed to recognize in 1975, Angola has almost no independent strategic significance for the United States. The principal significance of the war in Angola is that it takes place against the backdrop of the larger conflict over the future of southern Africa—a conflict which is not primarily between East and West but between white-ruled South Africa and black-ruled sub-Saharan Africa.

If that larger conflict adversely affects important United States interests, it will be because the United States policies leave the United States on the South African side at its end. While developments in Angola are not likely in themselves to have a significant impact on the outcome of that large a struggle, intervention in support of Savimbi would clearly identify the United States with the South African side.

Third, it has been the central United States objective in Angola to secure the removal of Soviet military advisers and Cuban troops which are there primarily to deal with continuing military threats from South Africa and UNITA.

To intervene to support UNITA is to undermine the effort—that effort by reinforcing a justification for continued presence of the Soviet and Cuban military personnel.

The current discussion of Angola is, of course, taking place in the larger context of proposals that the United States back military oppositions of Maxist-Leninist governments in the Third World all around the globe. The President seems to endorse such a policy in his recent U.N. speech.

It may help to put the Angolan problem in perspective if we view it against the backdrop of a critique of these proposals for wider involvement in Third World conflicts. I see many difficulties with such an approach.

First, we attach too much significance to political labels. So-called Marxist-Leninist regimes come in many varieties. Consider the case of Mozambique. The Frelimo regime there calls itself "Marxist-Leninist," but Mozambique was not on the President's list in his U.N. speech of countries to be liberated.

The reason is obvious. The pragmatic leadership of that country is seeking connections with the West and is encouraging private enterprise and private investment. Also, Savimbi called himself a Maoist when he was receiving aid from the Chinese, so his identification is somewhat murky as well.

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But, does anyone attach importance to that label now? Perhaps, perhaps not.

Second, it is a central purpose of all Third World regimes to maximize their autonomy and independence. Even Marxist regimes, when they are no longer dependent upon the Soviet Union for protection against internal and external enemies, typically seek to balance their international relationships by an opening to the West.

The regime in Angola has demonstrated such tendencies, but is inhibited from moving very far by its continuing dependence upon the Soviet and Cuban military.

Third, a difficulty with such a policy is that our objectives do not necessarily coincide with the objectives of anti-Communist insurgent movements. Our aid does not give us a capacity to determine political outcomes.

In Nicaragua the administration hopes that the contras, should they come to power, will establish a democratic regime, but given the history and social structure of Nicaragua, that is very probably a vain hope.

Similarly, we often use others to achieve our goals with little regard for their goals. Often the United States objective, as in Kampuchea and Afghanistan, seems to be primarily to harass the enemy regime. The insurgents, however, want to win. Our aid may affect their calculations, making them less willing to compromise, but we are not prepared to give them the kind of aid that might permit them to achieve power.

Fourth, our objectives change. We may settle for a compromise outcome or may decide to give up the struggle, abandoning those who have staked their lives and their political futures on our support.

And, the fifth problem with this sort of policy is that I believe we are sometimes too much influenced by our successes in the 1950's when our covert operations managed to topple the Mosadegh regime in Iran and the Arbenz regime in Guatemala.

This perspective neglects the failures of the 1950's, as when we supported the Outer Island rebels in Indonesia.

Moreover, many regimes are probably better rooted in their societies now than they were in the fifties, and Soviet assistance to regimes under attack is much more of a factor at present than it was earlier. We would not have a free hand.

There is a Messianic strain in American foreign policy. We have often sought to remake other societies in our own imagine, to convert them into open societies with a capitalist economy. It seems to me that that is the general thrust of the President's speech. However, it fails to recognize the limits of American power.

[Mr. Johnson's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROBERT H. JOHNSON, FORMER NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL STAFF

My name is Robert Johnson. I am a Visiting Fellow at the Overseas Development Council and Harvey Picker Professor of International Relations, Emeritus, at Colgate University. I was, in the 1950s and 1960s, a Member of the National Security Council Staff and of the State Department's Policy Planning Council.

I am not an African expert. I have, however, been doing some research on U.S. policy on Third World conflicts involving the Soviet Union.

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I believe that it would be a bad mistake for the United States to resume support for the UNITA forces led by Jonas Savimbi and backed by the Government of South Africa.

1. Some would argue that such action will demonstrate the credibility of American resolve. The credibility argument is one of several arguments regularly employed by U.S. administrations to give significance to conflicts in areas of the globe which have little or no intrinsic strategic significance. It was Henry Kissinger's central argument for continued U.S. involvement in Angola in 1975. In this perspective every Third World conflict involving the Soviet Union tests our willingness to respond to Soviet threats in areas that are of undoubted importance to us such as Western Europe and Japan or possible future nuclear confrontations. Every American interest and commitment is thus linked to every other. Careful examination of U.S. interests in Angola is thereby avoided. Moreover the credibility argument, since it involves estimates of the perceptions of others, is a wholly subjective argument which cannot be proven or disproven.

Since the Soviets and Cubans have regularly demonstrated a willingness to match any escalation by others of the conflict in Angola, and since it seems unlikely that the public or Congress will support continuously expanding U.S. involvement there, it is not a test of our resolve that we should seek. It is more likely to weaken than to strengthen U.S. credibility.

2. As Secretary Kissinger seemed to recognize in 1975, Angola has almost no independent strategic significance for the United States. The principal significant of the war in Angola is that it takes place against the backdrop of the larger conflict over the future of Southern Africa—a conflict that is not primarily between East and West but between white-ruled South Africa and black-ruled Sub-Saharan Africa. If that larger conflict adversely affects important U.S. interests, it will be because U.S. policies leave the United States on the South African side at its end. While development in Angola are not likely in themselves to have a significant impact on the outcome of that large struggle, in intervention in support of Savimbi would clearly identify the United States with the South African side.

3. It has been the central U.S. objective in Angola to secure the removal of Soviet military advisers and Cuban troops which are there primarily to deal with continuing military threats from South Africa and UNITA. To intervene in support of UNITA is to undermine that effort by reinforcing the justification for the continued presence of Soviet and Cuban military personnel.

The current discussion of Angola is, of course, taking place in the larger context of proposals that the United States back military oppositions to Marxist-Leninist governments in the Third World all around the globe. The President seemed to endorse such a policy in his recent United Nations speech. It may help put the Angolan problem in perspective to view it against the backdrop of a critique of these proposals for wider involvement in Third World conflicts. I see many difficulties with such a policy.

1. We attach too much significance to political labels. So-called Marxist-Leninist regimes come in many varieties. Consider the case of Mozambique. The Frelimo regime there calls itself "Marxist-Leninist", but Mozambique was not on the President's list, in his UN speech, of countries to be liberated. The reason is obvious—the pragmatic leadership of that country is seeking connections with the West and is encouraging private enterprise and private investment. When Savimbi was receiving aid from the Chinese, he called himself a "Maoist." But does anyone attach any importance to that label now?

2. It is a central purpose of all Third World regimes to maximize their autonomy and independence. Even Marxist regimes, when they are no longer dependent upon the Soviet Union for protection against internal and external enemies, typically seek to balance their international relationships by an opening to the West. The regime in Angola has demonstrated such tendencies, but is inhibited from moving very far by its continuing dependence upon the Soviet and Cuban military.

3. A third difficulty with such a policy is that our objectives do not necessarily coincide with the objectives of anti-Communist insurgent movements. Our aid does not give us the capacity to determine political outcomes. In Nicaragua, the administration hopes the "contras", should they come to power, will establish a democratic regime, but given the history and social structure of Nicaragua, that is very probably a vain hope.

Similarly, we often use others to achieve our goals with little regard for their goals. Often the U.S. objective—as in Kampuchea and Afghanistan—seems to be primarily to harass the enemy regime. The insurgents, however, want to win. Our aid may affect their calculations, making them less willing to compromise, but we are not prepared to give them the kind of aid that might permit them to achieve power.

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4. Our objectives can changes. We may settle for a compromise outcome or may decide to give up the struggle, abandoning those who have staked their lives and their political futures on our support.

5. Finally, I believe that we are sometimes too much influenced by our "successes" in the 1950s when covert operations managed to topple the Mosadegh regime in Iran and the Arbenz regime in Guatemala. This perspective neglects the failures of the 1950s—as when we supported the Outer Island rebels in Indonesia. Moreover, many regimes are probably better rooted in their societies now than in the fifties. And Soviet assistance to regimes under attack is much more of a factor at present than earlier.

There is a Messianic strain in American foreign policy. We have often sought to remake other societies in our own image—to covert them into open societies with a capitalist economy. It seems to me that that is the general thrust of the President's speech. It fails to recognize the limits of American power.

Mr. WOLPE. Thank you very much.

I'm trying to be a little bit lenient with the 5-minute timeframe, but please try to keep your remarks to 5 minutes.

I thank you very much, Mr. Johnson.

Mr. Bissell.

STATEMENT OF RICHARD E. BISSELL, EXECUTIVE EDITOR, THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, ADJUNCT PROFESSOR OF GOVERNMENT, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY

Mr. BISSELL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Let me associate myself with some of your opening comments to the extent that this is a complex issue.

Mr. WOLPE. Is your microphone on, Mr. Bissell?

Mr. BISSELL. I think it may not be. I think extended discussion would be very helpful, and let me say I'm boiling down a relatively long statement in terms of 5 minutes. I hope people will have a chance to read the longer statement.

The challenge for United States policy toward Angola today is to deal with the current realities of that troubled country, and the changes and regional conflict issues that inevitably intrude on Angolan politics.

From my perspective, internally generated interests and political negotiations on both the MPLA and the UNITA side are at a relative high now. The failure of military offenses by both UNITA and the MPLA in the last year has created an opportunity for conciliations on both sides within Angola and could help to steer events in a more positive direction.

Where stands the regional context? The negotiations on Namibia—the principal regional complication for Angola—have reached a standstill. The admirable effort by this administration over the last 5 years to bring the relevant parties to an agreement on Namibia has, unfortunately, been undermined by events.

The continuing weakness of the MPLA regime in Luanda has been one hazard to those neogitiations; the durability of the UNITA movement has complicated prospective withdrawal of Cuban forces from the area; and the recent weakening of the South African Government from internal rioting has removed the other leg supporting Namibia negotiations.

In those circumstances, it is time to shift the focus of constructive engagement from Namibia and its problems to Angola's desperate need for political problems to reconciliation.

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It seems to me it is also time for the U.S. Government to provide aid to UNITA. Many people find this an unfashionable thought, mistakenly believing that aid to insurgents universally encourages wars. For Angola, a better case can be made that aid to UNITA is the pathway to a lasting peace.

The challenge is to wean both UNITA and the MPLA from their principal patrons. Yet, to date, the United States talks primarily about weaning the MPLA from its political course. That is understandable. The 35,000 Cuban troops in the country greatly outweigh the force of last resort provided by the South Africa's UNITA, but it fails to take into account UNITA's distrust of the negotiation process to date.

To be fairhanded, the United States should be providing aid to UNITA in order to wean Savimbi from his ties with South Africa and in some small way to balance the billion dollar Chevron subsidy to the MPLA.

When both tracks—with the MPLA and UNITA—have been successful, the United States will be in a position to encourage the factions for conciliation on both sides willing to discuss seriously a coalition government.

This path to peace is strewn with certain hazards that I would like to point out in shorthand.

First, the United States needs to avoid misunderstandings by both UNITA and the MPLA of its purposes. For that reason I urge that aid be made as transparent as possible and be overt.

Second, the mutual hostage relationship between Namibia and Angola may jeopardize efforts in Angola. For that reason, the reinforcement of the Lusaka agreement of February 1984 is essential.

Third, the interests of the Cubans in the Angolan civil war have never been clear. We don't know, for instance, to what extent the Cubans may encourage the intransigence of the ideological faction of the MPLA.

And, fourth, the staying power of the American people and its political leadership on African issues must be monitored and encouraged.

This educational hearing on Angola that you've convened today is an important step in that process and I congratulate the subcommittee for holding it.

[Mr. Bissell's prepared statement follows:]

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PREPARED STATEMENT OF RICHARD E. BISSELL, EXECUTIVE EDITOR, THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, ADJUNCT PROFESSOR OF GOVERNMENT, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY

The subject of the hearing today before this committee is Angola. And it is a poignant time to hold such hearings, with the tenth anniversary of that country's nominal independence to be celebrated on the 11th of November. But as all of us in this room know, Angola is today neither one country nor politically independent of regional and global forces. What should interest us is the extent to which those forces are changing, and the prospects for Angola also changing. Angola, in that context, is at a watershed, and the United States would do well to reconsider where its policy has been for the last decade, and the prospects for seizing the current opportunity in southern Africa.

Let me say by way of preface that, while it is likely that Angola is at a major historical decision point, I do not believe that the tragic problems afflicting Angola will be settled easily and quickly. And the United States is not going to be the principal agent in solving Angola's problems. In fact, it may be more important to ensure that the United States does not inadvertently get in the way of peace and political freedom for Angola. We frequently misunderstand our influence on smaller, less powerful countries, in some aspects overestimating our influence and in other aspects underestimating it. In a country as far away from the U.S. as Angola is, we are prey to miscalculations of our influence, and need to remind ourselves of

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the primary role played by the people of Angola in whatever outcome develops over the coming years.

In this statement, let me address three issues: (1) where U.S.-Angolan relations stand today; (2) some opportunities for improvements in that relationship and achieving the goals of peace, economic development, and political progress that we all share; and (3) some longterm issues that we need to keep in sight as we move down new policy roads.

I see Angola at a watershed for a number of reasons, which in turn comprise only a few of the deciding factors of the Angolan dilemma. In the narrowest context, Angola has, in the last twelve months, witnessed very substantial challenges for supremacy by both UNITA and the MPLA. The summer offensive by UNITA gained much ground, capping several years' expansion, but did not demonstrate the ability of Jonas Savimbi's to establish governance unilaterally over the entire country. The recent offensive by the MPLA was also blocked, leaving the country divided much as it has been for the last decade. Angola cannot forever live divided in this way, and yet I think it manifest that any attempt by either party to achieve unilateral control will be resisted by a combination of internal and external forces. We know from informal discussions with both sides that there are substantial "peace parties" in both the MPLA and UNITA. Their factional strength varies over time, but it should be understood that the study of civil wars shows a pattern of pressure for negotiations growing in the wake of failed offensives. One would expect to find, and I generally find it confirmed in conversations, that the opportunity to capitalize on

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internally-generated interest in political negotiations is at a relative height now. When such interest has emerged in the past -- as I think all of us know -- it has failed to reach fruition owing to internal ideological extremism or external pressures on the fragile Angolan political situation.

Where stands the regional context, then, and what are its implications for Angola? The negotiations over Namibia -- the principal regional complication for Angola -- have reached a standstill. The admirable effort by this Administration over the last five years to bring the relevant parties to an agreement on Namibia has, unfortunately, been undermined by events. The continuing weakness of the MPLA regime in Luanda has been one hazard to those negotiations; the durability of the UNITA movement has complicated prospective withdrawal of Cuban forces from the area; and the recent weakening of the South African government from internal rioting has removed the other leg supporting Namibia negotiations. In those circumstances, I can only foresee a hardening of negotiating positions behind a facade of willingness to talk. At the same time, political realities tell us that Namibia remains related to Angola's future: for example, in the sanctuary granted to SWAPO's military forces in southern Angola.

I would suggest that Namibia remains related to Angola in several ways, not only in the ways generally accepted as conventional wisdom by the analytical community, but perhaps in other aspects as well. Certain assumptions that affect the strategic approaches of the various regional powers ought to be

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reconsidered:

o On the South African side, there is a ready assumption that a UNITA government in Luanda would be cooperative in eliminating the SWAPO presence from Angola. I doubt that, if only for any Angolan government's wish to enhance its legitimacy with other African states; among the political ikons of African political organizations is the rightful role of SWAPO as inheritor of Namibia.

o On the Angolan side, there is a presumption that South Africa has a long-run interest in overthrowing the MPLA, and installing UNITA in power. I think it more likely that South Africa wants to establish the right to attack SWAPO in the entire range of operational territory (including areas in southern Angola where SWAPO camps are located); elements of this view were codified in the Lusaka agreement of February 1984. South Africa also sees a certain beneficial interest in maintaining the civil war in Angola, and thereby reducing the power potential of the "front line states." But the actual overthrow of the MPLA as a result of visible South African efforts is a Cecil Rhodes-like gesture that has relatively few followers in South Africa today. After all, responsibility is the uncomfortable corollary of control -- as South Africa has discovered in Namibia.

o Contrary to the assumptions of many American observers, neither UNITA nor South Africa want to create a South Africa-UNITA-United States alliance. UNITA is fundamentally a populist movement that takes assistance from the most respectable sources available; its track record since the early 1970s in this regard is plain. For South Africa, much of its behavior (as opposed to

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words) in recent years has tried to establish ill will between UNITA and the United States, and thereby further UNITA's dependence on South Africa. The various attacks on American-owned and operated oil installations, for instance, are as plausibly understood as attacks on the United States -- with enough evidence scattered to implicate UNITA -- as much as attacks on the MPLA.

For the U.S. relationship with Angola, the current policy path is not likely to fulfill the promise of "constructive engagement." The distrust of the United States by UNITA ensures that Savimbi will be reluctant to enter into negotiations. And the even more fundamental distrust of the United States by the MPLA -- whose leadership cannot believe that the United States is not covertly involved with UNITA -- has meant that the United States is in danger of squandering its limited influence with the Angolan factions.

Some tentative suggestions for accomplishing U.S. policy goals in Angola would be along the following lines:

o If anything, the United States would gain with both sides in Angola with policies that were more transparent. The distrust of both UNITA and the MPLA towards external forces results in highly distorted views of the world. The rhetoric of both sides is not conducive to a political settlement, and enhances the ability of external forces such as the Cubans to play on the fears of political leaders. The United States generally conducts the most open (whether deliberate or leaked) foreign policy of any country in the world, and would contribute to a more trustful environment

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if it were active between Angolan factions.

o It is also time for the U.S. government to provide aid to UNITA. Many people find this an unfashionable thought, mistakenly believing that aid to insurgents universally encourages wars. For Angola, a better case can be made that aid to UNITA is the pathway to a lasting peace.

The challenge is to wean both UNITA and the MPLA from their respective patrons. Yet to date, the U.S. talks primarily about weaning the MPLA from its political course. That is understandable -- the 35,000 Cuban troops in the country greatly outweigh the "force of last resort" provided by the South Africans to UNITA -- but fails to take into account UNITA's distrust of the negotiation process to date. To be fair-handed, the U.S. should be providing aid to UNITA, in order to wean Savimbi from his ties with South Africa, and in some small way, to balance the billion-dollar Chevron subsidy to the MPLA. When both tracks -- with the MPLA and UNITA -- have been successful, we shall be in a position to encourage the factions for conciliation on both sides willing to discuss seriously a coalition government.

o We have to rethink the peace process in Angola. I see it as the establishment of trust between ethnic and nationalist groups that have been at odds throughout recent history. Peace will involve the construction of a new political system, a set of careful steps meant to gradually introduce more open modes of governing. It may even involve the devolution of some powers from a potentially-dictatorial central government to the various "nations" that comprise Angola.

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o An essential theme of the peace process will have to be the removal of ALL foreign troops from Angola. Mutual trust will have to mean the elimination of Warsaw Pact and Cuban force deployments from the MPLA side, and the elimination of South African forces from support of UNITA. Each can be weaned; Washington knows that from conversations with sensible individuals on each side. But the U.S. will have to move to establish more tangible and transparent ties with UNITA for it to be accomplished.

What kind and how much aid are we talking about? Not much. From UNITA's point of view, the amount and cost of military assistance is not a big issue. Its side of the war is not generally fought with great expenditures of hardware; much of UNITA's military supplies are captured from the MPLA. And what has to be supplied from elsewhere could be purchased from the trickles of foreign currency reaching UNITA. The U.S. may be able to supply some defensive military needs, but it should be primarily in the business of social/economic aid.

UNITA has major needs, for instance, in the educational area: not only assistance for the primary education of young people in the UNITA-governed areas, but also support for advanced training in the U.S. and abroad. In the peace process, as a military truce takes hold, the economy will need to be placed back on the development path. And needs are great in the health and nutrition areas, where the U.S. can be enormously helpful.

The proposal to aid UNITA encounters great skepticism. The State Department is clearly hesitant to get involved, seeing a

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greater likelihood of complicating the Namibian negotiations rather than simplifying them. Others who have spent much time on the Angolan issue are doubtful that shared power can ever be achieved in such a poisoned environment. Some who pander to public oversimplications allege that the U.S. would thereby create an "unholy alliance" with South Africa. And others see a "meddling" American hand; but would they prefer the current hands fanning conflict in Angola? I have tried to address aspects of those concerns about U.S. aid to UNITA in this statement.

As we head U.S. policy into uncharted waters, what will be the shoals on which it may perish? What are the long-term issues to keep in mind?

First, the injection of new U.S. initiatives should not fall prey to misunderstanding; such was my reason for transparency in the aid effort -- conducted through the Agency for International Development, the Department of State, or the National Endowment for Democracy. The United States should find it feasible to work with whatever government emerges from a peace process in Angola, so long as it fulfills basic requirements of democratic participation, tolerance for the human diversity that characterizes Angola, and a capacity to enter into international negotiations with an expectation of carrying them out. If Angolans perceive the U.S. to be interested in their country solely for short-term negotiating advantage rather than the long-term development of their country, the trust will be lost.

Second, the mutual hostage relationship between Namibia and Angola can jeopardize efforts in Angola. To date, the civil war in Angola has been a major factor preventing further progress in

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Namibian negotiations. One has to be careful not to let the reverse take hold: problems in Namibia could sabotage progress in Angola. But, if the essential elements of the Lusaka Agreement can be strengthened, the basis for progress in Angola should be established.

Third, the interests of the Cubans in the Angolan civil war have never been made clear. The lack of transparency on their side feeds suspicions that Castro's motives are not as charitable as they are sometimes presented. The addiction of Cuban fiscal planners to the annual massive hard-currency infusion -- payment for the 35,000 man Cuban foreign legion -- must be considerable after ten years. And the desire to redeem the unfulfilled domestic Cuban revolution through overseas legitimation appears to be strong, whether in Grenada or Angola. The question then inevitably arises in any such peace process: to what extent will the Cubans encourage the intransigence of the ideological faction in the MPLA?

Lastly, the staying power of the American people and its political leadership on African issues must be monitored and encouraged. Distant places attract only occasional attention, and tend to fall prey to very narrow, special interest groups. Inconsistency becomes the hallmark of policy, and Africans suffer as much as U.S. national interests. It is time to change focus in southern Africa, in the context of a broad strategy that advances the interests of Africans and Americans alike. This educational hearing on Angola is an important step in that process, and I congratulate the subcommittee for holding it.

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Mr. WOLPE. Thank you, Mr. Bissell.
Mr. Robinson. Randall Robinson of TransAfrica.

STATEMENT OF RANDALL ROBINSON, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF TRANSAFRICA

Mr. ROBINSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

TransAfrica believes strongly that any United States aid to UNITA would not only alienate the peoples of Angola, southern Africa, and the rest of the African Continent, but more importantly will adversely affect America's image, interest, and stated objectives in the area. The many reasons for these—for this include the following:

First, and most important, aid to UNITA is aid to South Africa. We must understand clearly that these current attempts to shore up UNITA are merely the latest effort to weaken our opposition to partheid. UNITA and the current war in Angola are very much the creations of the apartheid government in South Africa. But for Pretoria's advice, military supplies and intelligence, South African officers, troops, and equipment, UNITA would cease to be a credible threat. Angola would then be at peace, devoting its resources to the difficult task of improving the lives of its people. This fact is clearly understood in all of Africa. For the United States to aid UNITA, therefore, would be to support apartheid militarily and to join in Pretoria's policy of external aggression and destabilization as a strategy for protecting apartheid.

Such a development would not be lost on the African nations. I need hardly point out the damage that this perception would do to the United States—to the United States image and interest in Africa, and indeed, to the rest of the world.

Second, aid to UNITA would constitute an extremely defective policy. It would not advance United States regional objectives. On the contrary, it will damage American interest. Moreover, there are available better options for the United States to advance its regional and African policy.

The objectives of the United States policy in southern Africa have been identified to include reducing Soviet influence, promoting regional peace, securing Namibian independence and affecting the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola.

Aid to UNITA would not advance any of these four policy objectives. On the contrary, it will set us back on each count. It will enhance Soviet influence by making the Angolan Government more dependent on Moscow for military supplies and advice. It will escalate the war in southern Angola. It will delay even further any meaningful progress toward Namibia's independence and it will insure that Cuban troops stay much longer to help Luanda protect its territorial integrity.

Rather than aiding an apartheid surrogate that is terrorizing Angolans and foreigners, including Americans alike, the United States should enhance its regional interests by expanding the economic ties with Angola, by intensifying the negotiations concerning the Cuban troops and Namibian independence, and by eventually establishing diplomatic relations between Washington and Luanda.

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United States economic ties with Angola already are substantial. Today Angola is the fourth largest United States trading partner in sub-Saharan Africa despite the lack of diplomatic relations.

American investment in Angola is large. America citizens operate the United States-owned installations that dominate Angola's oil industry. Significant quantities of United States oil supplies come from the Chevron activities or operations in Angola.

Moreover, Angola has consistently tried to improve relations with the United States. Last year Angola offered a phased withdrawal of Cuban troops. Last month Luanda reopened negotiations over the troops and Namibian independence questions, and just last week Angolan President dos Santos offered to improve ties with the United States when he met in New York with Under Secretary Armacost and Assistant Secretary Crocker.

Significantly, it is apartheid South Africa that has always attemped to wreck United States-Angolan relations directly or indirectly through UNITA. South Africa has reneged on the United States-brokered Lusaka agreement which required Pretoria to withdraw its troops from Angola. It has invaded Angola several times. It engineered UNITA's terrorist bombing of Huambo. In April 1984 a UNITA jeep loaded with explosives destroyed a seven-story office building in Huambo in central Angola. Some estimates put casualties at 200 killed. UNITA has sent commandos after American installations and citizens in northern Angola.

South African officers—troops and air force—are known to have fought during the Mavinga battle in southern Angola last month. The South African objective in all of this is quite simple: to protect apartheid by continuing to invade and destabilize its neighbors.

Mr. Chairman, an American policy of negotiations and expanded economic ties with Angola is far superior to aiding UNITA. A similar policy has proved promising in Mozambique. Aid to UNITA should therefore be rejected.

Thank you.

Mr. WOLPE. Thank you very much, Mr. Robinson.

I'd like to invite now Mr. Jose Sorzano.

STATEMENT OF JOSE S. SORZANO, PRESIDENT OF THE CUBAN AMERICAN NATIONAL FOUNDATION

Mr. SORZANO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, in view of the comments of Congressman Siljander and the admirable job that the other individual on this side of my table, I beg your indulgence. I have a statement that is a little bit longer than 5 minutes. It's going to be 6 minutes.

Mr. WOLPE. OK.

Mr. SORZANO. Mr. Chairman, the Cuban American National Foundation shares the widespread conviction that the overall objective of American foreign policy toward Angola should be to help in securing a truly independent, free and prosperous Angola unburdened by the presence of thousands of foreign troops and capable of enjoying friendly and respectful relationships with the Western World in general and the United States in particular.

Regrettably, there is a wide gulf between that objective and present reality. In the interests of brevity, I will not repeat the sad

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history of Angola since it obtained its independence from Portugal. Suffice it to say that the period of time during which Angola was free from the presence of foreign troops on its soil was of extremely short duration. Indeed, the deeply held aspirations of the Angolan people for freedom and independence were quickly frustrated shortly after the departure of the Portugese when the MPLA seized power supported by thousands of Cuban troops.

It has been these troops and not domestic popular support that have constituted the foundation of the Angolan regime to the point that it is highly doubtful that the regime could long survive without them.

In addition to the over 35,000 Cuban troops, the self-professed Marxist MPLA is also supported by several thousand other Soviet bloc personnel and, according to the Department of State, the Soviet Union has provided over $2 billion in military assistance to the Luanda regime in this past year alone.

Not surprisingly, a regime so heavily dependent upon the Soviet bloc has been a systematic violator of human rights and routinely opposes U.S. interests in international fora.

Thus, the current human rights annual report of the Department of State indicates a lack of freedom of speech, press and assembly in Angola. It further shows that Angolans endure arbitrary arrest and imprisonment without due process, and that there are persistent and frequent allegations of torture and mistreatment in Angolan prisons.

Similarly, the State Department's May 1985 annual report to Congress on voting practices in the United Nations gives Angola a mere 4.9-percent level of coincidence with the United States votes in the United Nations. Out of 159 member states, the Angolan voting record in the United Nations is the sixth most anti-American, being surpassed only by Mozambique, Cuba, Algeria, Swaziland, and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen.

Angola voted against condemning the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, against the resolution condemning the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and against accepting the credentials of the Israeli delegation.

Angola's record of unrelenting opposition to the United States in international fora is highlighted by the fact that its votes coincide with American votes much less frequently than those of the Soviet Union, which, for the record, was 13.2 percent.

On the basis of the preceding evidence, the conclusion is unavoidable that the MPLA regime is undemocratic, Marxist, pro-Soviet, anti-American, and a systematic violator of human rights.

In opposition to the MPLA, Dr. Jonas Savimbi over the last decade has forged UNITA, a grass roots nationalistic organization which has established effective government in the area it already controls and has waged an increasingly successful arms struggle against the Cuban and Soviet backed MPLA.

UNITA's estimated 40,000 armed men fully control about half of Angola's territory and operate extensively over an additional 20 percent of the territory. And, just a few weeks ago, before the start of the rainy season, defeated a powerful MPLA offensive reportedly spearheaded by Cuban and Soviet officers.

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All this has been achieved by UNITA without overt or covert American assistance, which until quite recently was forbidden under the terms of the Clark amendment. Now that Congress has repealed the Clark amendment a number of congressional bills providing for various forms of assistance to the Angolan resistance have been introduced.

In the remaining time I would like to speak in support of the bill introduced by Congressmen Pepper and Kemp which would provide $27 million in nonlethal, humanitarian assistance to UNITA. Those reasons are:

First, the United States has an unmatched record of generosity. We traditionally have provided humanitarian assistance to those in need of it even including our adversaries. In recent years American humanitarian assistance has gone to Marxist regimes in Cambodia and Ethiopia, and it would be incongruous indeed to deny such assistance to African groups fighting for many of our own basic values.

Second, while it is true that Dr. Savimbi has received assistance from Pretoria, it is equally true that UNITA has also received material support from several other countries, including black African nations. As a matter of fact, I believe the proposed American assistance to Savimbi will lessen his relationship with neighboring South Africa.

Third, nobody can reasonably accuse Savimbi of racism or of supporting apartheid. On the contrary, Savimbi has fashioned an indigenous fighting force that is struggling against the presence of foreign troops in Angolan soil. It is precisely Savimbi's adversaries who, in a style reminiscent of past colonial times, are utilizing white troops, foreign troops to kill black Angolans.

The alternative to providing some assistance to Savimbi is to continue with the present policy, which has been stalled for some time and, given present and forseeable circumstances, is not likely to produce the desired result of a free, independent, pro-Western Angola unburdened by foreign troops on its territory.

Indeed, the Miami Herald in its editorial of October 29, 1985, just 2 days ago, supporting the Pepper-Kemp bill suggested that "The State Department ought to ask itself whether U.S. negotiations that have been accompanied by a significant increase in the Soviet and Cuban presence in Angola are worth pursuing."

The obstacles confronting a negotiated withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola are essentially two:

First, the vulnerability of the MPLA and the intransigence of the MPLA's Marxist hard core make it extremely unlikely that the MPLA could agree to the withdrawal of Cuban troops.

Second, Cuba for its part is also unlikely to voluntarily disrupt a highly profitable situation that is reaping concrete strategic benefits for the Soviet bloc and substantial financial rewards for Cuba itself.

Senator Proxmire has recently called our attention to the fact that Gulf Oil Co. has a huge investment in Angola as part owner of the Cabinda Oil Co. operating out of Angola. Senator Proxmire noted that the profits of the Cabinda Gulf Oil Co. provide hundreds of millions of tax dollars in revenue to the Communist leaders of

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Angola. This revenue goes to support the Cuban troops in Angola and the Soviet and Eastern European advisers.

The BBC and Reuters have also cited intelligence reports which variously estimate that the Angolan Government pays between $500 and $800 million a year to Cuba for the use of Cuban troops. Given this financial bonanza, Castro is undoubtedly not anxious to withdraw his troops from Angola and deprive his already chaotic economy of desperately needed hard currency.

This generous subsidy of Castro's army by revenues generated by Gulf Oil means that current United States policy toward Angola has ramifications that go well beyond Angola and southern Africa and negatively affect vital American security and strategic interests in the Caribbean and Central America.

Seen in this light, it is startling, to say the least, that millions of U.S. dollars are appropriated to turn back Castro's efforts in Central America and the Caribbean while at the same time in Angola we acquiesce in a situation that is providing Cuba the financial resources to continue its campaign of destabilization and subversion in this hemisphere.

There is, therefore, no discernible incentive for the Soviets, Cubans or MPLA to negotiate the withdrawals of Cuban troops from Angola with the likely result of a continuing diplomatic stalemate. In the meantime, the long suffering people of Angola continue to endure the disruption of their traditional way of life and the bombing and destruction of their villages.

The provision of humanitarian assistance to alleviate the suffering is the least we can do. Congressmen Pepper and Kemp are to be congratulated for their humane efforts on behalf of the freedom and well-being of the Angolan people.

Thank you, sir, and for your patience.

[Mr. Sorzano's prepared statement follows:]

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PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOSE S. SORZANO, PRESIDENT OF THE CUBAN AMERICAN NATIONAL FOUNDATION

STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF THE PEPPER/KEMP BILL TO PROVIDE HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO UNITA

I am deeply pleased and honored to be here today before this Sub-Committee and, therefore, at the outset I wish to express my appreciation for the opportunity to testify in support of providing American humanitarian assistance to the UNITA forces of Dr. Savimbi which, as you know, have for over ten years struggled to liberate their homeland from the presence of foreign troops.

The Cuban American National Foundation shares the widespread conviction that the overall objective of American foreign policy towards Angola should be to help in securing a truly independent, free and prosperous Angola unburdened by the presence of thousands of foreign troops and capable of enjoying friendly and respectful relationships with the Western world in general and the United States in particular.

Regrettably, there is a wide gulf between that objective and present reality. In the interest of brevity I will not repeat the sad history of Angola, since it obtained its independence from Portugal. Suffice it to say that the period of time during which Angola was free from the presence of foreign troops on its soil was of an extremely short duration. Indeed, the deeply held aspirations of the Angolan people for freedom and independence were quickly frustrated shortly after the departure of the Portuguese, when the MPLA seized power supported by thousands of Cuban troops. It has been these troops, and not domestic popular support, that have constituted the foundation of the Angolan regime to the point that it is highly doubtful that the regime could long survive without them.

In addition to the over 35,000 Cuban troops, the self-professed Marxist MPLA is also supported by several thousand other Soviet Bloc personnel and, according to the Department of State, the Soviet Union has provided over two billion dollars in military assistance to the Luanda regime in this past year. Not surprisingly, a regime so heavily dependent upon the Soviet Bloc has been a systematic violator of human rights and routinely opposes U.S. interests in international fora. Thus, the current human rights annual report of the Department of State indicates a lack of freedom of speech, press and assembly in Angola. It further shows that Angolans endure arbitrary arrests and imprisonment without due process; and that there are persistent and frequent allegations of torture and mistreatment in Angolan prisons. Similarly, the State Department's May 1985 Annual Report to Congress on Voting Practices in the United Nations gives Angola a mere 4.9 percent level of coincidence with U.S. votes in the United Nations. Out of the 159 member states, the Angolan voting record in the United Nations is the sixth most anti-American, being surpassed only by Mozambique, Cuba, Algeria, Swaziland and the People's

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Democratic Republic of Yemen. Angola voted against condemning the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia; against the resolution condemning the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and against accepting the credentials of the Israeli delegation. Angola's record of unrelenting opposition to the U.S. in international fora is highlighted by the fact that its votes coincided with American votes much less frequently than those of the Soviet Union (13.2%). On the basis of the preceding evidence, the conclusion is unavoidable that the MPLA regime is undemocratic, Marxist, pro-Soviet, anti-American and a systematic violator of human rights.

In opposition to the MPLA, Dr. Jonas Savimbi over the last decade has forged UNITA--a grass roots nationalistic organization which has established effective government in the areas it already controls and has waged an increasingly successful armed struggle against the Cuban and Soviet-backed MPLA. UNITA's estimated 40,000 armed men fully control about half of Angola's terriotry and operate extensively over an additional twenty percent of the territory, and just a few weeks ago, before the start of the rainy season, defeated a powerful MPLA offensive reportedly spearheaded by Cuban and Soviet officers.

All this has been achieved by UNITA without overt or covert American assistance, which until quite recently was forbidden under the terms of the Clark Amendment. Now that Congress has repealed the Clark Amendment, a number of Congressional bills providing for various forms of assistance to the Angolan resistance have been introduced. In the remaining time, I would like to speak in support of the bill introduced by Congressman Pepper and Kemp which would provide twenty seven million dollars in non-lethal humanitarian assistance to UNITA.

The Pepper/Kemp bill should be supported for a number of reasons:

- The United States has an unmatched record of generosity. We traditionally have provided humanitarian assistance to those in need of it, even including our adversaries. In recent years, American humanitarian assistance has gone to Marxist regimes in Cambodia and Ethiopia and it would be incongruous to deny such assistance to African groups fighting for many of our own basic values.

- While it is true that Dr. Savimbi has received assistance from Pretoria, it is equally true that UNITA has also received material support from several other countries including Black African nations. As a matter of fact, the proposed American assistance to Savimbi will lessen his relationship with neighboring South Africa.

- Nobody can reasonably accuse Savimbi of racism or of supporting <u>apartheid</u>. On the contrary, Savimbi has fashioned an indigenous fighting force that is struggling

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against the presence of foreign troops in Angolan soil. It is precisely Savimbi's adversaries who--in a style reminiscent of past colonial times--are utilizing white foreign troops to kill black Angolans.

- The Soviet Union has provided over two billion dollars in military assistance to Angola in just this past year. In addition, the MPLA is supported by over 35,000 Cuban troops and several thousand Soviet Bloc personnel. By contrast, the Pepper/Kemp bill just calls for twenty seven million dollars in non-lethal humanitarian aid for UNITA.

- The overwhelming Soviet/Cuban presence effectively makes Angola an occupied country and a threat to American political and security interests in the region. If, on the other hand, Savimbi succeeds in his efforts, the Angolan people would benefit by the diminution and even elimination of Marxist political repression and, simultaneously, the political and security interests of the U.S. in the strategic Southern African region will be enhanced.

The alternative to providing some assistance to Savimbi is to continue with the present policy, which has been stalled for some time and, given present and forseeable circumstances, is not likely to produce the desired result of a free, independent, pro-Western Angola unburdened by foreign troops on its territory. Indeed, the Miami Herald in its editorial of October 29, 1985, supporting the Pepper/Kemp bill suggested that "the State Department ought to ask itself whether U.S. negotiations that have been accompanied by a significant increase in the Soviet and Cuban presence in Angola are worth pursuing."

The obstacles confronting a negotiated withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola are essentially two: First, the vulnerability of the MPLA and the intransigence of the MPLA's Marxist hard core make it extremely unlikely that the MPLA could agree to the withdrawal of Cuban troops. Secondly, Cuba for its part is also unlikely to voluntarily disrupt a highly profitable situation that is reaping concrete strategic benefits for the Soviet Bloc and substantial financial rewards for Cuba itself. Senator Proxmire has recently called our attention to the fact that Gulf Oil Company has a huge investment in Angola as part owner of the Cabinda Oil Company operating out of Angola. Senator Proxmire noted that the profits of the Cabinda Gulf Oil Company provide "hundreds of millions of tax dollars in revenue to the Communist leaders of Angola. This revenue goes to support the Cuban troops in Angola and the Soviet and Eastern European advisers." The BBC and Reuters have also cited intelligence reports which variously estimate that the Angolan government pays between 500 and 800 million dollars a year to Cuba for the use of Cuban troops. Given this financial bonanza, Castro is undoubtedly not anxious to withdraw his troops from Angola and deprive his already chaotic economy of desperately

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needed hard currency. This generous subsidy of Castro's army by revenues generated by Gulf Oil means that current U.S. policy towards Angola has ramifications that go well beyond Angola and southern Africa and negatively affect vital American security and strategic interests in the Carribbean and Central America. Seen in this light, it is startling that millions of U.S. dollars are appropriated to turn back Castro's efforts in Central America and the Caribbean, while at the same time in Angola we acquiesce in a situation that is providing Cuba the financial resources to continue its campaign of destabilization and subversion in this hemisphere.

There is, therefore, no discernible incentive for the Soviets, Cubans or the MPLA to negotiate the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola with the likely result of a continuing diplomatic stalemate. In the meantime, the long-suffering people of Angola continue to endure the disruption of their traditional way of life, and the bombing and destruction of their villages. The provision of humanitarian assistance to alleviate this suffering is the least we can do. Congressmen Pepper and Kemp are to be congratulated for their humane efforts on behalf of the freedom and well-being of the Angolan people.

Mr. WOLPE. Thank you very much, Mr. Sorzano.

Now, I'd like to call for our last witness Mr. Jerry Bender.

STATEMENT OF GERALD J. BENDER, SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA

Mr. BENDER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The Chief of the CIA Angola Task Force in 1975–76, John Stockwell, appropriately titled his book on American participation in the Angolan civil war, "In Search of Enemies." At the time, the CIA assessments concluded that who won the war would make virtually no difference to the United States.

However, once the United States did decide to enter that conflict, in order to satisfy American public opinion, it was necessary to fabricate enemies and allies. Stockwell's book could just as easily have been titled in search of allies because the main U.S. ally in that war, Holden Roberto and his FNLA, was unsellable to anybody, including his own soldiers and followers.

The CIA did not discover Jonas Savimbi and UNITA until near the end of the war, and South Africa proved to be a dubious ally who ultimately undermined American credibility.

Ten years later, the United States is once again engaged in the search for enemies and allies in Angola, and once again they will have to be fabricated. The Luanda government is not our enemy, nor is South Africa an acceptable ally.

Contrary to the 1975 predictions of then-President Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger that an MPLA victory in the the Angolan civil war would cut off American access to Angola's resources, the United States has become Angola's leading trading partner. In recent years trade between the two countries has totaled over $1 billion annually.

Angola buys more American goods than all but two or three countries in sub-Saharan Africa. American business have invested hundreds of millions of dollars in Angola since its independence.

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No American citizen or property has been touched by the government. Any destruction of American property or murder of American citizens in Angola has been carried out by South Africa and by UNITA.

At a recent New York luncheon—last week—Angolan President Jose Eduardo dos Santos was highly praised for the business-like manner in which his government conducts its relations with American firms. Many of the dozens of American businessmen who attended this luncheon hosted by Chevron and Bankers Trust were impressed by dos Santos straightforward and nonrhetorical answers to their questions.

Dos Santos also surprised and impressed a number of foreign policy experts at the Council on Foreign Relations with his thoughtful responses to their questions during an hour and a half meeting.

Dos Santos' trip followed on the heels of a 2-week tour by a high level Angolan economic delegation that visited five American cities in search of more America investment. These trips came at a time when Angola is in the process of undertaking major steps to liberalize its economy and to reduce the role that the state has played in the economic sector.

In fact, these steps, along with some tough economic austerity measures that are being followed to further reduce Angola's relatively small international debt, would comfort any IMF official despite the fact that Angola is not a member of the IMF or World Bank.

The economic behavior of the Marxist government in Luanda toward American and foreign corporations underscores the danger of trying to judge regimes and parties through ideological labels. These labels are frequently misleading.

How can we know whether the given ideology is dangerous to U.S. interests in a given area? Should we read the scriptures of the regime's ideologues, or should we observe their behavior.

If we focus on behavior it is immediately evident that Pretoria's ideology of apartheid is infinitely more dangerous to the United States interests in southern Africa than is Angola's Marxism. If the United States interests include minimizing or eliminating the Soviet and Cuban presence in the region, then President Reagan should focus his attention more on the Botha government in Pretoria than on the Soviets in Moscow or Geneva.

It is the South African regime's aggressive military strikes against its neighbors that are primarily responsible or the Soviet and Cuban presence in the region.

The CIA accurately predicted in 1975—when less than 1,000 Cubans were in Angola—that the entry of South African troops would result in a 10 to 15 fold increase in the number of Cuban combat troops.

Moreover, the Washington-Pretoria axis, far more than any other factor, resulted in legitimizing the presence of thousands of Cuban troops in southern Africa.

One can only hope that these factors are not lost on those in the United States who now propose to cooperate with South Africa in attempting to remove the Cuban troops.

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Stopping the transmission of revolution and violence across borders constitutes another American interest spelled out by the Reagan administration. In the last 10 years no evidence has been presented that a single Cuban or MPLA soldier has crossed the Angolan border to attack a neighbor. Hardly a day has gone by during this decade that apartheid regime in South Africa has not carried violence across its borders into neighboring countries.

Again, we must look at actual behavior rather than labels to determine who really may be our allies and our enemies. Angola is by no means a democracy by any stretch of the imagination. Yet criticism of the government is not only tolerated but widespread, and few look over their shoulders when discussing government policies or criticizing ministers.

There are few political prisoners of conscience. In both these respects, the Angolan Government is far more tolerant than its larger neighbors to the south and north, South Africa and Zaire.

In short, one has to report to gross distortion or outright fabrication in order to portray the Luanda government as our enemy. In 1975, Stockwell tells us, because of reports from its station chief in Luanda that indicated the United States could easily work with the MPLA, the CIA resorted to writing false reports about the MPLA in order to portray them in a negative.

Similar false reports are beginning to appear now. Is it with the same intention? I trust that Members of Congress will not allow themselves to be lied to and misled again by agencies of our own Government.

Members of Congress must also be on guard against simplistic platitudes being substituted for hard analysis. For example, one frequently hears that aiding UNITA will provide the President with a bargaining chip in his talks with the Soviets in Geneva. It may give Reagan a white chip, but it also gives Mr. Gorbachev a stack of blue chips.

Does anyone seriously believe that the President can strengthen American foreign policy vis-a-vis the Soviets by burdening it with the albatross of South Africa? This policy backfired in 1975, and it will backfire again in 1985.

During the December 1975 Senate debate over the Tunney and Clark amendments, Mr. Kissinger told then-Senator Clark that his opposition to the United States participation in the Angolan civil war on the South African side might be right in the African context but it was wrong in the global context.

What that war demonstrated is it is not possible to be wrong in the Africa context and still win globally.

If the Reagan administration is truly interested in mitigating or eliminating the Soviet and Cuban presences in Angola it should continue on the present course of negotiations, not into the war. The number of Cuban combat troops in Angola has fluctuated with the extent of South Africa's military threat. The greater the threat, the greater the number of Cuban troops.

There is, therefore, every reason to believe that if the United States enters the Angolan conflict the number of Cuban troops will increase.

While the American-sponsored negotiations have been slow and laborious, nevertheless they represent the only hope for the United

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States to realize its goals of reducing the numbers of Cubans and promoting national reconciliation in Angola.

No one can be certain that the negotiations will succeed, but if they fail the position of the United States will not be harmed further. What is certain, however, is that if we join hands with South Africa on the Angolan battlefield we will not only fail but we will greatly damage our interest and prestige in the rest of the world.

Thank you.

[Mr. Bender's prepared statement follows:]

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PREPARED STATEMENT OF GERALD J. BENDER, SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA

I appreciate the Committee's invitation to appear at these critically important hearings concerning possible United States intervention in the Angolan war. I have been conducting research in and about southern Africa for more than 20 years. During most of this time, my work has focused on Angola. In the late sixties, I spent a year in the country while it was still a Portuguese colony. My first book, Angola under the Portuguese, resulted from this effort. Beginning one year after Angola's independence (1975), I have visited the country at least once a year. I have travelled by car over thousands of miles in the northern, central and southern provinces. I have published numerous articles based on these travels as well as on the subject of U.S. policy toward Angola. Next month, I will be sworn in as president of the African Studies Association.

The Chief of the CIA Angola Task Force in 1975-76, John Stockwell, appropriately titled his book on American participation in the Angolan civil war In Search of Enemies. At the time, CIA assessments concluded that who won the war would make virtually no difference to the United States. However, once the U.S. decided to enter that conflict, in order to satisfy American public opinion, it was necessary to fabricate enemies and allies. Stockwell's book just as easily could have been titled In Search of Allies because the main U.S. ally in that war, Holden Roberto and his FNLA, was unsellable to anyone, including his own soldiers and followers. The CIA did not discover Jonas Savimbi and UNITA until nearly the end of the war, and South Africa proved to be a dubious ally who ultimately undermined American credibility.

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Ten years later, the United States once again is engaged in a search for enemies and allies in Angola, and, once again, they will have to be fabricated. The Luanda Government is not our enemy, nor is South Africa an acceptable ally.

Contrary to the 1975 predictions of then-President Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger that an MPLA victory in the Angolan civil war would cut off American access to Angola's resources, the United States has become Angola's leading trading partner. In recent years, trade between the two countries has totalled over $1 billion annually. Angola buys more American goods than all but two or three countries in sub-Saharan Africa. American businesses have invested hundreds of millions of dollars in Angola since its independence. No American citizen or property has been touched by the Government. Any destruction of American property or murder of American citizens in Angola has been carried out by South Africa and UNITA.

At a recent New York luncheon, Angolan President Jose Eduardo dos Santos was highly praised for the business-like manner in which his government conducts its relations with American firms. Many of the dozens of businessmen who attended the luncheon, hosted by Chevron and Bankers Trust, were impressed by dos Santos' straightforward and non-rhetorical answers to their questions. Dos Santos also surprised and impressed a number of noted foreign policy experts at the Council on Foreign Relations with his thoughtful responses to their questions during an hour-and-a-half meeting.

Dos Santos' trip followed on the heels of a two-week tour by a high-level Angolan economic delegation that visited five U.S. cities

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in search of more American investment. These trips come at a time when Angola is in the process of undertaking major steps to liberalize its economy and reduce the role that the state has played in the economic sector. In fact, these steps, along with some tough economic austerity measures that are being followed to further reduce Angola's relatively small international debt, would comfort any IMF official despite the fact that Angola has not yet joined the International Monetary Fund or the World Bank.

The economic behavior of the Marxist government in Luanda toward American and foreign corporations underscores the danger of trying to judge regimes and parties through ideological labels. These labels frequently are misleading. How can we know whether a given ideology is dangerous to U.S. interests in a given area? Should we read the scriptures of the regime's ideologues, or should we observe their behavior?

If we focus on behavior, it is immediately evident that Pretoria's ideology of apartheid is infinitely more dangerous to U.S. interests in southern Africa than is Angola's Marxism. If U.S. interests include minimizing or eliminating the Soviet and Cuban presence in the region, then President Reagan should focus his attention more on the Botha Government in Pretoria than on the Soviets in Moscow or Geneva. It is the South African regime's aggressive military strikes against its neighbors that are primarily responsible for the Soviet and Cuban presence in the region.

The CIA accurately predicted in 1975--when less than 1,000 Cubans were in Angola--that the entry of South African troops would

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result in a 10-15-fold increase in the number of Cuban combat troops. Moreover, the Washington-Pretoria axis, far more than any other factor, resulted in legitimizing the presence of thousands of Cuban troops in southern Africa. One only can hope that these factors are not lost on those in the United States who now propose to cooperate with South Africa in attempting to remove the Cuban troops.

Stopping the transmission of revolution and violence across borders constitutes another American interest spelled out by the Reagan administration. In the last 10 years, no evidence has been presented that a single Cuban or MPLA soldier has crossed the Angolan border to attack a neighbor. Yet, hardly a day has gone by during this decade that the apartheid regime in South Africa has not carried violence across its border into neighboring countries. Again, we must look at actual behavior, rather than labels, to determine who really may be our allies and our enemies.

Angola is by no means a democracy; yet criticism of the government is not only tolerated but widespread, and few look over their shoulders when discussing government policies or ministers. There are few political prisoners of conscience. In both of these respects, the Angolan government is far more tolerant than its larger neighbors to the south and north, South Africa and Zaire.

In short, one has to resort to gross distortion or outright fabrication in order to portray the Luanda government as our enemy. In 1975, Stockwell tells us, because of reports from its station chief in Luanda that indicated that the U.S. could work easily with the MPLA, the CIA resorted to writing false reports about the MPLA in order to portray them in a negative light. Similar false reports are

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beginning to appear now. Is it with the same intention? I trust that the members of Congress will not allow themselves to be lied to and misled again by agencies of our own government.

Members of Congress also must be on guard against simplistic platitudes being substituted for hard analysis. For example, one frequently hears that aiding UNITA will provide the President with a bargaining chip in his talks with the Soviets in Geneva. It may give Mr. Reagan a white chip, but it also gives Mr. Gorbachev a stack of blue chips. Does anyone seriously believe that the President can strengthen American foreign policy vis a vis the Soviets by burdening it with the albatross of South Africa? This policy backfired in 1975, and it will backfire again in 1985.

During the December 1975 Senate debate over the Tunney and Clark amendments, Mr. Kissinger told then-Senator Clark that his opposition to U.S. participation in the Angola civil war on the South African side might be right in the African context, but it was wrong in the global context. What that war demonstrated is that it is not possible to be wrong in the African context and still win globally.

If the Reagan administration truly is interested in mitigating the Soviet and Cuban presences in Angola, it should continue on its present course of negotiations, not enter the war. The number of Cuban combat troops in Angola has fluctuated with the extent of South Africa's military threat. The greater the threat, the greater the number of Cuban troops. There is, therefore, every reason to believe that if the United States enters the Angolan conflict, the number of Cuban troops will increase.

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While the American-sponsored negotiations have been slow and laborious, nevertheless they represent the only hope for the U.S. to realize its goals of reducing the number of Cubans and promoting national reconciliation in Angola. No one can be certain that the negotiations will succeed, but if they fail, the position of the United States will not be harmed further. What is certain, however, is that if we join hands with South Africa on the Angolan battlefield, we not only will fail but also will greatly damage our interests and prestige in the rest of the world.

Mr. WOLPE. Thank you very much, Mr. Bender.

Thank you to all of the witnesses for excellent testimony and for maintaining the brevity of your remarks. That was very helpful.

I will ask just one question, at least, and maybe my colleague would like to ask one question as well of Mr. Newsom, who will have to leave. By the time we return, he will have to be leaving this table, so I want to use this opportunity for him to respond to one particular concern.

What in your judgment, Mr. Ambassador, would be the impact on the South African government of a United States decision to aid UNITA? How do you think it would affect South Africa's policy in Angola, in the region and within their own country.

Mr. NEWSOM. My experience, Mr. Chairman, with South Africa suggests that they look very carefully for signals from Washington on what Washington's basic attitude may be toward South Africa's activities in the region.

It certainly has been my feeling that we maintained a certain distance from South Africa through several administrations up to, but not including, this administration.

Not everyone in the United States was satisfied with the policies of the Nixon administration or the Johnson or Carter administrations with respect to South Africa, but there was a degree of restraint which I think the South Africans notice.

I think when the Reagan administration came in there was a certain relaxation of relationships with South Africa, and that the South Africans took this as the signal they had long been waiting for that Washington was finally prepared to look at the world in very much the same.

I think that a further signal in that direction would view, strengthen the South African feeling that ultimately Washington will come around to support that position.

Mr. WOLPE. Let me ask you for a very quick response, otherwise I will be late for the vote, to one other question.

Is any United States military aid that might realistically be intimidating to the Soviets and Cubans or, as Mr. Bissell suggests, enough to wean UNITA from South Africa?

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Mr. NEWSOM. Well, all I hear this afternoon from my distinguished colleagues on the panel, Mr. Chairman, is another beginning of a long road and an unwillingness to face what lies ahead down that road. Twenty-seven million in humanitarian aid is not going to help UNITA to win a military victory.

There's a much larger price farther down the road, and I think if this debate was a candid debate it would not be over the nature of the regime in Angola, but it would be over if indeed it is the desire of the United States to win a victory with Savimbi over the total cost of that victory, and it would be enormous.

Mr. WOLPE. Thank you very much. I really do appreciate your participation in today's panel.

We will recess for about 10 minutes. We'll resume at that time.

[Whereupon, a short recess was taken.]

Mr. WOLPE. The hearing will resume.

Will the witnesses return to the table, please.

We have obviously excused both Ambassador Newsom and also Mr. Tucker, who represented the intended witness Mr. Johnson, today.

I'd like to turn for a moment to the question of the nature of UNITA and Mr. Savimbi and what he represents because I'm interested if the panelists here could characterize their understanding of what Mr. Savimbi and UNITA represents. He's being portrayed in this country as a individual who is committed to capitalistic, Western, democratic values and is pro-American historically in his orientation.

I would be interested in the reactions of those who are on the panel.

Mr. Bender.

Mr. BENDER. Mr. Savimbi's a very difficult person to characterize or depict.

I put together a series of quotations of Mr. Savimbi on nine different subjects showing that he is basically on all sides of all the issues over a period of time, and if you want to make that a part of the record, that might be useful for some people to see.

Mr. WOLPE. I would welcome that, and if you could submit that, it would be appreciated.[1]

Mr. BENDER. In 1964 when Mr. Savimbi resigned from the FMLA he accused Holden Roberto of being a CIA stooge, and that the government—the movement of Holden Roberto was CIA-backed and any movement backed by the CIA, Savimbi said, could not be a friend of Africa.

He has changed his position over time. I think it's very important to everybody who would like to aid Mr. Savimbi not to fall into the traps of labels.

To call him a democrat—and mind you, I have a great deal of admiration for Mr. Savimbi, but it makes no sense to call him or anybody else in the Angolan conflict democrats or not. I mean, there's nothing democratic about his organization, and I don't mean that as put down. That is a fact.

[1] See appendix.

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The organization is run probably more by a single person in his case than is true of the Luanda government. So, we shouldn't fool ourselves that it's good guys on one side, bad guys on the other. There are good guys and bad guys on both sides, and it should be understood by everybody.

Mr. Savimbi has always indicated that his movement is socialist. When he set up an autonomous government in 1975 he called it the Black Socialist Government of Angola. He has been associated over the years with being antiwhite and antimestizo. Now people see him as being pro-white apartheid.

It is true that he is the only African who did attend the opening parliamentary session when President Botha was sworn in. He's on all sides of all questions, and I think it's—it does a grave disjustice to the debate to try to characterize him and his movement as something that they're not, just as it does injudice for other people to mislabel the MPLA.

Mr. WOLPE. Mr. Sorzano, would you care to comment.

Mr. SORZANO. Well, I certainly agree that putting very clear and sharp labels on politicians is a risky proposition. I think it is much better to do, as he indicated, watch what the behavior of the individual has been.

I think it's quite clear that the individual is a charismatic individual, perhaps one of the few charismatic leaders in Africa at this moment. The individual does have the allegiance of the people.

No. 2, I think by observing what he has been doing for the last 10 years, I think one could reasonably conclude that the individual is a nationalist. After all, he has been fighting foreign troops on Angolan soil.

No. 3, I think it is also important to keep in mind one of the elementary axioms in politics. As compared to what? The MPLA may be much worse than Savimbi. Savimbi may turn out to be no democrat after all.

However, reporters that go to the area that has been occupied by Savimbi always come back very impressed with the care that his administration is taking of the natives of that particular area.

So, it seems to me that we know the nature of the MPLA, and compared to the MPLA it seems to me that the Angolan people would be a lot better, less repression and with some of their rights better protected if we had Savimbi there as opposed to MPLA.

Mr. WOLPE. Mr. Bissell and Mr. Robinson.

Mr. BISSELL. Is it working?

Mr. WOLPE. No.

Mr. BISSELL. OK, we'll share.

The characterization of Jonas Savimbi is very difficult. As Professor Bender pointed out, he has shown many characteristics.

If there is any term that I think is incontrivertible—at least I find in terms of people who have followed Angolan politics for many years, is that he is a populist. For instance, I think here the contrast with the MPLA is one that should cause some reflection.

I'd go back, for instance, to what John Marcum wrote a few years back, who is, along with Jerry Bender, one of the finest historians on Angolan affairs, and he's was talking about the MPLA and contrasting it with UNITA.

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He said that this leadership represents principally one elite Portuguese-educated segment of Angolan society seems no less evident. It serves to highlight a dominant characteristic of the MPLA government. The prominence of mestizo-white and assimilado ministers, and the corresponding paucity of African names among those in senior positions.

This fact, of course, reflects a historical continuity within the MPLA. Elimination of the FNLA and UNITA as political contenders in a contest of force is sharpened and weighted by an underlying social dichotomy that cleaved Angolan nationalism through the struggle for independence. I think that perception is fairly common. The MPLA tends to be elitist and—frequently reflecting the strength—the ideological wing in the MPLA and that UNITA is fundamentally a populist movement, and that I think affects as much as anything the image of UNITA itself.

Mr. WOLPE. Thank you.

Mr. Robinson.

Mr. ROBINSON. My understanding—and I would invite Mr. Bender to comment further on this once I've finished.

My understanding is that the Ovimbundu people comprise a minority of the Angolan population, and Mr. Savimbi's reach, popularity and support base does not go beyond the Ovimbundu people and many of his own people support the central government.

So that, he is, at best, a minority leader in his country.

But I think more importantly, when we talk about what he really represents, that is perhaps an impossible question to answer since he is so in conflict with himself so often. I think it's more important to ask the question of how he is perceived because those perceptions can have enormous consequence for U.S. policy in the region.

I remember last year on the occasion of the inauguration of President Botha under the new constitution, and Mr. Savimbi shared the platform with the new President of South Africa and was photographed for all the world to see. Now, that photo simply underscored the close relationship between him and South African regime, and caused major consternation across the African Continent.

And so that, I think without question, there is no African leader who would want to identify with Jonas Savimbi. All of the African governments recognize the Angolan Government. As a matter of fact, all of the major governments in the world recognize the Angolan Government save two: the United States and South Africa.

So that, we would be making a very foolish judgment to assume that Mr. Savimbi has any influence or leadership capacity beyond his own group and doesn't have all of that. And in large part now because he is so closely identified with the South African regime, and that's why we say more than anything else and I think this will become a litmus test in this country on support that Americans are giving to South Africa because this situation, this aid, will affect South African interest more than it will Angolan interest.

And so, I can't see how one can escape the consequence that we underscore here. When you support Jonas Savimbi, you are supporting South Africa. I don't think there's any question about that.

Mr. BENDER. Could I just make one comment.

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It's often asserted, and we heard it this morning from Congressman Siljander, that Jonas Savimbi has the support of the Angolan people. Nobody knows that. There is no way for anybody to know that.

It's also been asserted that the MPLA has the support of the Angolan people. There's no way to know that. I've never asserted that, and I don't think anybody can assert that.

There have not been elections in Angola. There have not been opinion polls in Angola. There is no way to know whom the Angolan people support.

It's quite possible, in fact probably probable, that the Angolan people do not support either the MPLA or UNITA and that they wish that there would be a plague on both of their houses and they'd blow away in the next wind because the two parties have brought great misery to the Angolan people from their wars.

And therefore, I think it's demagoguery for anybody to assert when they have no knowledge that Jonas Savimbi has the support of the Angolan people.

Now, Randall Robinson stated that it's often stated that he has the support of the Ovimbundu and that's true. They are a minority. They represent roughly 30 to 33 percent of the Angolan population according to Portuguese statistics.

He certainly does not have the total allegiance of all of the Ovimbundu people because most of the MPLA army fighting against UNITA in the central highlands in the south—or a large part of that army are Ovimbundu. It's Ovimbundu versus Ovimbundu.

So we cannot descend into simplistic ethnic or tribal arguments by saying this leader has the support of these people, this race, this ethnic group, because it doesn't work out in reality that way, and I would hope that during the course of this debate we can try to focus on these realities rather than to resort to what might be enticing statements and seductive statements but false statements about the support of any Angolan leader by the Angolan people.

Mr. WOLPE. Thank you very much.

Mr. Siljander.

Mr. SILJANDER. Of course, one element of truth in all your statements has certainly been there's been no elections or opinion polls in that country and it's certainly true, with 45,000 Cubans and Soviets and others there's no opportunity for the democratic process to take place.

And, of course, there was an agreement signed I think by the MPLA as well as UNITA for a democratic process back in the seventies, and that never took place. I think the question is pretty obvious.

We have the gentleman on the end saying that the litmus test is photographs. Well, I mean, I guess we could probably look up several photographs of some interesting characters, Mr. Robinson, that you've—you've been photographed with. That doesn't necessarily mean you're part and parcel to any particular activity.

Well, how can we ever determine that with 45,000 Cuban troops and advisors in that country.

So, I guess the question I present to all four panelists is, Would the MPLA survive without the Cubans?

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Mr. ROBINSON. Let me answer that question. I think the MPLA has said several times, the Cubans have said several times, and we have understood them to be clear on this point, that as soon as the South African menace is removed, that they would be prepared to leave.

Let's test that. It is obvious to all that South Africa has crossed their borders several times. The Cubans have crossed no border. The Angolans have crossed no border.

Mr. SILJANDER. Isn't that——

Mr. ROBINSON. Let me finish my answer.

Mr. SILJANDER. They've already crossed their border thousands of miles away.

Mr. ROBINSON. Who?

Mr. SILJANDER. The Cubans. Angola is not their home country.

Mr. ROBINSON. The Cubans are in Angola on invitation from the Angolan Government.

Let me finish——

Mr. SILJANDER. What government? Were they elected? Appointed? What government is that?

Mr. ROBINSON. Will you allow me to finish my question.

Mr. SILJANDER. Please do.

Mr. ROBINSON. Obviously, the South Africans have invaded Mozambique. They have terrorized Lesotho. They have sent assassination squads into Zimbabwe. They illegally occupy Namibia, and they've invaded Angola and they've occupied southern Angola.

If, Mr. Siljander, you're so interested in this achievement of freedom would you also agree to appropriate $27 million for the African National Congress? After all, the Congress has since 1912 been fighting what has been identified to be the most vicious regime in the world.

Are you prepared to support that as you are apparently prepared to support the UNITA movement?

Mr. SILJANDER. I'm against any Communist organization, including the African National——

Mr. ROBINSON. Will you not believe, Mr. Siljander, that there may be some things in this world——

Mr. SILJANDER. You want to switch places with me? Would you like to come up here and—listen, you're the one that's testifying here today. You're the one that has been supporting, purporting the—what you call the Angolan Government, supported by Cubans, supported by the Soviet Union, supported by the rest of the East bloc countries——

Mr. ROBINSON. But, you are the one, sir——

Mr. SILJANDER. If you and Mr.——

[Simultaneous conversation.]

Mr. SILJANDER [continuing]. Touting how—touting away what a great government—and how wonderful the Cubans haven't crossed over the border.

Now, the issue at hand, is would that government survive or wouldn't it survive without the Cubans? The answer is obvious. They'd be blown out of the water by UNITA. UNITA would take over quite easily, and it should be the position of this government to assist those that are seeking to topple the Soviet empire vis-a-vis

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the Cubans who, unfortunately, through assistance from the Eximbank we, as a nation, are financing.

Mr. BENDER. I would like to address myself to that question, and I think the best person who can answer——

Mr. SILJANDER. Excuse me. Mr Robinson began. We'll go to Mr. Bissell, Mr. Sorzano, then Mr. Bender.

Mr. BISSELL. Well, African politics is anything but predictable. But, I think one straw in the wind that might be considered is the negotiation process over Namibia because a key variable in that negotiation has been the question of what level of Cuban troops would remain in Angola, if any, after the removal of South Africa from Namibia and presumably away from being an immediate threat to Angola in any way.

And the position, as I understand, that has been leaked—of the MPLA this spring in the negotiation over Namibia, was that in the process of South Africa leaving, and after it had left Namibia, that the MPLA requested that 10,000 Cuban troops remain in Angola.

One inference a person could draw from that is that if you divide the Cuban force in Angola into two parts, that is one part is to defend against South Africa and there's another part to defend against UNITA that in effect they need 20,000 to defend against South Africa and 10,000 against UNITA.

As I say, it's simply an inference, but I think it does suggest a real sense of insecurity on the part of MPLA with regard to the internal contest for power in Angola.

Mr. SILJANDER. Mr. Sorzano.

Mr. SORZANO. I don't think that they would be able to sustain themselves very long. I said as much in my statement.

I think that the governments in the Third World, whether its the MPLA or any other government, that have difficulty building roads, building bridges, and building dams, would also have difficulty dealing with the guerrillas, whether the guerrillas be left, right, anarchist, whatever.

So I think that the governments in the Third World are essentially not very good at getting actions implemented.

Mr. SILJANDER. Can I just interrupt.

When did the Cubans arrive in Angola?

Mr. SORZANO. I think that the record will show that the Cubans arrived in Angola prior to the South Africans.

Mr. SILJANDER. Well, that's the point I'm trying to make. The argument is it's all because of South Africa that the Cubans are there and they're there only to protect the interest of the Angolan people against the interest to the South Africa Government.

It seems rather interesting if one looks simply at recent history at the arrival of the Cubans versus the South Africans.

Mr. SORZANO. I think that the record will show that the Cubans arrived there prior to the South Africans. Then there were South Africans and more Cubans arrived.

Mr. BENDER. I have a very important answer to his question because Mr. Savimbi has addressed himself to it.

Your question is can the MPLA survive without the Cubans. Mr. Savimbi, in December 1981, told Alexander Haig in his office that he could not defeat the MPLA with or without the Cubans.

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Now, if you look at press accounts of UNITA and statements by Savimbi himself you'll see that they brag very often that the Cubans are afraid to fight against UNITA. That the Cubans aren't very good at fighting against UNITA when they have.

So I'm just certain from UNITA's own words, the answer is that UNITA could not defeat the MPLA militarily——

Mr. SILJANDER. That's 1971?

Mr. BENDER. 1981.

And, that agreement, by the way, between UNITA and the MPLA and FNLA was not in the sixties but was 1975.

And, on the question of who came first. They both came at roughly the same time, but it is true that there were no Cuban combat troops in Angola when the major South African invasion took place in October 1975.

Mr. SILJANDER. Is my time up?

Mr. WOLPE. Mr. Weiss.

Mr. WEISS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Let me just clarify for the record what the House did when it repealed the Clark amendment. As I recall the debate, there were very broad and clear representations that this repeal was in no way intended to authorize the granting of aid to Savimbi in any fashion whatsoever. It was simply a removal of the Clark amendment.

Now, Congress may or may not work its will in different ways in the future, but certainly it has not up to this point done so.

The question that I would like to ask is directed primarily to Mr. Sorzano and Mr. Bissell, because you especially had referred to the nature of the aid that you think ought to be given.

Right now the Kemp-Pepper bill talks about $27 million in "humanitarian assistance." Mr. Siljander referred to a bill, perhaps the one offered by Mr. McCollum which would authorize $27 million in clear military assistance.

Mr. SILJANDER. Will the gentleman yield just for a clarification?

Mr. WEISS. Yes.

Mr. SILJANDER. Mr. McCollum's bill would define the Angolan Government as Communist and prohibit the Eximbank from participating. My bill——

Mr. WEISS. Your bill——

Mr. SILJANDER [continuing]. Which has 41 cosponsors deals with direct military.

Mr. WEISS. Military, OK.

Mr. SILJANDER. Just so Mr. McCollum isn't misunderstood.

Mr. WEISS. You're right.

My question is this: Is what are your thoughts as to the amount and nature of the assistance which you would like to see given to UNITA? Would you like to have it limited to covert? Would you like to have it be overt? Would you like to have it be only economic? Would you like to have it be both economic and military? What kind of limitations, if any, would you like to see on whatever kind of aid you would support?

Mr. SORZANO. Thank you.

Well, I think that during the last few years there has been a tremendous economic and food crisis in Africa. We have seen the heartbreaking scenes on TV concerning the plight of the Ethiopian

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population. I have not seen it on TV, but I am aware that there has been a great deal of famine in parts of Mozambique as well.

I think that my statement indicated that we support the Pepper-Kemp bill because we believe that it would be uncontroversial and it would be uncontroversial—we have been giving assistance to——

Mr. WEISS. Would you oppose going beyond that? Would you oppose giving military assistance?

Mr. SORZANO. Well, I think that it is always foolhardy to give an answer in the abstract. One would have to see what the terms of the proposal would be.

Mr. WEISS. Well, in terms of Mr. Siljander's proposal.

Mr. SORZANO. Well, I would say that, no, I don't think I would oppose it either, except for one reason.

Mr. WEISS. OK, so that now you're not just supporting Kemp-Pepper. You also support Siljander?

Mr. SORZANO. Well, but that's not what my statement said.

Mr. WEISS. I know, but I'm trying to get some idea of where this path is taking us.

Mr. SORZANO. Let me tell you why I would support this other bill.

The reason why I would support it is the one I mentioned. Namely, I think that the Angolan situation cannot be seen a vacuum and that the Angolan situation is related to many other vital interests of the United States.

If it is indeed true, as those reports that I cited, that Fidel Castro is receiving between $500 and $800 million a year from Angolan sources then I think that we have a disjointed foreign policy. On the one hand, this Congress is asked to appropriate billions of dollars to turn back the efforts of Fidel Castro in the Caribbean and in Central America, and on the other hand——

Mr. WEISS. What limits would you put on it? Would you say $100 million? Would you say $1 billion? What kind of limitation, if any, would you put on military assistance to UNITA to overthrow the Angolan Government?

Mr. SORZANO. Well, I would say, Mr. Congressman, that I believe that if we are going to go into any of this situation, we should go in to win, and consequently, I would not put a limit, but I would put an objective. If we go in, we go in to win.

Mr. WEISS. OK. Mr. Bissell. [Applause.]

Mr. WOLPE. Just so the audience knows, such demonstrations are out of order.

Mr. Bissell.

Mr. BISSELL. I guess I think of aid to UNITA having certain characteristics and since I don't believe in congressional micromanagement I would think of very few—specific limitations that should be placed on this kind of foreign policy.

First of all that it should be overt, not covert aid.

Second, that it should be overwhelmingly what is called humanitarian economic assistance.

On the issue, in the third category of aid that should be military, I think one can draft language that basically said that this is a small remainder, part of the aid, but that given my understanding of the kind of South African aid, military aid that currently goes to UNITA which I think is quite small, that the purpose, as defined,

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would be to wean UNITA away from dependence on that South African aid.

Mr. WEISS. What do you think that would take?

Mr. BISSELL. I don't know what that would take at this moment. I can't quantify it. It may be $2 million a year. It may be $3 million a year. It may be $50,000. I honestly can't give you a precise figure.

Mr. WEISS. Would you put a limit on it?

Mr. BISSELL. I think that's for the Congress to decide, whether or not there's a defined limit they're comfortable with. As I say, I don't approach it from a fiscal point of view. I approach it from a policy sense and I find such specific limits uncomfortable in terms of arriving at an effective policy.

It seems to me that there should be adequate consultation between the executive branch carrying out such a policy and the congressional committees, including this one, to be able to make sure that that kind of overt military aid is in fact on a scale that's acceptable at very regular intervals, such that specific limit wouldn't have to be put on.

Mr. WEISS. Thank you. Mr. Sorzano, one final question.

I think I know where Mr. Siljander stands on this issue because I've heard him make some statements, but I'd like to get your view. Is it your position that the United States should support indigenous forces to overthrow nonelected Marxist governments that are holding power any place on the face of the earth or would you exclude some Marxist governments who hold nonelected power?

Mr. SORZANO. Well, obviously, the second position.

Mr. WEISS. Yes? Would you support the American support for the overthrow of the Cuban Government?

Mr. SORZANO. I don't think it's a realistic proposition right now.

Mr. WEISS. Right now? OK.

How about Mozambique?

Mr. SORZANO. I have not looked at that one since I left the administration. At that time it would appear to me that the Machel regime was in a rather weak position.

Given the fact that it does receive and is closely—at that moment was closely allied with the Soviet bloc, I just don't see that it would be at all embarrassing publicly that I believe that if the United States could change the situation in which we have a government that is our adversary and turn it into a government that is our friend, I don't think that we should refrain from that.

Mr. WEISS. Is it your position that any place where there is a chance of successfully overthrowing any such government the United States ought to be supporting that kind of effort?

Mr. SORZANO. Not everywhere because there are many places in the world where our strategic and security interests are not directly involved ought to take an active position.

Mr. WEISS. If you want to, submit the exceptions that you have in mind for the record, I would appreciate it.

Thank you.

Mr. WOLPE. Thank you very much.

Mr. DeWine.

Mr. DEWINE. Mr. Bender, you testified, and I quote, "In 1975 the CIA resorted to writing false reports about the MPLA in order to

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portray them in a negative light. Similar false reports are beginning to appear now."

I'm just kind of curious if you're privy to some secret CIA reports that are coming out or——

Mr. BENDER. I didn't—I think if you read that carefully, I'm not saying that the CIA is putting out false reports. There are false reports that are circulating. I don't know where they come from.

Mr. DEWINE. OK. I'm glad you clarified. I just read verbatim from——

So, your testimony is not now that CIA reports are false. You don't know about that?

Mr. BENDER. I don't know.

Mr. DEWINE. But, your testimony is that in 1975 they were false?

Mr. BENDER. Yes, and the head of the Angolan task force, John Stockwell, gave 3 days of testimony before the Senate Intelligence Committee spelling out all of those deeds.

Mr. DEWINE. Your testimony as right now, you don't know about the CIA reports. You're just saying that there are some false reports circulating.

Mr. BENDER. Right.

Mr. DEWINE. I wonder if the four of you who are remaining could very briefly, in the limited time I have, tell me what you think the nature of the MPLA is. We've gotten into what UNITA is. I want you to describe for me the way you would describe it to the typical American citizen that we represent? What are they? Who are they? What do they represent? What are they going to do?

Mr. BENDER. It's difficult to characterize the MPLA as it is UNITA and Savimbi. It's a government, as Mr. Siljander says. It's not democratic. They were not elected. They are Marxist, but there are all kinds of Marxists around the world.

It's a government that is different. It's a government that is not run by one or two or three people. There are vigorous debates over most major issues, and there's quite a bit of input within those members who make up the government.

It's often characterized and we heard it again today as a government of Mestizos, but in fact, on the central committee of over 60 people, there are only either 3 or 4 Mestizos on it and there are certainly not more than a couple of Mestizos in the key policy making positions.

I think that that government genuinely wants to help the people of Angola live a better life. I think they have failed in many fundamental respects. They have not delivered food or key items like cooking oil, blankets and so forth to the people of the rural areas, and that's one of the reasons that led me to suggest that they, like UNITA, may not be popular.

But it's been hard to deliver these things in a war. The country's been at war now for over a quarter of a century, and not many people move around in the country-side, including the government. I think in many ways if we were to measure them just by their attempts they probably come out with high marks in intentions. If we measure them by their delivery, fairly low marks.

But, they're not evil. They're not terrible people.

Mr. DEWINE [continuing]. The other witnesses respond.

Mr. SORZANO. Thank you.

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I characterized them in my testimony as being undemocratic, pro-Soviet, anti-American, and violators of human rights. I would also say that in the close to 5 years I was in the United Nations one gets used to the normal anti-American rhetoric that one hears daily in the United Nations.

However, even in that atmosphere of anti-Americanism, the speeches of the Angolan delegation were very clearly most anti-American of all them all. The virulence against us was just surprising.

Mr. BISSELL. I'm not sure I have a great deal to add to that.

I would simply say that the MPLA does consist of factions, ones that are both ideological in character and ethnic in character, which influence considerably the reaction of the MPLA to a whole range of events and policy decisions. The kinds of debates that Mr. Bender referred to.

The strength of Marxism has been repeatedly confirmed in the process of going through those decisions. The ideological wing is a very powerful one, and attempts to try to indigenize the party in the sense of reflecting more of its Angolan routes rather than its Marxist roots of having very important and sometimes dramatic political controversies, including a purging of people.

We'll have I think a better sense of what the MPLA is, frankly, in the course of next month. They're having their party congress in December. I believe it is December. And, at that time, I think many of the issues that are coming up, including issues like our consideration of aid to UNITA and so forth, will be considered and we will have an additional sense of what the MPLA is all about.

Mr. DEWINE. Mr. Robinson.

Mr. ROBINSON. It's difficult to add anything to what Mr. Bender has said. With respect to the undemocratic nature of the government, of course that is beyond dispute based on their record. But, it is difficult to measure that even over the last 10 years when a government is locked in war, and they've been in war beyond, for the last 25 years.

I do not believe they are as anti-American as has been suggested here. We are their leading trading partner. Obviously they are pragmatic. Any time you find a situation in which gulf installations are guarded by Cuban troops you find a government that may be Marxist in orientation, but obviously tremendously pragmatic.

Here is a government that obviously wants better relations with the United States. They have wanted to cooperate with us on the Namibia diplomacy. They would desire diplomatic recognition from the United States. That has not been forthcoming.

But, a government that is hanging on for its life, menaced by South African troops to the south.

I think we ought to test their commitment to send the Cubans back to Havana by making certain that the—that they feel safe and secure within their borders and doing all that we can do to deliver Namibia to independence.

This aid will create quite the opposite effect, and on that I have no doubt at all.

Mr. DEWINE. I believe Mr. Sorzano has already answered this, but I'd like for the other three to very briefly—because my time is already up—answer this question. What is your opinion about the Soviet influence and the Cuban influence as far as the actual gov-

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ernment is concerned. You have 30,000 to 35,000 Cuban troops in the country. What is the influence from the Soviets or from the Cubans?

Mr. BENDER. You know, it's not easy to measure. I think one way I tried—I think about that question a lot because it's often asserted.

We heard this morning asserted that it's controlled by the Soviets and the Cubans and that's certainly not true.

One way that I try to think about it is what positions does the MPLA take domestically and internationally that are contrary to their own interests but in favor of the interests of the Soviets and the Cubans. That's one way to measure whether or not they're being controlled by the Soviets and Cubans. And, it's very hard to find examples.

There have been serious conflicts between the Angolans and the Cubans. Cubans have been expelled from the country. Cuban sugar technicians have been replaced by American sugar technicians. If you think the Cubans were pleased by that, you can think again.

The fact is that there was a dispute between the Angolans and the Cubans over the nonaligned meeting that was held in Luanda just a couple of months ago where the Cubans had a position apparently quite different and the MPLA tried very hard to get them to accept it and the final position came out to be exactly the one that the MPLA had advanced in the first place, not the Cuban position.

So, when they have had a clash over interest, I think the Angolans have generally—not always, but generally, dominated and are very much in control of their own house. Nobody should be in question about that.

There are no Soviets telling them what to do, and they suddenly think, well, we better do it because we're being told that.

Mr. DEWINE. What's the size of their military?

Mr. BENDER. I don't know. I hear it's 60,000, but I don't know. I'm not sure if 30,000 is true or 35,000 is true of Cuban troops either. Nobody really knows exactly how many Cuban troops are there.

I mean, for example, it's being asserted that the Cubans are getting $500 to $800 million a year for their troops. That's simply not true. That's an exaggeration of five to eight times probably.

It's being asserted that the Soviets sent 2 billion dollars' worth of military equipment to the MPLA in the last 18 months. That is not true. These figures come out of the air, and suddenly they take on a life of their own.

We should examine these figures very, very carefully.

Mr. DEWINE. Do any of the other witnesses want to respond?

Mr. SORZANO. In the U.N. there are several key votes that indicate more or less the alignment of a particular country. The votes on Afghanistan, for instance, the whole nonaligned movement votes against the Soviet Union on the Afghanistan question. Angola joins the hardcore Soviet bloc in this particular one and there is no more than about 20, 25, or 30 votes on this particular side.

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Vietnam, ASEAN takes the lead on this one. The whole nonaligned movement, again, votes against Vietnam on Cambodia. Not Angola. Angola votes, no.

So, in answering the question what international position does Angola take that it would not take were it not controlled by the Soviet Union, I think that those are two very good examples.

Mr. BISSELL. I would just make—two comments in this area about Soviet and Cuban control. We're dealing with a relatively sophisticated environment in Angola, many impressions the contrary. This is not Grenada. The Prime Minister doesn't have to go around to the Soviet Embassy to clear his statements before he decides to do something.

We're dealing not with the issue of control in that sense, but rather with what I call anticipated deference. I mean in many areas in which there is not an immediate national Angolan interest or MPLA interest they can read what it is that those who are their most important protectors—what their positions are and can readily adopt them and sometimes going beyond, as might happen in U.N. voting.

Mr. ROBINSON. It seems that we too often set up a self-fulfilling prophecy and then characterize in a certain way the fruit of that prophecy. Inasmuch as the Angolan Government would like to have relations with us, we would have, of course, a great deal more influence with them. A government that's hanging on for it's very life and made that much more dependent on the Soviet Union by us, naturally, we would see a situation in which the Soviets would have more influence than we would.

So that this legislation would worsen that problem, not improve it. In addition to which, we might add the point that, after all of these years in its own independence war, people in MPLA are simply not going to trade the freedom they won from the Portuguese in for shackles from the Soviet Union and I think that's clear across the face of Africa.

Mr. DEWINE. Thank you.

Mr. WEISS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Sorzano, I would like to ask you a question about the nature of the humanitarian assistance that's being proposed.

As you know, famine has extended to Angola, and the International Red Cross and Oxfam, among others, have been providing famine relief to the people of Angola regardless of who controls the area.

I understand that when the Kemp-Pepper idea of humanitarian assistance was first raised, Mr. Savimbi's representative here in Washington, Mr. Jeremiah Chitunda, said that they're not interested in humanitarian assistance. They're looking for military assistance.

So, what kind of humanitarian assistance do you have in mind which would not be rejected by the Savimbi people?

Mr. SORZANO. Oh, I think we ought to be respectful of their wishes. If we offer humanitarian assistance and they don't want to take it, I don't think we should be in a position of forcing them to take anything they don't want to take.

Mr. WEISS. Should we then give them military assistance instead?

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Mr. SORZANO. But, this is a different question. The question was——

Mr. WEISS. I understand your answer that we should not give them humanitarian assistance, since they've said they don't want it. Should we then give them military assistance?

Mr. SORZANO. Well, of course, that would go back to the bill introduced by Congressman Siljander and I already answered that once, sir.

Mr. WEISS. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. WOLPE. Thank you, Mr. Weiss.

I'd like to just—

Mr. SILJANDER. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. WOLPE. Yes, Mr. Siljander.

Mr. SILJANDER. I wonder if I could just ask two questions.

Mr. WOLPE. Surely. Go ahead. Please proceed.

Mr. SILJANDER. What day is the hearing including congressional witnesses scheduled?

Mr. WOLPE. We haven't yet set the date. It may not be next week, but it'll be within the next 2 weeks.

Mr. SILJANDER. In the next 2 weeks?

Mr. WOLPE. Yes.

Mr. SILJANDER. The other—I'd like to ask unanimous consent that the National Jewish Coalition be allowed to submit testimony for the record. That the record be kept open until next Tuesday so they can be allowed to do so.

Mr. WOLPE. You mean to this—hearing record?

Mr. SILJANDER. Yes.

Mr. WOLPE. Anyone who wishes to submit written testimony, it will be received.

Mr. SILJANDER. In order for them to accomplish that the record be—it would necessitate the record staying open until next Tuesday.

Mr. WOLPE. It will be remained open.

Mr. SILJANDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The subcommittee requested a list of the officers and organizational attachments of the National Jewish Coalition for identification purposes, but no information was received.]

[The following was subsequently submitted:]

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STATEMENT OF THE NATIONAL JEWISH COALITION, SUBMITTED BY REPRESENTATIVE SILJANDER

Mr. Chairman, the National Jewish Coalition is pleased to have this opportunity to submit this statement for the record in support of providing $27 million in humanitarian aid for the National Union for Total Independence of ANGOLA - U.N.I.T.A.

The Coalition would also like to take this opportunity to express its appreciation for the efforts of Congressman Jack Kemp (R-NY), Congressman Claude Pepper (D-FL), and Congressman Mark Siljander (R-MI) to build bipartisan support for this funding. These members reflect the American tradition of bipartisanship in foreign policy decision making and are an indication of the growing support in the Congress for aiding anti-Communist forces around the world.

The National Jewish Coalition was formed after the recent elections because of a feeling on the part of many American Jews that there is a need for a change in the traditional, liberal approach to the nation's domestic and foreign policies. We have spoken out forthrightly about the Soviet Union's mistreatment of its own Jewish citizens, the involvement of the P.L.O. in Central

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America and the need for a strong U.S.-Israel relationship. Having spoken out so strongly when Jews and Jewish interests have been threatened, it is now time for us to speak out on behalf of others whose freedoms are in jeopardy.

The Soviet Union during the 1970's carried out the most extensive expansion of its power since the end of World War II. They invaded Afghanistan, tightened their grip in Southeast Asia and deployed proxies such as Cuba throughout Africa and Latin America.

It is true that Angola has aligned itself with forces in the world that are hostile to Jews and Jewish interests. They have consistently supported anti-Israel resolutions at the United Nations, such as efforts to deny Israel's credentials in the U.N.

However, it is not for those reasons that we submit this statement. Rather, the National Jewish Coalition believes that we in the West, particularly we Jews, must, as a matter of principle, help those who seek freedom and democracy, and speak out against repression and dictatorship. Modern Jewish history has taught us what it is like to live under totalitarian domination.

UNITA is not asking for our troops. It is merely asking for U.S. assistance to continue its own battle. This seems a small price to pay to help people seeking freedom.
We must make our voices heard against the gravest threat to the free world: Soviet expansionism. It is for this reason we support granting $27 million in humanitarian aid to UNITA and urge this committee to act as soon as possible. Thank you.

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Mr. WOLPE. The point that I wanted to pursue for a moment is this notion of the dimensions of South Africa assistance for UNITA at the moment—at this point in time. This relates to the analysis of what it would take, I suppose, to wean UNITA away from South Africa.

What do we know about that, the dimensions of South Africa assistance? Is it as modest as has been described earlier? Anyone care to respond to that?

Mr. Bender.

Mr. BENDER. Well, one of the problems is—in measuring what it is that South Africa has been assisting from the very beginning and they've always claimed that they weren't assisting.

UNITA always claimed that they were totally on their own without South African assistance. Then South Africa carried out a number sabotage acts, claimed it was UNITA, but South African officials have admitted that it's South Africa that carried them out.

There is so much confusion as to who is carrying out what activity that the lines between the UNITA and South Africa have become, unfortunately blurred.

I say unfortunate because I think Angola's one hope is national reconciliation and I think national reconciliation is impossible as long as UNITA has close links with South Africa, and as long as the MPLA has close links with the Cubans.

And therefore, if people care about Angolians, as some Senators or Congressmen say, or Angolans, I think that they should work to remove the foreign troops and help bring about a national reconciliation, rather than further exacerbating that war.

One of the problems that South Africa causes UNITA is that it undermines its credibility. When it invaded in October 1975 it said it was UNITA and then later admitted it was itself.

This has happened maybe a dozen times in the last 10 years with South Africa claiming that some act that they'd carried out was UNITA and then it was discovered that it was South Africa. Most recently, their attack on the gulf Chevron operations in Cabinda where they had the UNITA propaganda and everything with them to try and lay it at UNITA.

I think UNITA suffers when that happens, and Angola as a whole suffers because it makes it infinitely more difficult to resolve the problem.

Mr. WOLPE. Anyone else? Mr. Bissell.

Mr. BISSELL. Well, I can't give you a specific figure either, but I think there's a tremendous amount of evidence around that—people don't want to pull together the party because it's not particularly rigorous.

For instance, the literature of magazines—people don't like to admit they read, like Soldier of Fortune—in fact includes a tremendous number of what I think are quite authentic recollections that describe the extent and the nature of contact going on militarily between South Africa and UNITA.

That could be pulled together. It would take a fair amount of work, but I also think that it would be a great service to all parties in fact to somehow develop that kind of figure of what South African assistance really is.

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Mr. WOLPE. OK. Let me thank all of the witnesses for the testimony they have presented.

I want to go back, in closing this hearing, to some of the observations that were made by Ambassador Newsom at the outset, particularly those related to the definition of what our goals and purposes are because one of the things that strikes me is this kind of fuzzy inclination. We must look down the road in terms of what we are trying to achieve other than are the people defined as good guys or bad guys. Obviously, one of the things that emerges from this testimony is how even the good guys-bad guys are pretty mixed up on all sides of the conflict within Angola.

But, we end up choosing sides without having a clear sense of how far we are prepared to commit our resources. How much are we prepared to commit, even indeed what our goals in fact our?

I hope that as this debate continues we will focus on the real issues here. Namely, should the United States initiate a policy which seeks to overthrow the Angolan Government, cooperating militarily with UNITA and South Africa, and is this the policy that would enjoy broad based public support and the bipartisan congressional support required to fund what would inevitably become a large and long-term financial commitment. Careful analysis of the political realities in the field is required.

There is an internal debate in the administration that is continuing. There is an internal debate within this Congress.

I certainly hope that the views advanced by Secretary of State Shultz and the State Department will be ultimately—become the policy of the administration.

Thank you all very much for your assistance.

[Whereupon, at 4:27 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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ANGOLA: INTERVENTION OR NEGOTIATION

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 12, 1985

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met at 2 p.m., in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard Wolpe (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. WOLPE. The hearing will come to order.

This is the second hearing into the subject of proposed intervention in the country of Angola. A number of proposals have been advanced, some within the administration, some within the Congress, that would call for either covert or overt assistance in military or economic form, to assure the Savimbi UNITA group operating within Angola.

There was so much interest by a number of our distinguished colleagues that it was impossible to accommodate all the people who wished to testify at our first hearing, and so we have arranged the second hearing for the exclusive purpose of taking testimony from those Members of the House that are interested and involved in this issue.

I have no prepared statement myself, but I would like to yield to my distinguished colleague Mr. Siljander, for any opening remarks he may desire to make.

Mr. SILJANDER. Mr. Chairman, a couple of quick comments.

One, I want to thank you for following through in holding this hearing as you promised, and allowing some of our colleagues to testify.

Mr. Pepper, I had heard earlier that you were ill. I am glad to see you are feeling better, and being supportive of what you are doing and being even more happy that you are here and able to testify.

I would just like to announce I introduced a bill dealing with overt military aid of the same amount as your humanitarian aid bill by which I support for $27 million.

We now have over 70 cosponsors. It is a strongly bipartisan bill.

I just wanted to announce that to you today, Mr. Pepper, that we seem to be moving on equal parallel tracks, but with the same vision, helping a democratic movement called UNITA in Angola.

I believe that America does have a moral, political, and historical responsibility to help Jonas Savimbi and UNITA.

Opponents site several reasons why we shouldn't, and of course, the most evident one is that somehow UNITA is a tool of the South

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African Government, and they are nothing more than bandits supporting apartheid system.

That in itself is totally ridiculous.

UNITA is a legitimate movement. UNITA has been fighting against colonialism for 25 years.

UNITA fought against the Portuguese when they were the colonial power in Angola, and certainly they are now fighting against the Cubans and the Russians as another colonial power in their own country. And to suggest that somehow a black liberation movement that has been fighting for freedom for 25 years would somehow yield and support a white racist regime is totally inconsistent and ridiculous.

Yet many of the same people who offer this argument and discount UNITA say we should assist the ANC, or we should somehow assist SWAPO. Although both of these groups have received almost all of their aid from the Soviet Union and/or other East bloc countries. This is clearly a double standard.

They say no to UNITA because it is supported by an apartheid government, but they call for support to the ANC in spite of its strong Communist links overseas.

My question is, Why is UNITA less legitimate as a freedom movement than is the Soviet-backed ANC or SWAPO?

The ramifications of such an argument are far-reaching when put in the context of the world view of many of those who oppose aid to UNITA.

It is no accident that most of the opponents of aid to Savimbi also opposed aid to Nicaragua freedom fighters, and saw the airport construction of Marxist Grenada as just a great tourist attraction.

Here is another double standard. Some say Savimbi can't be trusted and somehow he is a Maoist.

Can't the same argument be used against aiding African freedom fighters?

Although they are anti-Soviet I wouldn't say they have proven themselves to be particularly democratic in nature.

And Cambodia where we are aiding Prince Sihanouk in his fight against Soviet Vietmanese occupation, no one questions the fact that the prince was the prime minister under the brutal Khmer Rouge, and eventually got support from the Chinese Maoist as well.

Yet Mr. Solarz and Mr. Siljander have happily supported him.

We provide aid to Nicaraguan freedom fighters, some, many of whom, were Marxist Sandinistas.

I had the honor of spending several hours with Rodolpho Roberto, who was one of the five original junta members after toppling Somosa, just recently.

He told me while he was a Communist ideologist at one time, and he supported the Sandinistas at the beginning, he soon and very quickly saw the evils of communism, has now taken to the jungles fighting the brutal Sandinista regime.

My question is just this.

Why are anti-Soviet movements for the Near East, Far East, Europe, and Latin America but not for Africa?

Finally there is one last question.

Who came there first, the Cubans or the South Africans?

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This question is actually irrelevant, but since it is the point of many of the arguments and especially in the last hearing we heard last week and from many of the apologizes for the Cuban occupation of Angola, the truth is the current government in Angola is not the legitimate government to begin with.

Second, South Africa could not afford politically or financially to set up a permanent shop in Angola. The people of Angola, the U.N., OAU or even the United States will not sit by and allow that to happen.

Third, it would be a diplomatic disaster, hundreds of times worse of South African occupation in Namibia.

And last I would even say that Savimbi would be the first certainly to fight against the South African under similar types of circumstances as the Portuguese and now the Cubans and the Soviets.

Finally, adding that UNITA will put Angola in the Soviet sponsors working through its Cubans surrogates on notice if we pass your bill, Mr. Pepper, and Mr. Stratton; or the Siljander approach, either one and/or both, American policies in the southern African region will have the same teeth in Africa that it has in the rest of the world. I think this is important.

And second, that America has to revive the Vietnam syndrome finally of the worldwide retreat in the face of Communist aggression.

Somehow every time we lift our head proudly in the support of others fighting for freedom the cries go out this is another Vietnam. Let's get off of that syndrome, what I call the creeping cowardice that is finally squelched in America and stand up for those fighting for democracy, those that are fighting for freedom.

Until then, America does have a moral responsibility to support those seeking democracy and freedom in Angola.

Support for UNITA is, therefore, in our best interests, and the best interests of the Angolan people and in the best interests of those seeking rapid peaceful and democratic change in South Africa.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. WOLPE. Thank you, Mr. Siljander.

We will now turn to our panel of witnesses. We happen to have two panels today, a total of some 10 Members of Congress that have asked to testify, so I am going to make a request that all of us, witnesses, and committee members alike, exercise some restraint and attempt to operate within the 5-minute rule.

With that I am very pleased to welcome our distinguished colleague and chairman of the House Committee on Rules, Senator Pepper.

We are very pleased to have you with the committee today and look forward to receiving your testimony.

STATEMENT OF HON. CLAUDE PEPPER, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF FLORIDA

Mr. PEPPER. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee. I thank you very much for the privilege of being here with you this afternoon.

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I have been at home with a little cold this weekend, and I didn't actually know about this meeting until a little while ago, so I didn't have time to do much preparation for it.

However, I am not a stranger to the principle that is embodied in the bill that I and others are now supporting before the House.

And by the way, Mr. Siljander, I want to congratulate you upon being one of our good number, and for the excellent statement that you have made here a little bit ago to the committee.

A few months ago I was not any more aware of what was going on in Angola except in a general way than one is aware of other parts of the world that pass in kaleidoscopic review from time to time before our mental and hindsight vision. But I was approached about this matter by the Cuban American National Foundation, which is in Miami, basically, although they have an office here.

They are an outstanding group of dedicated Americans I believe. They fought the battle that free men fight, many of them offering their lives in the Bay of Pigs. And I think they deserve to be counted among the heroic brigades in the causes of freedom in the world from that battle, but they told me something about the condition in Angola.

Well, as far as I am concerned, I am just as strongly in favor of one part of the world being free as I am another. I want to see all men free.

If I may say so, on September 27 along about the time I first introduced the bill that we are talking about now—first, why I was awarded, if I may say so, the Franklin D. Roosevelt Medal of Freedom, by Baird College, by the foundation that is the trustee of that great name and honor, and I was identified with Roosevelt's four freedoms, in the minds of those who conferred that honor because I was a Member of the Senate, and if I may say so a close personal friend and a strong supporter of President Roosevelt when he made that speech about the four freedoms to the Congress.

And one of the freedoms, as you know, the last one, is known to be freedom from fear, and Roosevelt echoed and reiterated in respect to everyone of those four freedoms that they applied everywhere in the world. So, I didn't see why a little place called Angola over in Africa whose people have been so long, so disgracefully treated by our race, the white race, and many of the powerful nations of the world, I didn't see any reason why that little country should be out of limits, out of bounds to American goodwill, American compassion, and America's concern. It was included in Roosevelt's "anywhere in the world" to me.

So these people down home from the Cuban American foundation are the same people who had been telling me about what was going on in Nicaragua.

At first I didn't vote with them on Nicaragua, but they convinced me that there really is a Communist drive there that the Cubans and the Russians were aggressing into that area of our hemisphere, which I thought was not only antagonistic to the Monroe Doctrine, but to all the principles that we hold dear in our hemisphere. So I had found these people to be responsible people, who really believed in democracy.

They have been driven out of their homes. My late wife and I, on December 30, 1936, began our honeymoon in Havana, Cuba, at a

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hotel. It was called then the Jewel of the Caribbean. Everybody spoke about beautiful Cuba, its fair fields, its wonderful farms, and the beauty spots that it possessed.

Anyway, I first supported the bill to repeal the Clark amendment. We got rid of that at long last, a prohibition against America showing any concern whatsoever for Angola.

Well, I had seen myself in the paper that this despicable Castro, a tarnisher on the shield of America, had said in the paper he had sent 200,000 troops to Angola, and was prepared to send another 200,000 if necessary.

Of course, he is getting good pay in the oil revenues of Angola for the troops that he sends over there.

(May I have just a little bit more time?)

Then I introduced this bill to provide $27 million, exactly the same amount we are allowing in Nicaragua, $27 million, not in military supplies, not in getting involved in that way at the present time, but we want to give help to those people.

Do they need any help?

The Russians gave Angola $2 billion this last year to shore up their military strength. The Cubans have 35,000 troops in Angola, and I just saw yesterday in the Post for the first time that another despicable Communist crowd, the North Koreans are in there now with their help.

And so what have you got?

You have got the North Koreans, you have got the Cubans, and you have got the Russians.

Are they Communists?

I don't think I have to ask any Member of this Congress about that question.

Now, I have been very embarrassed to have a lot of my black friends come to me, because I was defeated for reelection to the House of Representatives in the legislature when I was 29 years old, because I voted against a resolution offered by a white demagog, condemning Mrs. Hoover for including the wife of a black Congressman from Illinois, a priest at a White House lawn tea.

We couldn't afford to allow a commingling of the white and black in America, he said.

I was one of the 13 who voted no. So you don't have to keep me, coach me to be against apartheid. I vote for as strong a sanction as any man in the House of Representatives against that. It is the most hopeless human situation that I know of down there.

The only argument I ever hear, not that these black people in Angola are not human beings, not that they are not entitled to be free men and women, not that they are not entitled to have some of our compassion if we extend it to the others, but that South Africa has helped them.

I didn't have time today to check up on it, but I wish you would have your staff, Mr. Chairman, in the giving of famine aid to the nations of Africa, the black people of Africa, see whether or not South Africa gave famine aid.

If we gave famine aid, as, of course, we did, and if we found out that South Africa gave some famine aid, are we going to get ours back saying, "wait a minute, we don't want to give any aid to anybody given any aid by that South African crowd." But these people

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are hungry. Maybe that is the one decent thing the South Africans have ever done. We know, but we don't want to feed anybody that the South Africans happen to feed even if it keeps them alive.

It is ridiculous. You know I can't help but remember since I was in the Senate during that period, the question that was presented to Churchill about an alliance with Stalin.

He said, "I have always been rather outspoken against the devil, but I would say a few kind words for the devil if he would come out against Hitler."

If these follow, the government is supported by the Russians, militarily supported by the Cubans, and militarily supported by the North Koreans, if that is not enough to show that those people there need help, and if that is the only help they have got (perhaps I understand they do have some help maybe through some of the other black nations), but South Africa is not in a position to give any help to anybody for very much longer, in my opinion.

I would just like to say one other thing. A few days ago in Miami, I had lunch with the President of the 2506 Brigade. That is the Bay of Pigs Brigade. That man is named Michael Alvarez, and he is the President of Brigade 2506. Congress passed my resolution commending that brigade for its courageous attack upon the Bay of Pigs.

Accompanying Mr. Alvarez at that luncheon was Jose Rebelo. Mr. Rebelo's father was the Angolan Governor of the northern district, and both these men had fought in the democratic armies against the Cubans and the Russians. They were both there.

Now, they prefer that we give aid to Roberto. They want him included.

I told him all right, I will say to my colleagues I think what we mean in our bill, we want to give aid to anybody that is fighting communism in Angola, and supporting freedom for the people of Angola.

Now, here are two men who are Americans, and honorable Americans, men who have a history as courageous fighters for freedom, who actually fought those Communist forces over there. They say Savimbi is not a Marxist, as, I think, the State Department has also said, and they say that Roberto is fighting a good battle.

I said I don't know anything about Savimbi or Roberto, but I am for helping anybody that is fighting communism in Angola.

I just say this in conclusion, Mr. Chairman. These people, it seems to me, are reputable witnesses.

They are there actually fighting in the battle lines, and this man is the President of the Bay of Pigs Brigade 2506. They have proven their mettle as enemies of communism.

All I have to say is that I am very grateful to be associated with my colleagues who see the need of these poor people for help, and propose to give them the same kind of help we are giving some other poor people in Nicaragua, who although closer to our shores, are not closer to us as brothers and sisters in the human race.

I am sorry to have taken a little bit too much time, Mr. Chairman, but those are some of the things I wanted to say.

Mr. WOLPE. Thank you very much, Senator, for your remarks. I think we will hold questions until we have finished the panel and then we will turn to the questions.

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Let me now invite Congressman Solarz to offer his testimony.

STATEMENT OF HON. STEPHEN J. SOLARZ, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Mr. SOLARZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

When Senator Pepper ran in his famous campaign against Senator Smathers, it was a legend that his sister was a noted Thespian in New York, and I can see that great performances do indeed run in the family. There is no other Member of the House for whom I have more affection and admiration than Senator Pepper.

I suspect most of us feel the same way, and it is therefore with acute sense of embarrassment that I find myself, for one of the first times in my 11 years in the House, on the other side of an issue than my very good friend from Florida.

I would hope he would forgive me if I present a somewhat different perspective on this issue, and offer a few brief comments on some of the observations he put forward, and then set forth my own thinking on why I believe it would not be in the national interests of the United States to provide help for Mr. Savimbi or to enact the legislation of which he is the chief sponsor.

First of all, Senator Pepper referred to the fact that the North Koreans now presumably have established the presence in Angola, and the implication was that anywhere the North Koreans are we should be prepared to help those fighting against the government they are helping.

It wasn't too long ago, if my memory serves me correctly, that the North Koreans trained a platoon of pygmies in Zaire, and I didn't hear at that time anybody suggest we should suspend all of our support for our friend Mr. Mobutu, simply because his armed forces were also receiving the assistance of North Korea.

Let me just note parenthetically, having been to North Korea, that I think there is no more oppressive regime in the entire world, but I don't know that mere presence of the North Koreans, if, in fact, they are present in Angola, ipso facto means it is in our interests to help UNITA.

Then there was a suggestion which I have heard on a number of occasions from others, that the way for us to support freedom in Angola is to support Mr. Savimbi, who presumably embodies the cause of freedom in that country. And there are indeed a number of people who have suggested that Mr. Savimbi is a kind of African version of James Madison.

Yet the truth of the matter it seems to be that Mr. Savimbi characterizes himself as a Marxist, albeit one of the Chinese variety, and has on a number of occasions affirmed his commitment to the principles of socialism.

In any case, it seems to me that what is really involved in Angola is not so much a conflict between ideologies as a rivilary between different ethnic groups.

With the MPLA lead by Mr. Savimbi representing the interests of the Obangundu people in the south, and the MPLA representing the Luanda people in the north, I simply do not believe that the triumph of UNITA would inevitably result in the establishment of a western style parliamentary democracy with peoples' guarantees

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of freedom of speech, and the press, and I think it is a mistake for us to assume that it would.

There are indeed situations around the world where I believe it in the interests of those in the United States fighting against communism. I believe it is clear that we do so in Afghanistan by helping fight the Mujaheddin.

As my colleagues know we believe in fighting the non-Communist forces in Cambodia. In both of those instances I think, American help for the freedom fighters would serve our interests, but I do not think that is the case in Angola; and I will tell you why.

Clearly, these are situations which have to be evaluated on a case by case and country by country basis. The world is simply too complex for us to make policies on a reflective basis on which we automatically decide to support or automatically decide to refrain from supporting insurgencies around the world.

In the case of Angola I think two primary interests, getting the Cubans out of Angola and second, facilitating a resolution of the Namibia conflict which would result in the withdrawal of South African troops from that country.

Insofar as the Cuban troops in Angola are concerned American support for Savimbi would undoubtedly result in an increase rather than a decrease in the Cuban military presence in that country. There might perhaps be a case to be made for helping UNITA, if, in fact, the Angolans had been utterly intransigent with respect to the Cuban military presence in this country, but the fact of the matter is that Angola Government has already tabled the proposal in the Obangundu-Namibian negotiations, in which they offered to withdraw two-thirds of all of the Cuban troops in Angola over the course of the next 3 years, with the remainder being stationed 1,000 miles north of South Africa border, and there is every reason to believe that in the context of a Namibia settlement that the Angolans would be prepared to further accelerate the withdrawal of Cuban troops from their country, perhaps in less than 3 years, and to reduce the numbers by even more than they have already offered to.

I would submit that the Cuban military presence in Angola can best be dealt with by a solution to the Namibia problem. The way to get the Cubans out of Angola is to get the South Africans out of Namibia.

The way to increase the Cuban military presence in Angola is for the United States to provide help for Savimbi.

In a context in which Cuban military presence in Angola would become much more legitimate throughout Africa as a whole since it would be seen by other Africa countries as a way of enabling the recognized government of Angola defend itself against South Africa supported insurgents against them.

Insofar as a Namibia concern, I think that the provision of assistance to Mr. Savimbi would be completely counterproductive.

Were we to do so, the chances are that the Angolans would refuse to reenter the Namibia negotiations, and insofar as South Africa is concerned the South Africans would jump at the opportunity for a tacit strategic alliance with the United States in support of Savimbi in Angola, as a consequence of which the South African interest in Namibia settlement would evaporate, because the South

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Africans would have much more of an interest in continuing the Angolan conflict, in order to derive the benefits of a strategic association with the United States in Angola as distinguished from agreeing to an Namibian settlement pursuant to which their forces would be obligated to withdraw from Namibia and they would be obligated to cease supporting Savimbi, in which case they would no longer have the benefits from their point of view of this kind of strategic association with the United States in Angola.

So I think that were we to adopt this legislation, whatever slim chance there may be of a Namibia settlement would go right down the diplomatic drain.

Last, Mr. Chairman, it may well be that in the circumstances of World War II, it made sense both for Britian and the United States to enter into an alliance with the Soviet Union, whose human rights record obviously left a lot to be desired. Of course, at that time the very survival of our four nations was at stake, and furthermore at that time there was no political downside in terms of a association with the Soviet Union.

This is simply not the case in South Africa. Nobody can possibly argue that the survival of Western civilization in the battle in terms of who wins the struggle for power in Angola, and unlike the situation that existed at that time of World War II, our support for Savimbi in cooperation with South African support for UNITA would constitute a significant political and diplomatic setback for the United States throughout Africa as a whole.

And perhaps if we could send Senator Pepper on a tour of Africa to persuade all of the African leaders that they shouldn't criticize us for our support of Savimbi, we might be able to change their opinions.

I know of nobody more able for that task, and if we decided to help Savimbi I hope the administration will ask the Senator to make that journey, because my fear is that they won't see it the way some people here do, and all of the benefits we have derived from our decision to apply economic pressure against South Africa in an effort to induce them to abandon apartheid would be lost as a result of our decision to enter into this kind of strategic alliance with South Africa.

That is simply a reality of the situation in Africa today. And if we are really concerned about preventing the spread of communism on that continent, I think there are few things we could do which would be of greater benefit to the Soviet Union and of greater disadvantage to us than entering into this kind of relationship with UNITA.

[Mr. Solarz' prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. STEPHEN J. SOLARZ, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you, particularly in the company of such distinguished Members of the House, to discuss a major policy issue which will have long-term consequences not only for our Nation, but for the people of southern Africa.

I, too, share the concerns of many of my colleagues about the need to promote democratic values and prevent the spread of communism. I believe that there are times when it is in the interest of the United States and to further the traditional values this Nation stands for, to provide assistance to anti-Communist freedom

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fighters. But, I also believe that there are times and situations when nonintervention is a much wiser policy.

ANGOLA IS ONE INSTANCE OF A CIVIL WAR WHERE THE UNITED STATES SHOULD NOT INTERVENE

Some complain that conservatives are overreacting to our debacle in Southeast Asia by seeking to aid anti-Communist insurgencies everywhere, while liberals automatically oppose American military involvement anywhere. But our world is far too complex to conduct our Nation's foreign policy by reflex—either interventionist or isolationist—which ignore local and regional realities.

To determine what the best course of action is in Angola, it is essential that we carefully examine six questions that spell out what are our central objectives in this situation and how, we as a nation should best pursue them.

1. First of all, what are the central policy objectives of the United States in the area? Our primary aims in Angola are: to secure the withdrawal of the 30,000 Cuban troops from Angola, and the adoption of an internationally recognized settlement of the conflict in Namibia. A Cuban troop withdrawal would reduce the East-West dimension of the conflict in southern Africa. A Namibian settlement would end one of the last vestiges of colonialism and a threat to stability in southern Africa.

2. Second, how can we best achieve these U.S. objectives? By maintaining pressure on the parties involved to seek a negotiated political solution in Angola. If Angola were unwilling to reduce or remove the Cuban troop presence, a case might be made for American support for UNITA. But the Luanda Government has been relatively flexibile and forthcoming on this issue. Angola has expressed a willingness to remove two-thirds of the Cuban troops within 3 years and insure that none of those remaining are stationed within 1,000 miles of the South African border in return for South Africa withdrawing its forces from Namibia and ending its support for Savimbi. If serious negotiations between Angola and South Africa on Namibia were resumed, it is entirely conceivable that Luanda would agree to an even greater and more rapid withdrawal of Cuban forces from their territory.

Providing support for Jonas Savimbi would simply increase Angola's dependence on the Cubans and the Soviet Union. Rather than allow UNITA and South Africa to overthrow the Angolan Government, Cuba would most likely dispatch more troops to Angola to shore up the Luanda regime.

Reaching a Namibian settlement is thus the only path to a Cuban troop withdrawal, and the roadblocks to that withdrawal are to be found now in Pretoria rather than in Luanda. South Africa continues to occupy Namibia in defiance of International law. Its contemptuous rejection of Angola's proposal for a Cuban troop withdrawal demonstrates that, for Pretoria, the Cuban troop presence is not the major obstacle to an accord.

American aid for UNITA, however, would all but obliterate the chances of a Namibian settlement. Angola would be unlikely to return to the negotiating table. South Africa would then have every incentive to use and prolong the Angolan conflict, both to avoid a Namibian settlement and to gain maximum benefits from its new de facto strategic alliance with the United States in support of Savimbi.

Another unfortunate fallout from U.S. aid to UNITA, would be South Africa's abiiity to once more dismiss American objections to its outrageous policy of apartheid as merely a domestic political gesture. This would reenforce the Botha Government's refusal to accommodate the legitimate demands of black South Africans to fully participate in the political, social and economic life of their country.

3. How do our friends in the region view United States support for the insurgency in Angola? South Africa and Zaire are the only countries in Africa which support UNITA. The others do not believe that the UNITA insurgency will contribute to a lasting peace. For the United States to support Savimbi, in an implicit alliance with South Africa, would make us appear oblivious at best and complicit at worst in South Africa's efforts to destabilize its neighbors. It would also quickly wear out the welcome with which most of Africa greeted the sanctions President Reagan, under pressure from Congress, recently imposed against the apartheid regime.

4. How closely tied to the Soviet Union is the regime which the insurgency is challenging? Our chances of having an even minimally cooperative relationship with Angola—on Namibia, trade, and other issues—depend on how tight the ties are between the Luanda regime and the Soviet bloc. Despite its obvious dependence on Moscow and Havana under current circumstances, the MPLA government does have an independent identity and some freedom of action. If, in the context of a

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Namibia settlement, it asked the Cubans to leave, there is every reason to believe that they would do so.

5. What are the prospects that the insurgency will achieve its goals, with or without American aid? Even with American aid, UNITA has little chance of overthrowing the MPLA regime, and particularly at the levels suggested by the legislation introduced in the House. American assistance moreover, would only stimulate increased Soviet aid and an augmented Cuban military presence, thus leading to a new stalemate and higher levels of violence and suffering for the 8 million people of Angola.

6. Would achievement of the insurgency's objectives result in a major improvement in the condition of the people in Angola? Advocates of American intervention assert that a UNITA victory would bring a new birth of freedom and democratic values to that country. Yet Jonas Savimbi's background and beliefs belie the feverish attempts of his most fervent American backers to paint him as an African James Madison. He has described his own political philosophy as Marxist with a preference for the Chinese system, rather than the Soviet or Cuban variety. If Savimbi were to triumph the prospects for any genuine political pluralism are hardly encouraging, and it is unlikely that we would see a democratication of Angola or witness its people enjoying free speech and freedom of the press. Beneath the veneer of Western ideologies in Angola is the reality of deep tribal and regional rivalries in which the majority of the Ovinbundu people led by UNITA are arrayed against the Lunda people represented by the MPLA.

In conclusion, an analysis of the recent history of Angola indicates that the best way to get the Cubans out of Angola is to get the South Africans out of Namibia. American aid for UNITA would all but obliterate the chances of a Namibian settlement. Angola would be unlikely to return to the negotiating table if the reasonable proposals it has advanced are now met by American efforts to destabilize their Government. U.S. aid to Savimbi would implicitly constitute an American strategic alliance with the apartheid regime of South Africa, which is after all Savimbi's chief supplier and supporter.

South Africa would see United States aid to UNITA as proof that the longer the Angolan insurgency continued, the more likely the United States would be forced to decrease its pressure for internal change and the abolition of apartheid, since the United States would desire military cooperation in Angola. This would be a serious mistake for our country, both militarily and politically, since the last thing we should want is to have the United States working closely with the white supremacists in South Africa in the effort to destabilize another African country and deny independence to the people of Namibia.

My impression is that we have a strategic stalement in Angola. The Dos Santos government cannot break the back of the insurgency, and UNITA, even with South African forces involved, cannot defeat the MPLA. If the Cubans went home, then possibly UNITA could defeat the MPLA, but then the MPLA would take to the bush and Savimbi would be defending Luanda in a new guerrilla war.

In the last analysis, whether the United States gets involved or not, the only solution in Angola is a negotiated one. We should be working with our allies for a political resolution of the conflict and a national reconciliation of all the factions in Angola rather than pursuing an illusory and extremely costly policy that seeks a military victory for UNITA and places the United States in a close strategic relationship with South Africa and its efforts to maintain apartheid at all costs.

Mr. WOLPE. Thank you very much, Mr. Solarz.

I would like to invite our other distinguished colleague from New York, Mr. Stratton.

STATEMENT OF HON. SAMUEL S. STRATTON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Mr. STRATTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I don't pretend to be an expert on Angola, but I did have the privilege of introducing the resolution that the gentleman from Florida offered on the floor several months ago to repeal the Clark amendment. Since a number of years have passed since the Clark amendment was enacted, it might be of interest and perhaps helpful in this discussion if I recalled exactly the circumstances under

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which the Clark amendment was approved by the House of Representatives and by the Senate as well.

The Clark amendment was a knee-jerk reaction to the withdrawal from Vietnam, which occurred just before. We had withdrawn from Vietnam with the impression on the part of many individuals who weren't particularly familiar with what actually was going on in Vietnam, that all that was needed to transform Vietnam was to wipe out the terrible regime of President Thieu, and put in Big Minh, and then democracy would flourish in South Vietnam and the trees would grow back again.

At the same time we were in the process of that traumatic withdrawal from Vietnam, the collapse of the Angolan Government. The uprising in its territories under the leadership of General Di Spinola raised the question of whether we should provide help to Portugal, which we had always regarded as a friendly country, a very beautiful country, one that was joined with us at least in trade, and which had been the terminus of the clipper that flew the Atlantic during World War II.

The issue was whether or not we should provide help, because, as a result of the uprising in the colonies of Angola, a fight was going on between the Communists and the anti-Communists. Senator Pepper has correctly pinpointed the head of the anti-Communist group, Mr. Roberto.

But the trauma that was associated with having to withdraw from Vietnam was one that has blinded many people on all sides, simply touting the slogan "no more Vietnams!"

Yet here we were confronted once again with another Soviet attempt to take over a country to which it had no claim whatsoever. But so deep was the disappointment with what had resulted from Vietnam that when Senator Clark, a junior Senator, proposed his amendment, there was a big rush to support it. It was believed that there was no real threat to the United States in Angola, there was no problem that concerned us, and as a result, the Clark amendment was readily accepted.

I don't think there has ever been in recent history anything quite like the Clark amendment that would announce publicly that there was one spot in the world the United States was not going to provide any kind of aid regardless of whether the Russians were there, or if the Mongols were there, or even if the men with green eyes from Mars were there.

It was something, when you look back on it in terms of its history, that seems almost incredible for the United States to have enacted, and even more incredible for the United States to have continued to respect that legislation until the brave, determined, and eloquent Senator from Florida, Mr. Pepper, brought it to the attention of the House.

I remember that I felt very honored when my colleague from Florida asked me if I would be willing to introduce this repeal legislation, because he was going to be a few minutes late. And so I stood in the well and introduced the amendment by my colleague.

I couldn't, of course, defend it in the eloquent way that he did, but we got the move underway and when the Senator finally arrived on the floor with his usual eloquence, the House overwhelm-

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ingly supported the elimination of the Clark amendment as provided in the Pepper resolution.

I think obviously the support for eliminating the Clark amendment was because, looking in hindsight it made the United States look foolish to single out one small piece of the world and announce we would never give them any assistance to fight Communist and Cuban aggression.

And for us to be quibbling today, it seems to me incredible, that having made this remarkable decision not only in the House, but also in the Senate, that we shouldn't several weeks ago have begun to supply the aid that the elimination of the Clark resolution was designed to provide.

I want to congratulate not only the gentleman from Florida, but also Mr. Siljander for his resolution, and I think both of them are moving in the right direction.

What is, I think, of the most grave concern is the idea that when we brush this thing off, it is incredible that we should be tolerating, and should have tolerated over so many years the idea of Cuban troops in Angola.

They have no business in Angola. They have no business in Ethiopia. They have no business in a number of other places around the world.

And yet, although we now have the legal authority to deal with this situation, we are apparently trying to prevent the enactment of what the Senator from Florida has provided us.

The gentleman from New York says (Mr. Solarz) there is nothing really down there in Angola that we want or that we need. There is, in fact, a very substantial oil supply, and one of the major benefits of the Clark amendment was that it provided to the leftist Cuban supported Government of Angola the funds from the oil activities that were going out of the main port in Angola.

I think that we certainly ought to reverse ourselves not just with a single vote, but to make sure that the purpose of that vote is carried out.

I think we ought to remind ourselves of the situation in Angola and of the speech that the President of the United States gave to the United Nations when he was there a couple of weeks ago. He proposed that the Soviets and the United States join together to try to stamp out these small wars that are being carried on in Afhganistan, in Cambodia, in Nicaragua, in Ethiopia, and in Angola.

These are the places where the Soviet so-called wars of popular liberation are being carried out by Soviet leaders with Soviet assistance, and they are one of the major reasons for world instability and for the possibility of further military operations in other world areas.

I don't think that we should be leaving Angola off that list. It is long over due that we should provide assistance to the leadership of the Angolan people, whether it is Mr. Roberto, whether it is Mr. Savimbi. Those who have fought the Cubans and those who have fought the Communists, I think, are the ones that should be provided the assistance that they deserve, I hope that this will be done quickly, although I must say, I am not too overly optimistic that this subcommittee will report the resolution favorably.

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But I hope that they may be touched as a result of these hearings to do the right thing.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. WOLPE. Thank you very much, Mr. Stratton. I am confident that we will be touched to do the right thing, and I thank you for your testimony.

Mr. McHugh.

STATEMENT OF HON. MATTHEW F. McHUGH, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Mr. MCHUGH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Our friend Senator Pepper has to leave for another meeting unfortunately, and I know he extends his thanks to you and his apologies for having to leave.

Mr. WOLPE. Thank you very much, Senator.

We certainly understand.

Thank you.

Mr. MCHUGH. First of all, Mr. Chairman, my appreciation to you and the rest of the committee for holding these hearings. It is an opportune time since the administration is now in the course of debating whether to proceed with aid to Mr. Savimbi.

Whatever else might be said about providing assistance, it is certainly clear that to do so would be seen in this country and in Africa as a significant change in U.S. policy. For that reason alone it seems to me that we should evaluate very carefully this significant change in light of our broader interests and our broader goals in Africa, especially in Southern Africa.

In general terms, I think it is safe to say that our policies have been designed to promote stability in Africa, including Southern Africa. We do that in recognition of the fact that out of a stability evolves moderate leadership and an opportunity for the African people to focus on their economic development and growth.

To the contrary, instability promotes radicalization, economic stagnation, and the kind of governments which it would not be in the interests of the African people or the United States to see evolve in that region.

In furtherance of that general proposition and goal of stability we have tried to promote a number of specific objectives which include, of course, fundamental change in South Africa.

We have also promoted a negotiating process which we hope will lead to the independence of Namibia, a settlement that would bring with it the withdrawal of South African troops from Angola and Namibia, as well as the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola.

We have also tried to develop a more constructive positive relationship with all the nations in Southern Africa, not only through political initiatives where appropriate but through the provision of economic assistance.

All of these things have been consistent goals of American policy, and have generally been supported in Africa itself.

The risk in of providing assistance to Mr. Savimbi is that it will change the thrust of American policies, or at the very least, the perception of American policies in Africa. The United States in my

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judgment would lose its opportunity to serve as a potential mediator within Angola itself, and also it will be seen as having abandoned our efforts to promote the independence of Namibia.

Clearly, we would be seen as collaborating with the policies of South Africa.

And I think you are all aware that at the Summit meeting this summer, the Organization of African Unity clearly expressed its concern about the repeal of the Clark amendment, and just last week a group of African Ambassadors to the United Nations met with our Ambassador, General Walters, and expressed their very strong concern about the possibility of American support for the Savimbi forces.

In that connection, Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce for the record, if I may, a copy of the aide memoire which was delivered to our Ambassador by the African group last week. I would like that to be included in the record.

Mr. WOLPE. Without objection.

[The information referred to follows:]

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SECRETARIAT EXECUTIF DE L'ORGANISATION DE L'UNITE AFRICAINE AUX NATIONS UNIES

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY TO THE UNITED NATIONS

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AIDE MEMOIRE

The African Group has noted with deep concern the action taken by the United States Congress in abrogating the Clark Amendment which prohibited assistance to the rebels operating to the overthrow of the legally constituted Government of the People's Republic of Angola.

Since the abrogation of the Clark Amendment, the concern of the African Group has been heightened in view of the efforts being made by various quarters in Washington to render assistance to the rebels to overthrow a legally established Government, Member of the Organization of African Unity, of the Non-Aligned Movement and of the United Nations.

In the light of the above-mentioned developments, reports in the press to the effect that the US Administration is contemplating assistance to the rebels is highly alarming to all the O.A.U. Member States.

We draw your attention to the Declaration of the Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity meeting in Addis Ababa in July 1985 to the effect that "any American covert or overt involvement in the interna) affairs of the People's Republic of Angola, directly or through third parties, will be considered a hostile act against the Organization of African Unity."

The rebels operating in parts of Southern Angola, it is common knowledge, are trained, financed, deployed and armed by the racist regime in Pretoria which in pursuit of its policy of state terrorism has carried out a lengthy series of acts of aggression against independent African States in the region resulting in wanton killings of civilians and systematic destruction of the economic infrastructure.

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The Organization of African Unity earnestly hopes that the U.S. Administration would not want to assist the racist regime of Pretoria and rebels aided by them to subvert or overthrow sovereign and independent African Governments.

The Heads of State and Government of the O.A.U., meeting in Addis Ababa in July further added that "any renewal of clandestine operations against the territorial integrity of the People's Republic of Angola, would constitute gross interference in the internal affairs of the Republic of Angola, and the latter reserves the right to take any appropriate action it may deem necessary."

It is our considered opinion that assistance in any form to the rebels would seriously put in question the credibility and good faith of the United States and undermine efforts to reach a peaceful solution to the conflicts in the region.

Rameschand SEEREEKISSOON
Permanent Representative of Mauritius
Chairman of the African Group

Mr. McHUGH. I would like to read the last paragraph of that which I think is the thrust of the African opinion:

It is our considered opinion that assistance in any form to the rebels would seriously put in question the credibility and good faith of the United States and undermine efforts to reach a peaceful solution to the conflicts in the region.

Now, if one discounts completely the opinion of these African leaders and African nations, then it is not important what they think and this aide memoire and the views it expresses are not terribly significant, but I think it has been in the interests of the United States and continues to be in the interest of the United States that we be seen as promoting stability and peace by these African countries.

And I am afraid that that would be seriously compromised if we were to provide aid to Savimbi.

In short, Mr. Chairman, I think that we would be taking a new turn in American policy, and for what purpose it is not terribly clear to me. The amount of money that is proposed by Senator Pepper and others would not measurably improve UNITA's position in Angola. It is not a great deal of money.

It would, however, symbolically put us in the position of a combatant, at least indirecly in that conflict, and that is the fundamental problem.

Finally, I would say that, for any policy of this kind to be sustainable, and ultimately to be successful, it has to enjoy the broad understanding and support of the Congress and the American people. That is true in a democracy whatever policies we are discussing.

It is certainly clear that in the Congress, and I believe increasingly in the country, that this policy direction as proposed by our

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friend from Florida and others is, will not enjoy the kind of broad support that is required if this policy is to be sustainable and ultimately successful.

There is not a clear understanding and there is certainly not broad support for this proposition. And for that reason alone it seems to me inappropriate and unwise for us to proceed with assistance to Mr. Savimbi, at least at this time.

Again, Mr. Chairman, my thanks to you for giving us this opportunity, and I do have a formal statement which I would appreciate also being included in the record.

[Mr. McHugh's prepared statement follows:]

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Prepared Statement of Hon. Matthew F. McHugh, a Representative in Congress From the State of New York

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Subcommittee, I appreciate the opportunity to be here this afternoon to discuss U.S. policy toward Angola, and more specifically to share some observations regarding the wisdom of various proposals that would involve the United States in the conflict in that nation.

As you know, legislation has recently been introduced in the House that would dramatically change U.S. policy toward Angola. One bill would provide $27 million in U.S. military assistance to the insurgent forces of Jonas Savimbi. Another would provide a similar amount of non-military assistance. Still a third would prohibit new investment, embargo trade, and prohibit loans to Angola. In addition, of course, press reports indicate that the Reagan administration is considering whether to covertly assist UNITA.

Perhaps the most fundamental point that I wish to make this afternoon is that any change in U.S. policy toward Angola should not be considered in isolation. Proposed changes need to be evaluated in terms of broader U.S. policy objectives toward Africa in general and southern Africa in particular. In short, I believe it would be a mistake to make policy solely on the basis of our assessment of the Angolan government or UNITA. The issues involved are far more complex than that, and need to be carefully assessed in the context of broader U.S. interests.

I am opposed to any fundamental change in U.S. policy toward Angola at this time. In particular, I oppose efforts, direct or indirect, covert or overt, to provide U.S. military or economic assistance to the forces of Jonas Savimbi. I do not believe that it is in our interest as a nation to do so for a number of fundamental reasons.

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First, I believe that U.S. involvement in this conflict would seriously damage our relations with governments throughout Africa.

Second, such involvement would complicate our efforts to address a host of complex issues in southern Africa and undermine the potentially constructive role that our government can play as a mediator in the Angolan conflict.

Third, U.S. assistance is not needed to sustain UNITA. Thus, the purpose of the various proposals now pending before the House is largely symbolic, that is, to explicitly align the United States with UNITA. That makes very little sense when broader issues regarding U.S. policy toward Africa are taken into account.

Finally, U.S. involvement in on-going conflicts, whether overt or covert, cannot be sustained over the long haul unless there is a broad consensus among the American people in support of such involvement. With regard to our potential involvement in the Angolan conflict, there is no such consensus.

Let me briefly elaborate on each of these points.

AFRICAN ASPIRATIONS AND U.S. POLICY

As you know, Mr. Chairman, Africa is a continent of great diversity. While it is sometimes easy to define our specific policy objectives in particular African countries, it is not so easy to detect the common threads of U.S. policy toward the continent as a whole.

Nonetheless, since the dawn of the independence movement on the African continent, United States policy has fostered three broad objectives that most Africans share in common:

-- support for decolonialization;
-- opposition to the South African government's policy of apartheid; and
-- encouragement of rapid, sustained and equitable economic growth and development.

These are goals with which the vast majority of the American people can identify, and by-and-large I believe that our government

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has played a constructive role in attempting to promote them. At the same time, most of us would agree that progress toward the achievement of these goals over the course of the last thirty years has been mixed at best.

On the positive side, with the notable exception of Namibia, the goal of decolonialization is largely an accomplished fact today. By way of contrast, far less progress has been made toward the goals of ending apartheid in South Africa and achieving economic growth and development. Nonetheless, these are goals to which the United States remains committed, as demonstrated by the overwhelming bipartisan support for a tougher policy toward South Africa and our continuing commitment of resources to meet the very severe problems that African nations face.

It has been our commitment to these three goals that has earned the United States considerable good will throughout the continent. In this context, one must question the impact in Africa of our providing material assistance to UNITA.

My own judgment is that such a decision would seriously damage our relations with governments across the African continent, given Mr. Savimbi's ties to the South African government. Most African governments would question why the United States is prepared to assist UNITA while refusing to aid those who have taken up arms against a white minority government in South Africa that consistently violates the basic human rights of the non-white majority and that refuses to allow the citizens of Namibia to exercise their right to self-determination. In short, assisting UNITA would be perceived throughout Africa as a step away from two of the three basic policy objectives that have enjoyed broad support in Africa.

This should be clear from the reaction throughout Africa to the repeal of the Clark amendment. As you know, the Organization of African Unity expressed deep concern about that decision at its summit conference last summer. A decision to go ahead with assistance to UNITA would undoubtedly evoke a much stronger reaction.

Indeed, just a week ago a key group of African ambassadors at the United Nations met with Ambassador Walters to express their concerns about potential U.S. involvement in this conflict. Mr. Chairman, I

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would ask permission to have the full-text of their aide-memoire inserted into the hearing record at this point. I would also call your attention to the concluding paragraph which states: "It is our considered opinion that assistance in any form to the rebels would seriously put in question the credibility and good faith of the United States and undermine efforts to reach a peaceful solution to the conflicts in the region."

U.S. POLICY OBJECTIVES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

The United States has been pursuing a complex series of objectives in southern Africa. On the one hand, we are seeking to promote an end to apartheid in South Africa and to secure the independence of Namibia. At the same time, we are also seeking to bring about the removal of Cuban troops from Angola, to limit Soviet influence in Angola, Mozambique, and other countries in southern Africa by promoting peace and stability, and to open up the political systems of countries such as Angola so that groups like UNITA can participate fully in their political life. That is certainly an ambitious policy agenda for the United States and one that remains far from complete. However, there have been some encouraging developments in recent years, including the U.S.-brokered Lusaka and Nkomati accords and an improved relationship with Mozambique.

If the United States actively involves itself in the Angolan conflict, it would be focusing upon one element of a complex equation to the detriment of others. Clearly, Angola would become even more dependent upon Soviet advisors and Cuban troops, and prospects for peace in the region would dim. The United States would have lost its role as a potential mediator within Angola itself and would be seen as having abandoned its efforts to promote the independence of Namibia. In fact, we would be seen as collaborating with the policies of the South African government, which would be an albatross around our neck across Africa, just as South Africa's association with Mr. Savimbi taints his movement among Africans.

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DOES UNITA NEED U.S. ASSISTANCE?

At a more practical level, moreover, U.S. assistance is not needed. UNITA has carried on this war for a decade partly with captured arms and equipment and partly with the assistance of the South African government, which has demonstrated its readiness to provide whatever assistance UNITA requires (including air strikes if necessary).

The amounts of U.S. assistance contemplated in the different bills before Congress are relatively small. Funding at these levels will not make any significant difference in the war, but will almost certainly complicate our efforts to end it and to open up the Angolan political system.

In short, we are talking about a symbolic commitment of U.S. assistance that aligns us with a particular faction at the expense of broader U.S. policy objectives in southern Africa. That hardly makes sense at this point since it would represent an abandonment of 10 years of hard work in the region.

What these bills seek to do, then, is to subordinate our regional interests in Africa to larger East-West concerns. Yet, it is questionable as to what would be gained by doing so.

LACK OF PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR CHANGE

Finally, there is no consensus within our country that would support the use of force in Angola. Most Americans know very little about that country, or about southern Africa's political problems in general. They do not perceive Angola to be the victim of Soviet aggression, as is the case in Afghanistan, but rather a combatant in a conflict with South Africa. Thus, the American people are not likely to support U.S. assistance to UNITA over the long haul, a condition precedent in our democracy if any policy is to be sustainable and successful.

A decision to assist UNITA would undoubtedly prompt many Americans to ask some tough questions. What are our objectives in Angola? Are we seeking to overthrow the Angolan government? If so, how much

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are we prepared to spend in this effort and for how long? Are the forces we are supporting truly committed to democracy? Do they have a chance of winning? How will our involvement promote an end to apartheid in South Africa and Namibian independence? Why run the risk of being further perceived as an ally of South Africa? Are we prepared to support similar movements in other African countries, such as Mozambique and Ethiopia?

CONCLUSION

Mr. Chairman, I recognize that some believe that the mood in the United States has changed since Congress voted to repeal the Clark amendment. Yet, I have talked with members who supported that decision but who are opposed to direct U.S. involvement in the Angolan conflict. And the conference report on this issue was quite clear in indicating that the decision to repeal the Clark amendment should not be taken as an indication that Congress is prepared to support assistance to UNITA:

> It is the intent of the Committee on Conference that the repeal of the Clark amendment not necessarily be construed to be an endorsement by the Congress of the provision of assistance of any kind, for the purpose, or which would have the effect, of promoting or augmenting, directly or indirectly, the capacity of any nation, group, organization, movement, or individual to conduct military or paramilitary operations in or against Angola. Provision of such assistance requires further legislative procedures--the appropriate authorization and appropriation bills or presentment by the President of a finding to the Select Committees on Intelligence.

Unfortunately, what we can anticipate from so fundamental a change in policy is a long, bitter and devisive debate over the wisdom of U.S. policy in southern Africa. Any vote in the Congress is likely to be close. That is not a sound basis for such a major change in policy, and I believe that such a change could haunt us for decades.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

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Mr. WOLPE. Thank you very much, Mr. McHugh. All of the statements that have been submitted in writing will, of course, be included in their entirety in the record.

Let me begin the questioning before we recess for the vote.

Let me make just a couple of quick observations by way of a preliminary question to the gentleman from New York.

The point has been made, I think, by yourself, Mr. Stratton, and also by Senator Pepper, a lot of people do not have a great deal of involvement with Africa; particularly with Angola. This is simply not a subject most Americans have had intimate involvement, or much experience in. There has been a tendency to end up responding to labels in a way that I think is frequently rather deceptive, and where we end up unintentionally being manipulated rather than doing the manipulation.

To illustrate, there are a couple of points that were made by both you and the Senator earlier that, if you were to check the historical record, you might be surprised a bit. You indicated in your characterization of history of the Angolan nationalist movement that Mr. Holden Roberto was one of the anti-Communist leaders that the United States chose to support.

It is certainly true we chose to support Roberto as we did in an earlier period to support Savimbi. I think what most Americans would be surprised to discover is that both of these gentlemen have characterized themselves and been characterized by others as, in fact, Marxists, and that indeed, not only was the United States supporting Roberto, and Savimbi, but the Chinese and the North Koreans were involved in the support for both Roberto, and the Chinese as well for Jonas Savimbi.

I say that because one of the real tragedies, is that I am sure that most Americans really think what we have in Angola right now is a struggle between the forces of democracy, capitalistic values, and the Western world on the one hand, laid against Marxism and the Soviet Union on the other.

When, in fact, the whole history of the movement indicates that ideologies was not at the core of the dispute between Savimbi, Mr. Roberto, and Mr. Natu; but actually there were various conflicts of leadership, to some extent difficulties in the ethnic bases of the three different factions.

Consequently, not knowing that, not understanding the internal dynamics of these conflicts, we end up responding in a way that is counterproductive. It turns out, for example, that Mr. Savimbi has been eminently pragmatic, not only has he received assistance from the North Koreans and the Chinese, if I can just finish the thought——

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Chairman, do you want to give me the question so I can answer it before the next bell rings.

Mr. WOLPE. Maybe we will have time.

Mr. STRATTON. The point is, what is the tragedy is because of the failure to provide help to Angola that you got the Chinese and the North Koreans.

Had we been in there, the way we should have been, it would have been entirely different picture.

I would point out to you, Mr. Chairman, that the revolution in Portugal began in the colonies in Angola, and there was where the

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Communists' forces were located, but today the thrust of the Communists' leadership, General Despanola, has evaporated and Portugal now has a democracy.

Mr. WOLPE. Mr. Stratton, you are missing my point. My point is very simply that the characterization of Jonas Savimbi as the embodiment of Western values is simply nonsense on its face, and that, in fact, this is an individual who has avowedly characterized himself as a Maoist.

Now it may be that there may still be reasons to support him.

The point I am trying to get away from is the overall simplistic charcterization of the forces that are in dispute.

Let me read you and ask you for your evaluation of Mr. Savimbi analysis here.

"Yes, UNITA is a socialist movement. We are in favor of Socialism because it is necessary to socialize production. Only in this way can values be created in people."

Or on another occasion he observed, "No productive action is possible with men who serve American interests—the notorious agents of imperialism."

On another occasion, "UNITA is aware that the struggle against United States-led imperialism in Angola is a vital key to the heart of the entire Southern African problem."

The last comment is not by Mr. Savimbi but by Jorge Sangumba the internal secretary of Angolan affairs.

I was going to ask you your reaction to those particular quotes that Mr. Savimbi, and one of his key ministers within his political party?

Mr. STRATTON. I don't want to miss my vote here. I want to keep my record straight.

Mr. WOLPE. Fair enough. The committee will recess.

[Brief recess.]

Mr. WOLPE. The hearing will resume. My time has expired, I suspect. Let me at this point yield to the gentlemen from New York, Mr. Weiss.

Mr. WEISS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I simply want to commend our distinguished colleagues from New York for the very profound and insightful statements that they made. I think that history will prove that indeed their position is absolutely sound, and hopefully in the short history their statements and presentations will provide support for the Secretary of State against those within and without the administration, within and without Congress, for attempting to in fact undermine his position and tc take the United States off on another reckless venture.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. WOLPE. Thank you very much, Mr. Weiss. Let me thank both of my colleagues for their observations. I really was attempting to make a point. I think it was a very serious point—sometimes we get locked into these disputations over foreign policy. They acquire symbolic value and a political life of their own, independent of what is out there in the real world, and I guess I am still hopeful that the more people begin to learn about the historical and political context of developments that are now unfolding within Angola and southern Africa, that perhaps a few people will be courageous enough to reassess the wisdom of what is being proposed.

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I am absolutely convinced that assistance to UNITA at this point will play directly into the hands of the Soviets and the Cubans and the South Africans. It simply does not make sense from my point of view that the United States should be viewed as entering into a military alliance with South Africa on behalf of Mr. Savimbi. It does not make sense to increase the government's reliance upon the Cubans and the Soviets, which I believe would be the consequence of this kind of assistance.

Mr. Solarz, I believe you wanted to make a point.

Mr. SOLARZ. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to submit for the record a series of quotations from Mr. Savimbi which buttress the argument you have been making, and which indicate that whatever else he may be, he is not necessarily an unabashed exponent of political pluralism as we have understood it in the West.[1]

One other point I would like to add here, Mr. Chairman, is I don't think we should be indifferent to the fate of freedom in Angola, and I don't think anybody should believe that those of us who are opposed to aid for Savimbi are therefore necessarily uninterested in facilitating greater respect to human rights in Angola. The real question that confronts us is how best to go about it, and indeed, if the main argument for helping Savimbi boils down to an argument that he is fighting against a repressive regime, then where will it all end?

There are many other repressive regimes around the world. Not all of them are Communist governments, and if the sole criteria for determining whether the United States should provide help to a group of insurgents fighting against the repressive regime is the extent to which the regime against which they are fighting is repressive, why, then, it seems to me we would have established the formula for a kind of perpetual American military involvement and support of insurgencies in dozens of countries all over the world, and I don't think that would be in the interests of the United States.

There are other ways of advancing the cause of human rights, and in the case of Angola, I think one of the best things we can do is to try to facilitate the withdrawal of the Cuban troops from that country.

On that issue, I don't think there is any disagreement among us. All of us on both sides of the aisle, liberals as well as conservatives, would like to see the Cubans go. They have better things to do in their own country than fight in wars 3,000 miles away in Africa, but I do believe that if we start providing aid for Savimbi, the most likely result is that the Angolan Government will ask the Cubans to send more troops to help them defend themselves against the growing challenge to their Government, and at the end of the day, a new stalemate will be established in Angola, albeit a higher level of violence, with more destruction and more people being killed and more Cuban troops in the country.

On the other hand, if we concentrate on trying to get a Namibian settlement pursuant to which South Africa would withdraw its

[1] See appendix.

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forces from Namibia and cease supporting Savimbi, there is every reason to believe that we would be able to facilitate the withdrawal of either all of the Cuban military forces from Angola or most of them, and that would clearly be in our interests and it would be in the interests of the Angolan people as well.

Mr. WOLPE. Mr. McHugh.

Mr. MCHUGH. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

On this question of how we distinguish between those groups we help and those we don't help, there is an interesting letter in today's Post which I might just draw the committee's attention to. It is written by Donald Norland, who was formerly an Ambassador for the United States to Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland. I will just quote from a part of it, if I may.

He says, "If the aim is to take a stand on the side of freedom, self-determination and human rights, why embark on a shadowy project requiring close cooperation with a minority white regime in order to assist a controversial minority black rebel movement in Angola? How can one overlook existing movements representing the acknowledged majorities in both South Africa and Namibia? There the denial of freedom, self-determination and human rights is obvious to one and all, and contrary to proposed help for UNITA, there would be a broad national consensus for direct financial assistance to an organization such as the United Democratic Front of Bishop Tutu."

Now, one can agree with that or disagree with it, but at the very least, it points up the problem we have at distinguishing between what groups we should help and what groups we should not help; and it makes the point I was trying to make earlier, that there is a real division of opinion in the Congress and in the country on the wisdom of providing aid to Savimbi's forces.

It is unwise in my judgment, as I said earlier, to embark upon a policy such as this without a broader consensus on the part of the American public and the American Congress, because without that kind of consensus, this kind of policy change is impossible to sustain, and therefore it won't be successful.

Mr. WOLPE. Thank you very much. Mr. Siljander.

Mr. SILJANDER. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

You read a quote from Mr. Savimbi?

Mr. WOLPE. If the gentleman would yield, two of the quotes were from Mr. Savimbi, one from Mr. Sangumba.

Mr. SILJANDER. What year?

Mr. WOLPE. In 1982. The second from Mr. Savimbi was 1976. The third one from Mr. Sangumba, 1970.

Mr. SILJANDER. I have a letter dated November 11, 1985, by Mr. Chitunda, Secretary of Foreign Affairs for UNITA. I would like to ask unanimous consent to put the entire letter in the record.

Mr. WOLPE. Without objection.

Mr. SILJANDER. It says, quoting the letter now dated 1985, "As for the assertion that Dr. Savimbi is an avowed Marxist, this accusation undoubtedly emanates from Dr. Savimbi's preindependent ties with China and can be understood within this context. Like many other members of the Third World indigeneous liberation movements of the 1960's, Dr. Savimbi trained in China. Such guerrilla warfare training was only available in Communist nations and

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was essential to overthrowing colonial rule. Dr. Savimbi values the military training he acquired in China, which aided the UNITA anticolonial struggle. However, Dr. Savimbi has never accepted the principles of Marxism. UNITA's political and economic system is clearly of a Western style in orientation."

So the most recent updated letter by the group themselves, of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, is fairly clear. They are for democracy, they are for free enterprise, which is also indicated under the ideological beliefs in this letter dated 1985, which I think is very important to clearly looking at history. As you indicated, Chairman Wolpe, one should have a good grasp of history, understanding that oftentimes the training available only at that time was in China.

Second, one quick comment on Mr. Solarz' argument—and I would like a comment from Mr. Solarz—unless we engage in continuous negotiations and otherwise allow military and/or humanitarian aid, they will simply increase the amount of Cuban troops. Well, 10 years ago when the Clark amendment was passed and signed by the President in 1975, there were 12,000 Cuban troops in Angola.

We have engaged in constructive engagement, or whatever you care to term it, negotiating over the last 10 years attempting to do precisely what you claim are the goals at least in your mind, getting the South Africans out of Namibia, and independence of Namibia and the Cuban troops out of Angola.

Now, in 1985 there were 35,000 Cuban troops, three times the amount in the beginning, so it seems like in the last decade we have failed to negotiate, and banning any assistance to UNITA has certainly proven not to be successful in reducing the amount of Cuban troops but, rather, increasing the amount of Cuban troops. And I see the argument, frankly, counterproductive. Do you care to comment on that?

Mr. SOLARZ. I didn't mean to suggest that negotiations in and of themselves would lead to a withdrawal of the Cuban troops from Angola. What I was trying to suggest was that a negotiated settlement of the Namibian problem, pursuant to which the South African forces that continue to illegally occupy Namibia would leave and pursuant to which South Africa would cease its support for Savimbi, would lead to a substantial drawdown of the Cuban troops in Angola.

I quite agree with you that intermittent efforts to get a negotiated settlement in Namibia have been underway over the last several years. The problem is there hasn't been any agreement, and the main reason there hasn't been any agreement has much more to do with the intransigence of the South Africans than of the Angolans. As I indicated in my testimony, I think the Angolans have put a pretty forthcoming proposal on the table, and the South Africans contemptuously and categorically repudiated it.

Mr. SILJANDER. If I may take back my time because it is fading quickly. It seems pretty obvious when we had the Clark amendment in place, the troops tripled, so the argument that under repeal of the Clark amendment now as of October 1, aiding the UNITA would somehow double or triple the troop numbers seems ridiculous.

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I agree with you in your own statement we need to negotiate, as well as put extra and added pressure, and certainly added extra pressure in pulling UNITA away from the South Africans, a black independence organization that has fought colonial rule from the Portuguese for 25 years now through the Cubans the Soviets and North Koreans (whether you agree that they are there or not), certainly the Cubans are there and 1,200 Soviets are there, irrespective of the North Koreans.

The fact is that it seems unconscionable and totally ridiculous to suggest that a black independence movement will somehow be open-armed welcome in an apartheid white regime of South Africa to take over Angola. That is probably one of the most ludicrous arguments of the whole effort.

Mr. Stratton, do you have any response to this argument as presented by Mr. Solarz? What we would be doing is assisting in a strategic alliance with the South African apartheid system, which for a long time hindered any progress in eliminating apartheid in South Africa by this humanitarian aid bill or our other bill dealing with military aid overtly.

Mr. STRATTON. I think that is a red herring. I don't see any need to spread out in other directions. The Clark amendment was precisely designated for Angola, and that is the area that we ought to be focusing in on, and because of the Clark amendment, we have had no real opportunity to try to examine what is going on in Angola. We haven't had any opportunity to determine who might be the main leader. What we are looking for in Angola and what we are looking for in any other place that is beseiged by the Communists would be self-determination, and I think that if the American presence began to be felt there, and if we began to have some kind of relations with them, I think the aid that we could be providing could be helpful to them, and we would have an opportunity to try to determine precisely who would be the best leader.

We have wasted an awful lot of time, and we have given the Communists a far longer opportunity to dig themselves in than should ever have been provided, and I think the chairman read something as I was going out to respond to the bell about how bad Mr. Savimbi was. I don't have any particular case to provide for him. I met him some years ago in the House of Representatives, and he seemed to me to be a knowledgeable and capable individual, but the idea that he is a tool of South Africa seems to me to be strangely absurd. Anybody who is fighting against the Communists—which is what Mr. Savimbi is doing—certainly would be on the side of the South Africans who want to protect themselves from the spread of Communist activity down the western slope of Africa.

I think the State Department apparently is just taking this decision by Congress as though it didn't really mean very much. A few whackos got up and somehow mesmerized the House of Representatives and the great Clark amendment suddenly was flushed down the drain. I think we need a serious analysis of what is going on, and if we really believe that we want Cuban troops in Angola, which I don't think anybody wants—Mr. Solarz has indicated he wasn't for it—we are going to have to put some pressure on that government, and that ought to be our first and foremost objective. I think if we can do that, we will have done a great deal.

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Mr. WOLPE. Thank you very much, Mr. Stratton. The gentleman's time has expired. Mr. Crockett.

Mr. CROCKETT. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I really don't have questions for any of our witnesses. Maybe it is because my mind is made up. And I haven't heard anything yet that causes me to change my mind. I think it is unfortunate that here in America when we look at foreign affairs, we always tend to put them in a context of East against West, Communist against anti-Communist, and all it does is lead us into difficulties.

I have had the advantage of talking with President dos Santos in Angola. I have also had the advantage of talking with Mr.——

Mr. STRATTON. I am afraid I can't hear the gentleman.

Mr. CROCKETT. I said I had the advantage of talking with President dos Santos in Angola. I have also had the privilege of talking with Mr. Castro in Cuba. It seems to me America's primary concern would be one of trying to ensure peaceful relations in the world, and not leading us down the road to world war III.

President Santos' position is that the Cubans will stay in Angola until the South Africans are out. We for a long while carried on negotiations with a view to getting the South Africans out. The resolution that is before us today is a complete reversal of our position. Not only are we not getting the South Africans out, we are proposing to go in on a gradual basis to assist the South Africans and to assist Savimbi.

In my discussions with Mr. Castro, I asked him pointblank when will the Cubans be coming home, and his answer was just as straightforward. The Cubans will come home as soon as President dos Santos says he no longer needs them and he wants them to come home.

Now, that is the situation in which we find ourselves.

Mr. STRATTON. Do I understand the gentleman to say——

Mr. CROCKETT. Just 1 minute, Congressman. I didn't undertake to ask you a question and I am not asking you a question. I am putting my views on the record just as you have been putting your views on the record.

Mr. STRATTON. I haven't been able to follow the gentleman.

Mr. CROCKETT. So it seems to me, Mr. Chairman, that the ultimate answer is one of whoever we want in gradual stages to get involved in war in the southern part of the continent of Africa, or whether we want to leave them to do the fighting between themselves. This power struggle between the dos Santos forces on the one hand and the Savimbi forces on the other hand is not one that concerns the best interests of the United States, and I think we should stay out.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. WOLPE. Thank you very much, Mr. Crockett. Mr. Burton, the gentleman from Indiana.

Mr. BURTON. We have another panel, Mr. Chairman, and I don't want to prolong this, because we have some very competent people to testify coming up, but I would just like to make a couple of comments for the record. This line of thought that we are going to jeopardize East-West relations by supporting people who are fighting for their freedom, that logic eludes me.

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The Soviet Union has put $2 billion in military aid into Angola, $1 billion in military aid into Mozambique right next door. They have Cuban advisers there. As a matter of fact, there was an offensive about 6 or 8 weeks ago, the battle of Mavinga. More than 20,000 Angolan troops accompanied by Soviet officers exercising tactical command that included 2 T-34's, T-55 tanks, T-62 tanks, 8 MIA-10, 4 PC-7 helicopters, 7 MIG 17's, and so on and so forth. It was a Soviet offensive against UNITA, and UNITA prevailed without any support from the West.

The Communists are trying to expand their sphere of influence. They are trying to crush the freedom fighters over there, and so far they have been totally unsuccessful, and our State Department, I think has made a grave error by not recognizing the Angolan Government as a Communist government, thereby allowing the Export-Import Bank to loan $129 million to the Angolan Government. But that is not the point I am trying to make.

The point I am trying to make is that at some point we have to decide we are for freedom or we are going to let the Communists just take whatever they want in this world. Now, the Soviets have sent, as I said before, $2 billion into Angola and $1 billion into Mozambique, as well as advisers, and if we pull all of our support out, we don't do anything. in time they will prevail. They will prevail in Mozambique and you will have a satellite all across the southern part of Africa and ultimately South Africa will fall.

Now, anybody who has studied this issue of South Africa knows there is more than just apartheid involved. Five minerals that are absolutely vital to the security of the United States of America come out of South Africa, and 40 percent of the free world oil supplies go around the southern tip of South Africa, and so at some point we are going to have to decide whether or not these vital resources, these vital minerals are important to the United States and to the free world, and I think it is imperative that we reevaluate the position that we have taken in the past.

The repeal of the Clark amendment was a step in the right direction, and I think that giving military and economic aid to Angola is very, very important right now. The Soviets see it as an East-West struggle. The Soviets see it as a battle for control of all of South Africa and these vital minerals and these oil supplies that come around the southern tip of Africa. And if they can see it, why in the dickens can't we. And with that, I will yield back the balance of my time and try to get to our next panel.

Mr. WOLPE. Mr. Berman, any questions? Mr. DeWine.

Mr. DEWINE. No, Mr. Chairman, in deference to our two panels, I don't have any questions.

Mr. WOLPE. Thank you very much. Let me again express my appreciation to all of our witnesses for their testimony this afternoon. Thank you very much.

Mr. WOLPE. I would now like to call upon our next panel. Let me welcome our three panelists that have so far arrived. Mr. Weiss will be joining the panel, and Congressman Bill Gray will be scheduled to come in at 4 o'clock. He is in the midst of this conference on the budget legislation, and I have indicated to him when he arrives we will, in deference to our other colleagues, allow him to go

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forward so he can return immediately to the conference. He will not wait to respond to questions, if that is all right.

Again, I would like to indicate, first of all, that the written testimony, of course, will all be submitted in the record in its entirety and we will ask you as far as possible to try to keep to the 5-minute limit. We will begin with our distinguished colleague from New York, Mr. Kemp.

STATEMENT OF HON. JACK F. KEMP, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Mr. KEMP. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

In 1976, Mr. Chairman, the Organization of African Unity called for the immediate and total withdrawal of all foreign forces from Angola. I don't think, though, there is a wide spectrum of thought with regard to aid to UNITA that anyone would disagree that all of us could support the immediate and total withdrawal of all foreign troops from Angola, and a negotiated settlement, that would lead to freedom, peace, democracy, and justice for the people of Angola, leading to the same goal in Namibia. Obviously, all of us, left, right, and center, hope that there will be progress, prosperity, human rights, and an end to apartheid in South Africa.

I only start with that at least to establish a common goal or idea that is very much on all of our minds as we approach this very difficult subject, which obviously has led to such a disparity of views. I happen to be one of those who is very proud to support Congressman Pepper's H.R. 3472, which would give $27 million in humanitarian assistance to the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola. I realize that that is not the purpose of the subcommittee's hearings, but it is so related to the subject matter that I wanted to state it for the record.

I think your hearings, Mr. Chairman, come at a very opportune time. Just as the plans were being laid for the Reagan-Gorbachev summit meeting, there was a major Soviet-backed offensive launched against the UNITA forces in Angola. Thanks this summer to the dedicated work of many on this committee, including your forceful new chairman, Dante Fascell, in my view the Congress enacted a foreign affairs authorization act that repealed the Clark amendment, long overdue in my view, and so Congress opened the door for possible assistance to UNITA, which is the major effort on the ground fighting the Soviet-backed government in Angola, and against 35,000 Cuban troops which are in Angola and 1,200 Soviet advisers, and Czech pilots, and you name it, ad nauseum, East bloc support for the Marxist government. UNITA, in my view, needs assistance.

On July 19 of this year the Soviet-backed Angolan army started that offensive to occupy the UNITA base of operations. There were Soviet-supplied tanks, jet fighters, helicopter gunships, and they exacted a formidable toll on the Savimbi forces, but they were stopped in late September, just 100 or so miles from Savimbi's headquarters. I think we can expect in the near future that offensive to be renewed.

Jonas Savimbi is asking publicly for United States, that is Western support to counter the Communist government of Angola. I am

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certain it is unnecessary to review for anyone here of how that Government seized power in 1975. They did it with the presence of Cuban troops. That is very much a part of the record, and with all due respect to statements that have been made by committee members, it was not those of us who were supporting aid to Savimbi who have introduced East-West relations into this area of the world. It was the Soviet Union and East bloc countries and Cuban troops who introduced a struggle that transcends the normal desire of African people, black, or white, to be free.

Mr. Chairman, the title that was given to today's hearings, "Angola Intervention or Negotiation," strikes me as somewhat limited. The choice is, rather, what we can do best to secure the prospects for democracy and freedom for all people of Angola, and as I suggested earlier, free of foreign troops or foreign involvement.

We are engaged in pressing negotiations not only in Angola but Namibia. Those negotiations are affected by the events as they happen in Angola, by Soviet actions, by Cuban troop presence, and by other aspects of our policy. Simply stated, Mr. Chairman, it is not a question of either we encourage negotiations as they appear promising or we do other things such as provide support to Savimbi. In my view, we can and should do both.

Indeed, I think it is commonly agreed that UNITA's success has been the singularly most important source of pressure on the MPLA to move toward elections, to move toward a negotiated settlement, to move toward a withdrawal of Cuban troops, and in my view Savimbi's organization continues to demonstrate that it has a widespread and popular support among the Angolan people.

Again, finally, Mr. Chairman, in my view, if negotiations which we all favor have a chance of succeeding in Angola, and in Namibia, it is because UNITA has succeeded in putting pressure on the Marxist government there, and now with the long overdue repeal of the Clark amendment, we have the opportunity to provide the long-needed support for the men and women who love freedom just as much as other freedom-loving men and women in this room and throughout the world.

Thank you.

Mr. WOLPE. Thank you very much, Mr. Kemp.

[Mr. Kemp's prepared statement follows:]

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PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JACK F. KEMP, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Mr. Chairman:

Thank you very much for the opportunity to appear before your subcommittee today, which is concluding hearings on the topic of "Angola: intervention or negotiation?"

I am proud to be an original cosponsor of H.R. 3472 introduced by Senator Claude Pepper, which would provide $27 million in humanitarian assistance to the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). While I realize that this subcommittee is not today examining that legislation per se, it is closely related to the subject of this hearing; and it is my hope that passage of that measure will be expedited by the attention generated by the Subcommittee's work today.

I believe that this hearing could not come at a more opportune moment. Just as plans were being laid for the meeting between President Reagan and Communist Party Chairman Gorbachev now scheduled for next week, a Soviet-backed major offensive was launched against the resistance forces in Angola. Fortunately, this summer, thanks to the dedicated work of this distinguished Committee and its forceful new Chairman Dante Fascell, the Congress enacted a Foreign Affairs Authorization Act that, inter alia, repealed the Clark amendent. In so doing, the Congress opened the door to resume assistance to UNITA, which is fighting against the Marxist government in Angola and against some 35,000 Cuban troops, 1,200 Soviet advisors, and a host of East bloc personnel.

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GENERAL BACKGROUND

In that respect, UNITA is not unique. Indeed, for some years the news has been full of accounts of wars and struggles being waged by ordinary people against communist regimes. This belies the impression, once common in "progressive intellectual circles", that people demonstrate and fight primarily for leftist causes. But although in the 1950s and 1960s Communists were able to mobilize an effective, professional cadre of revolutionaries, and to impose their tyranny on much of the so-called Third World, the fact remains that ordinary people have always fled from places that were being taken over by Communists -- or they have fought back. In the 1980s, not only Angolas, but also Poles, Afghans, Laotians, Cambodians, Nicaraguans, Ethiopians, Mozambicans (to mention just some) have risen up against their socialist tyrants, and against their tyrants' master, the Soviet Union.

Nowhere do Marxist tyrants live without daily fear of violent resistance -- that is one reason why their appetites for "security" can never be satisfied. But, though their armed might has never been greater, their intellectual and moral force is clearly on the wane. Today, they are being challenged as never before.

We Americans must ponder what this means to us. What, if anything, should we do about these struggles? In fact, the outcome of wars in faraway Angola and in nearby Nicaragua, in Poland, Afganistan, and many other places, will affect our prospect of living in peace with freedom.

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And so I am especially pleased that this subcommittee has decided to examine how the United States can best support our goals of human rights and security and peace in one of these outposts of the fight for freedom: Angola.

THE FIGHT FOR FREEDOM IN ANGOLA

On July 29 of this year, the Soviet-armed Angolan Army began a major offensive to occupy the UNITA's base of operations. Soviet-supplied tanks, jet fighters and helicopter gunships exacted a formidable toll on Savimbi's forces; but they were stopped in late September, 150 miles from Savimbi's headquarters.

Now, Savimbi is asking publicly for U.S. assistance to counter the central government. I am certain that it is unnecessary to review for anyone here the history of how that government seized power in 1975 thanks to the presence of 20,000 Cuban troops; or the subsequent struggle led by Savimbi to throw out the foreign occupying troops and restore the independence and freedom of Angola.

Mr. Chairman, the title that has been given to today's hearing, "Angola: intervention or negotiation?" strikes me as somewhat limiting. The choice before us, rather, is what we can do to best secure the prospects for freedom for all people of Angola. We are engaged in pressing negotiations, to be sure; but those negotiations are affected by events as they happen in Angola, by Soviet actions, and by other aspects of our policy. Simply stated, it is not a question of either we encourage

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negotiations as they appear promising or we do other things, such as provide support to Savimbi; we can and should do both.

Indeed, I think it is commonly agreed that UNITA's success has been the single most important source of pressure on the MPLA to move toward free and fair elections in Angola, and to secure the withdrawal of Cuban troops. Aside from the most recent communist offensive, Savimbi has been striking with increasing success through most of the country. Savimbi's organization continues to demonstrate that it has developed into a truly popular national resistance force with an increasing mobile capacity, and a strong and expanding base of support among the Ovimbundu and other Angolan people.

If negotiations have a chance of succeeding in Angola, it is because UNITA has succeeded in putting pressure on the Marxist government there. Now, with the long overdue repeal of the Clark amendment, we have the opportunity to provide that long-needed support.

Some have argued against U.S. aid to UNITA on the grounds that such a policy would ally us with South Africa. I would like to make two observations about this point.

In the first place, it is true that Savimbi has received substantial backing from South Africa. But he was forced to turn to South Africa for aid precisely because the Clark amendment prohibited the U.S. from supporting him. Once our support was withdrawn, where else was he to turn? But now that the Clark amendment has been repealed, UNITA shouldn't have to rely on South Africa -- unless by denying aid, we force them to.

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In the second place, like it or not the U.S. and South Africa have a common interest in seeing Soviet influence removed from Southern Africa. It is the same interest anyone should have who wants to see Black Africans secure free, democratic governments that protect the liberties of the people. That is what UNITA is fighting for. And that is why we must help them.

We have vital security interests in southern Africa, to be sure. It is a region rich in rare minerals, and of great strategic importance.

But in keeping with our security interests, I believe our foreign policy toward the nations of Black Africa must present a vision of hope for the future, that offers the model of democratic capitalism to nations that seek to develop their economies, and to individuals who seek a better way of life for themselves and their children.

The U.S. stands on the side of freedom, self-determination and human rights, in sharp contrast to the human misery, suffering, starvation, and dying economies that Soviet imperialism has brought to the African continent. We should make it clear to the rest of the world that the threat posed by the Soviets and Cubans will be met, and that the U.S. intends to support those people in Angola who share our commitment to democratic government and open political societies.

For I believe that we cannot both proclaim our support for freedom and democracy, and then prohibit any assistance to people who are fighting aginst totalitarian governments and foreign communist troops. Our support for the national resistance in

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Angola is part of what I hope will prove to be an enduring U.S. foreign policy objective to promote the forces of freedom throughout the world.

AMERICA'S ROLE IN THE DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION

Our policy toward Angola is part of a broader challenge facing our nation. We must decide where our place will be in the democratic revolution that is welling up among so many peoples of the world. The English philosopher, John Stuart Mill, believed that the desire for liberty was an irrepressible human drive. We see this today, in Angola, in Afghanistan, in Nicaragua, and in other places as well, where people are fighting communist tyrants for their own freedom and in the interest of free people everywhere. They are fighting our battles. They need - and deserve -- our help.

Freedom fighters, whether in Angola or elsewhere, were not created by the United States. They were created by their oppressors. They were created by "a long train of abuses and usurpations evinc[ing] a design to reduce them under absolute Despotism", as we said in declaring our independence from England's tyranny two centuries ago. Freedom and human rights defeated oppression then, and lighted people's hopes for freedom everywhere.

In the long run no passion is more enduring than the desire to be free. The final question Americans must answer is whether we will give others the assistance they need to establish their democracy, just as others two centuries ago were generous and compassionate enough to help us establish ours.

I hope that the Members of this Subcommittee will decide that the answer to that question must be yes. If you do, I believe you will have the American people's wholehearted support.

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Mr. WOLPE. Mr. McCollum.

STATEMENT OF HON. BILL McCOLLUM, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF FLORIDA

Mr. MCCOLLUM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think, Mr. Chairman, we need a new policy toward Angola. We have been dealing with Angola with a negotiated attitude toward trying to get the South African troops out and the Cuban troops for quite some time now. What has happened, as many witnesses apparently have testified before your committee preceding me, is that during this course, we have seen a dramatic increase in the Cuban troop presence. We have seen an increase in the Soviet activity, including aid to that country, of enormous proportions from the standpoint of hardware.

We have seen the United States free enterprise efforts over there diverted, at least the resources of it, to the purchase of this hardware from the Soviet Union and the payment of Cuban troops who are present in that country, since our country purchases about 90 percent of the Angolan oil from that country today and our companies produce about 60 percent of that oil that comes out of that country that is its primary resource.

It seems to me that we need to reassess where we are going to go if we are going to accomplish goals and objectives that are in our national security interests. As one of the members of your committee said a while ago--I do not agree with it, but he said this doesn't involve an East-West conflict. It really shouldn't. It is just a war between Savimbi's forces and dos Santos' forces, or between the MPLA and UNITA.

If it were that, I wouldn't be here testifying before this committee today, and I don't think most of the people would be down here, and you wouldn't be having these hearings. The fact of the matter is that we are talking about the presence of the Soviets, as strong a force as they are outside of Afghanistan, virtually any place today in the world. They are intent in making their forces strong in South Africa and they are going to do so as long as we let them get away with it.

I don't advocate that we send troops in in any broad-based activities, but it seems we have sat and done what we have done without success so far. The best information I have is that the country of Angola is not free. If they were free and had free elections tomorrow morning, our best sources of information tell us Savimbi would be elected as the leader of that country, not dos Santos and some of the others.

There is no freedom there. The best sources indicate that the fact of the matter is that we can expect less negotiations in the future from the MPLA, in light of the fact that they think they have achieved success in the last few weeks in their efforts against UNITA. Whether or not that is true, they did fail in the ultimate goal but they certainly think they achieved some.

I don't believe, for one, that we are going to see a withdrawal of these troops, the Cuban troops anytime soon, regardless of any negotiated efforts, that the best interests of our country would be to try to give as much assistance in a reasonable fashion as we can, as

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is in the bill of Congressman Pepper or the bill of Congressman Siljander and others to try to support UNITA, and we ought to at the same time also do what a bill I introduced would do, and that is to cut off the kind of economic support that we are giving to Angola now, most of which is going toward the purchase of hardware and arms and paying the Cuban troops.

We ought to stop future United States investment in Angola while this is going on. We should stop Export-Import Bank and other loans to that country, and we should stop the importation of oil and other products from Angola and trade with Angola, with the MPLA Government, because to me right now the way things stand, that kind of activity on the part of the United States and its citizenry is both indefensible and immoral.

I would suggest that what we would best be doing by that process as well as by the other legislation directly aiding UNITA would be to bring as much pressure as possible for some kind of reasonable response from the MPLA Government. Maybe then and just maybe we would see the Cuban troops go home and some attention being paid. What we have been doing has not been succeeding. It has only been playing into the hands of the Soviets. I would submit that this is not the process to be going through and I would urge this committee to look very seriously at promoting a policy that can stand some chance of working.

Nothing is perfect. Savimbi is not perfect. Conditions over there aren't going to be. The country is a shambles but we need to reassess our policies and do something that can be realistic in expecting results instead of kowtowing to what has been a very aggressive Soviet policy to date and one which we have just simply turned our other cheek to.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. WOLPE. Thank you, Mr. McCollum.

[Mr. McCollum's prepared statement follows:]

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PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. BILL MCCOLLUM, REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF FLORIDA

MR. CHAIRMAN, I thank you and your Subcommittee Members for giving me the opportunity to testify before you today regarding "The Promotion of Democracy in Angola Act of 1985" which I introduced recently. This bill would call for a total trade embargo with the People's Republic of Angola, prohibition of loans to the Angolan Government, restrictions on all new investments in that country, and the U.S. declaration of Angola as a Communist country under Section 620(f) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 if conditions do not improve.

In June of this year, the House voiced its oppostion to the deplorable human rights conditions in the country of South Africa by passing the South Africa Sanctions Bill. I opposed the use of economic sanctions as a U.S. foreign policy option then and I continue to oppose them in all but a very few circumstances which warrant such a strong U.S. reaction. The contemporary situation in Angola is clearly one of those circumstances. Economic sanctions imposed against Angola will exert great pressure on the Communist MPLA Government to improve conditions in their country and also help to clear up the misconceptions created by the sanctioning of a U.S. ally, South Africa, by providing a stronger, more easily understood precedent for future U.S. policy.

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The U.S. Government is one of the few nations of the world which has never officially recognized the present government of Angola. The Ford Administration's original refusal to recognize the MPLA government has withstood the test of time since the MPLA violation of the 1975 Avlor Agreement which called for joint rule by the three Angolan resistance factions and subsequent holding of elections, the introduction of 15,000 Cuban troops and a massive Soviet airlift of military supplies into Angola in 1975. Ten years later, the situation in Angola has become progressively worse.

The Cuban military presence has swelled to an unbelievible 35,000 troops. The Lusaka Agreement of 1984 which called for reductions in both the Cuban and South African military role in this internal conflict resulted in a MPLA alteration of Angolan naturalization law to allow citizenship for any foreigner who has performed service to the country. Cuban troops can therefore be technically classified as Angolan citizens and avoid the Cuban troop reduction stipulations of the Lusaka Agreement. In addition, Soviet, East German and North Korean military advisors have arrived in Angola to train, organize and even lead Angolans into battle against the UNITA resistance forces. A soon to be published Heritage Foundation study claims over 100 Soviet personnel participated in a recent MPLA military operation against UNITA forces involving four brigades of MPLA troops.

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Soviet military hardware has been upgraded from light tanks and field artillery to "big ticket" items such as MIG-23's and MI-25 helicopters. In the past two years alone, Soviet arms supplies to the MPLA government are estimated as high as $2 billion. SWAPO forces continue to base their operations against Namibia with increasing support from the various Eastern Bloc forces presently in Angola. The fate of Namibia as an independent nation looks dim with an escalation of these regional tensions which are fueled by third parties.

The U.S. State Department's "Country Report on Human Rights" and Amnesty International have thoroughly documented the MPLA's abysmal human rights record. Detention without trial, torture and execution are fundamental to the MPLA's control of Angola. Freedom House rated Angola's human rights observance in 1978-79 on par with North Korea and Cambodia.

The U.S. response to the deterioration of conditions of conditions has been extremely confusing. Our State Department has used a ten year "carrot and stick" approach to lure Angola back to the West. Unfortunately, the "stick" used is entirely too short and has resulted in tremendous U.S. expenditures for "carrots".

Our Export-Import Bank has indeed guaranteed hundreds of millions of dollars in loans to the Angolan government since the 1975 Marxist takeover to finance oil production equipment purchases.

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Ex-Im approves these loans only with the sign-off of the U.S. State Department and the National Security Council who are charged with the review of the political and national security issues surrounding each loan application. It is totally indefensible for U.S. officials to deny that the MPLA government is Communist and a legitimate national security concern of the United States by approving these loans.

The Soviet puppet MPLA government diverts over one half of its total national budget to defense outlays. Revenues derived from the abundant natural resources of Angola, particularly oil found in the Cabinda region, provide the MPLA government with funds needed to support the Cuban military presence in Angola and make that country all the more attractive to the Eastern Bloc. U.S. firms are contracted to pump Angolan oil and supply an entire range of support services to the Angolan oil industry. The U.S. in turn imported over $1 billion in oil products last year alone making Angola the sixteenth largest supplier of imported oil to the U.S. worldwide.

The confused U.S. policy towards Angola has failed to advance U.S. concerns for regional security in southern Africa. It has given the MPLA the needed breathing room to consolidate its hold on Angola through increased levels of outside assistance from Cuba, the Soviet Union and a host of other self described enemies of the U.S.

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The bill which I have introduced gives the U.S. a rare opportunity to make much more than a political statement regarding the state of affairs in Angola. It gives us the chance to make a difference in the way Angola conducts itself in southern Africa and the world. This small nation is more dependent on the U.S. market and U.S. financial support than the vast majority of countries we have chosen to economically sanction in the past. Sanctions can be a very effective foreign policy tool if they specifically target nations which heavily rely on U.S. economic power and are the recognized enemies of the U.S. Angola has earned the rare distinction of enemy of the U.S. through ten years of serious crimes against its own people and ever increasing affiliation with the Eastern Bloc.

MR.CHAIRMAN, the repeal of the Clark Amendment earlier this year and the present legislative proposals offered by Mr. Pepper and Mr. Kemp, Mr. Siljander and myself all address the fundamental belief that the present relationship the U.S. has with Communist Angola is not in our country's best interest nor is it in the best interest of the people of Angola. The time has most certainly arrived for Congress to correct a foreign policy which offers no possible chance of improving the deplorable and dangerous situation we all are witness to today in Angola.

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Turning our backs on the current U.S. economic support to Angola equates to more than tacit approval of the status quo in that nation, it provides direct financial backing to the dos Santos regime and our nation's enemies. Postive action must be taken now to compensate for the ten long years of misguided U.S. policy towards Marxist Angola.

Once again, I thank you MR. CHAIRMAN and Members of this Subcommittee for the opportunity to express my views.

Mr. WOLPE. Mr. Weiss

STATEMENT OF HON. TED WEISS, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Mr. WEISS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. As you can tell, my voice has been giving me some problems. If you can't hear me, just indicate and I will try to speak louder or closer to the microphone. You may welcome not being able to hear me.

I will ask unanimous consent that the prepared statement I have be entered into the record in its entirety, together with an economic study that the Congressional Research Service did at my request, and some stories that appeared in the public prints over the course of these past few years.

Mr. Chairman, it seems to me that all of us who are concerned about people being deprived of their right of self-determination and independence ought to be concerned about the lack of freedom everywhere. We are concerned in South Africa about the deprivation of freedom, self-determination and independence, and I suggest that the focus ought not to be in Angola.

The focus ought to be in Namibia, where the apartheid Government of South Africa has illegally kept a people in a territory that was given to it in trusteeship after the First World War in subjugation and deprivation and suppression over the course of these past almost 70 years at this point, and South Africa has done everything in its power to keep Namibia from gaining its independence.

I suspect that some of what is going on now by way of the attacks on Angola by the South Africans and by those who support them has to do with the determination to provide support to South Africa in both maintaining its own system of Government and in keeping the people of Namibia under suppression.

There are a number of bills that are pending before the House at this point, one by Messrs. Pepper and Kemp, wanting to provide $27 million in humanitarian assistance. Mr. McCollum's legislation seeks to impose economic sanctions and to cut off imports and exports between us and the Angolans, and any company working there.

Mr. Siljander has legislation which would provide direct military assistance to the tune of $27 million to Jonas Savimbi. I have legislation which I have proposed which would in fact prohibit the provision of any kind of assistance to any nation, government, faction,

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group or what have you of a military or paramilitary nature, that could be used to support military activity within Angola.

I am distressed and bothered and concerned by the disparities in legislation that has been proposed, because I think that those variations by my friends on the other side whom I have mentioned, and Mr. Pepper, leave us quite unclear as to where they are going.

I don't think that the questions have really been asked by them of themselves, never mind answers given to the rest of us. Is this a project ultimately to overthrow the Angolan Government? If so, what will be the cost, human, economic, and political, of such a project. How long will it take? Will $27 million or $200 million or $20 billion be sufficient? How many people will be killed? How many crops destroyed, how many bridges and factories burned? What will be the fruits of victory if victory is achieved?

Do we have reason to expect democracy and prosperity at the end of that bloody road or will we be sowing the seeds of another generation of bloodshed and destruction? Does UNITA even have the capacity to accomplish the overthrow of the Angolan Government? If not, what will be the cost in dollars, in lives, in our credibility of a failed attempt? Is overthrowing the South African Government with South Africa's help a worthy policy objective for this country? What do we really hope to accomplish for ourselves or for Angola or for South Africa by making that attempt?

To add to the confusion as to what is really intended here, let me quote a couple of lines from the prepared statement of my distinguished friend and colleague from New York, Mr. Kemp. He said in his statement:

> In the 1980's, not only Angolans but also Poles, Afghans, Laotians, Cambodians, Nicaraguans, Ethiopians, Morambicans (to mention just some) have risen up against their socialist tyrants and against their tyrants's master, the Soviet Union.

And just a paragraph down he says:

> We Americans must ponder what this means to us. What, if anything, should we do about these struggles? In fact, the outcome of wars in faraway Angola and in nearby Nicaragua, in Poland, Afghanistan and many other places will affect our prospect of living in peace with freedom.

Have we now, are we now about to undertake a crusade to provide military support to anyone who seeks to rise up against a Communist Government anyplace on the face of the earth?

And finally, Mr. Chairman, what do we make of a situation where the Government of Angola, with all the charges of Marxism, having its prime commitment and involvement in trade partnership with the West and especially with the United States, how do we characterize that as being some assignation that is in the thralls of the Communist Soviet Union? It just seems to me that there are so many questions that have been raised and that have been unanswered that we ought to darn well get some answers as to what path we are going down before we start going down these paths.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. WOLPE. Thank you very much, Mr. Weiss.

[Mr. Weiss' prepared statement follows:]

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PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. TED WEISS, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK

One thing stands out about all the proposals to aid Jonas Savimbi's faction in Angola: the implications of such a project have not been carefully or thoughtfully explored. Before we start on this road, we need the answers to some questions about where it is taking us.

Is this a project to overthrow the Angolan government? If so, what will be the cost---human, economic, and political---of such a project? How long will it take? Will $27 million, or $200 million, or $20 billion, be sufficient? How many people will be killed, how many crops destroyed, how many bridges and factories burnt? What will be the fruits of "victory," if "victory" is achieved? Do we have reason to expect democracy and prosperity at the end of that bloody road, or will we be sowing the seeds of another generation of bloodshed and destruction?---

Does UNITA even have the capacity to accomplish the overthrow of the Angolan government? If not, what will be the cost---in dollars, in lives, in our credibility---of a failed attempt?

Is overthrowing the Angolan government, with South Africa's help, a worthy policy objective for this country? What do we really hope to accomplish, for ourselves or for Angola---or for South Africa--by making the attempt?

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I have not yet heard clear answers to these questions from the proponents of aid to Savimbi's forces, let alone answers based on adequate examination of the evidence.

What we have heard is a great deal of rhetoric about the need to "stop the Soviets" in Southern Africa. This raises a serious issue: let us look at the evidence.

Does the evidence suggest that Angola is a Soviet satellite in Southern Africa? Let's look at Angola's economic relations. The United States is Angola's largest trading partner---by a wide margin---and that margin increased between 1980 and 1984.

To whom does Angola look for economic assistance? The answer is clear: to the West. Western economic aid is greater than East-bloc aid by a factor of forty to one, according to the latest available statistics. Angola's commerce is Western-based, and capital formation in Angola---to the extent it is possible in a war situation---is based overwhelmingly on Western investments.

U.S. direct investment in Angola was $178 million in 1983, the latest year for which figures are available. The Export-Import Bank is active in Angola, with an exposure of some $261 million.

American companies sell oil field and mining equipment, aircraft, and food to Angola. American oil companies are responsible for much of Angolan oil production. Among American companies doing business with Angola are Boeing, General Electric, General Tire, Morgan Guaranty Trust, Fluor Corpoartion, Gulf Oil, Texaco, Marathon Oil, and Occidental Petroleum.

Aid to the South African-backed UNITA forces will inevitably

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have a serious impact on this Western-oriented economy. According to the Economics Division of the Congressional Research Service, "UNITA targets have consistently been industrial centers, electric power facilities, transportation infrastructure, mining areas, agricultural projects and petroleum installations." Just this past September, South African-backed forces came close to sabotaging the huge Gulf Oil installation at Cabinda. Aid to UNITA now would be a clear signal to South Africa that such tactics are acceptable to the United States.

In short, aid to UNITA is likely to wind up physically destroying many of the manifold economic links which tie Angola to the West.

Another U.S. policy option which has been discussed---a trade embargo---would simply shift Angolan trade to other countries, since the products the United States sells to Angola are readily available on the world market. What goals of American policy will be furthered by engineering such a shift?

Since Angola's economy is so westward-looking, those who argue that we should destabilize Angola rely heavily on the presence of Cuban troops there. Let us grant that the removal of those troops is a desirable goal. What is the most efficient way to accomplish it? Will they be removed faster if we facilitate negotiations to reduce the threat which the Cubans are there to defend against? Or if we pin our hopes on their forcible removal by a faction which after ten years of fighting has never controlled even half the country, and which few observers believe can win?

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Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to testify here today. I would like to share with the Committee the results of some research which bears on the questions which I touched on, and which was carried out at my request by the Economics Division of the Congressional Research Service.

I ask unanimous consent that the full text of the C.R.S. report be included in the record.

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Congressional Research Service
The Library of Congress

Washington, D.C. 20540

November 8, 1985

TO : The Honorable Ted Weiss
Attention: Martin Putnam

FROM : Dario Scuka
Analyst in International Trade and Finance
Economics Division

SUBJECT : Review of Events Concerning Angolan Economic and Petroleum Developments as Background to More Recent Articles and Clippings dealing with U.S. Commercial Relations with Angola and Angola's Commercial Relations with Other Countries.

Following is a brief background review in support of the attached material supplied from our files.

Angola was a colony of Portugal from the 15th century until its administrative status was changed to an overseas province in 1951. Its independence was achieved in November 1975.

Some movement toward nationhood began in the 1950s, but the first real armed struggle for liberation began in 1961. The severe repression after the 1961 rebellion led to the creation of more nationalist guerrilla groups, which increasingly tested the Portuguese armed forces in Angola. Dissension among the groups and within each group, however, reduced their effectiveness against the European defenders. In addition, the strain within the Portuguese armed forces command, related to this colonial war, became one factor leading to the 1974 overthrow of the dictatorial regime of Marcelo Caetano in Portugal.

The new military government of Portugal quickly decided to grant Angola independence in a complicated agreement that provided for the three liberation

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groups together with Portugal in January 1975 to comprise a transitional government leading to elections for the November 1975 scheduled independence. The conflicting political aspirations of the three liberation movements, however, soon proved to be irreconcilable and the transitional government collapsed in the early summer of 1975.

The local contending factions were the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). The MPLA, which considered itself a Marxist movement, was receiving Soviet aid, while the other two had indicated a pro-Western orientation and were receiving aid from the United States in the summer of 1975. To complicate Angolan affairs at that time, South Africa invaded Angola from Namibian territory (ostensibly to protect the integrity of Namibia) and soon South African forces joined the two pro-Western guerrilla groups in their march toward Luanda, the Angolan capital. The South African occupation of Angolan territory precipitated the arrival of Cuban troops. 1/

The involvement of South African and Cuban troops internationalized the conflict and caused an international furore. Within a short time United States assistance to FNLA and to UNITA stopped in response to congressional action prohibiting all direct and indirect military and paramilitary assistance to any group in Angola (see the Clark Amendment).

1/ The sequence of events, according to the Bureau of Public Affairs of the Department of State, was as follows: after the collapse of the provisional government, fighting among the guerrilla groups broke out in many Angolan cities, with the MPLA receiving Soviet weapons while the other guerrillas were supplied mainly by South Africa. In August 1975, the United States began supplying arms to the FNLA and UNITA. Also in August, South African forces occupied some Angolan territory and by October they were fighting alongside UNITA and FNLA in a march on Luanda. In September, however, Cuban troops began landing in Angola at the MPLA's request, but it was not until February 1976 that their number was estimated at 15,000.

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Subsequently, South African troops withdrew from Angola, while Cuban and Soviet assistance proved decisive to the MPLA which was then able to establish a government in the capital city -- Luanda -- with control over most of the nation's territory. The two pro-Western guerrilla groups proclaimed their own coalition government but dispersed their forces. The FNLA, led by Holden Roberto, retreated to guerrilla tactics in the North with its leader apparently leaving Angola. UNITA forces, led by Jonas Savimbi, retreated to the South-eastern region from where guerrilla operations have been conducted into the heartland of Angola.

It should be noted that on November 11, 1975, when Portugal declared Angola independent, it transfered sovereignty to the Angolan people rather than to any of the liberation groups.

The dissension among and within the guerrilla groups noted earlier did not disappear. In 1977 a former Interior Minister of the MPLA failed in a coup attempt, which led to purges of state and party officials. Eventually, even the position of Prime Minister was abolished. Meanwhile, the MPLA leader and first President of the central government of Angola, Dr. Neto, died in 1979 and was succeeded by party leader and President dos Santos.

This ten-year civil war, which has from time to time intensified and has also revealed some fissures among the ruling government, has been aggravated by two other situations. The first involved Belgian Congo (now called Zaire) rebels operating from Angolan bases into Zaire during 1977-78. This issue was eventually resolved through an agreement after the intervention of Belgian troops on the side of Zaire. But a more intractable issue involved a Namibian liberation movement, the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO), operating from Angola (with permission from the MPLA government), for the independence of Namibia fighting South African rule there against the

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background of UN Security Council Resolution 435 of 1978. This resolution provided for Namibia's independence, an issue that has focused directly and indirectly on the Cuban presence in Angola. The United States and major European powers have been active in negotiations with South Africa for the independence of Namibia.

ANGOLA'S EXTERNAL RELATIONS

Angola has diplomatic relations with most Western and Eastern countries, according to EUROPA Publications Limited, a London-based compiler of country information published annually in several volumes. According to the State Department, Angola has made an effort to establish diplomatic relations with some moderate African states, particularly with neighbors in order to resolve their mutual security problems. Officially, Angola espouses a policy of non-alignment while accepting the principles of the U.N. Charter and the Charter of the Organization of African Unity. At the United Nations Angola has regularly supported the Soviet line.

The United States does not maintain diplomatic relations with Angola in spite of considerable private U.S. economic interests in the country. Since the 1978 U.N. Resolution the United States and Angola have had frequent contacts to discuss regional and bilateral issues. In 1981 the Reagan Administration initiated new efforts to arrive at a settlement on the longstanding Namibian problem. By 1983, the U.S. Under Secretary for Political Affairs declared that in a mutual effort South Africa and Angola must respect each other's territorial integrity, while South Africa must also leave Namibia, a move which itself is seen as predicated on Cuban forces leaving Angola. 2/

2/ The Economist (London), March 24, 1984, p. 25 comments: "Both the Americans and the South Africans have been at one in insisting on a linkage

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It should be noted that while the United States has had contacts with the Angolan government, it has also maintained a dialogue with UNITA, declaring that it considers UNITA to be a viable political movement in Angola. 3/

Angola's relations with the Eastern bloc centers on the Soviet Union for purchase of military equipment and payment for troops and advisers. In 1982, the Soviet Union and Angola signed an economic cooperation agreement for about $2 billion over a ten-year period, but little economic assistance appears to have resulted. 4/

The People's Republic of China recognized Luanda in 1983 after having previously supported MPLA's opponents in the civil war.

A visit to South Africa, relating to the Angolan and the Namibian situations, by the U.N. Secretary General in 1983 failed to produce any movement toward independence for Namibia. The multilateral involvement on this issue remains complex and murky with internationally negotiated ceasefires violated periodically. A multi-page "Survey on Southern Africa", published July 16, 1983, by The Economist elaborates on the complexity of the regional and international issues, including those directly affecting Angola.

2/ (continued) between a Cuban withdrawal from Angola and independence for Namibia, but for different reasons. For the South African the precondition was, for a time, a way of delaying Namibian independence without having to shoulder the blame themselves. For the Americans, getting the Cubans out of southern Africa is the big prize; the promise of Namibian independence is partly an inducement to secure black African support for a Cuban pull-out."

3/ UNITA claims to control one third of Angola's territory, while it has 40,000 well-trained and well-equipped men operating in groups of about 100. It is organized as state within a state. For its needs it is openly supplied mostly by South Africa. The Economist, July 30, 1983, p. 39. For UNITA leader Savimbi's 1981 visit to the United States, see attached clippings.

4/ The Economist, July 16, 1983, p. 27, suggests that: "Eastern aid to the region was primarily military. Russia did not see why its valuable foreign exchange should end, like much economic aid to southern Africa, in a Johannesburg bank."

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THE ECONOMY OF ANGOLA WITH SPECIAL FOCUS ON PETROLEUM

In 1971, a Lloyds Bank Group (London) publication under the title of BOLSA, that was regularly reporting on the economic and financial conditions of South America and Africa, stated: "The scarcity of statistical information prevents any comprehensive or accurate analysis of the structure and growth of the Angolan economy". The situation has not improved much in 1985. It is doubtful that in over two decades of combined liberation and civil war any economy can flourish. The departure of more than 300,000 Portuguese who ran the Angolan economy caused skilled labor shortages with severe economic dislocation and disruption. The intensification of the civil war affected crops and the quality of life in general. UNITA targets have consistently been industrial centers, electric power facilities, transportation infrastructure, mining areas, agricultural projects and petroleum installations. South African incursions into Angola have additionally hampered Angolan economic recovery. 5/

Angola is potentially one of the best endowed nations of the sub-Saharan Africa with rich farmland, valuable mineral resources, and extensive petroleum reserves. According to the International Petroleum Encyclopedia, Angola is second to Nigeria in this region with oil production well exceeding 225,000 barrels per day (b/d). Angolan potential petroleum reserves, inclusive of the Cabinda enclave, have attracted a large international effort concentrated in off-shore exploration. The central government has divided its entire coastal

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5/ Some examples of assessments: "Mr. Savimbi has wreaked a terrible toll on the Angolan infrastructure. The Americans assess this damage -- to roads, bridges, railways, factories, refineries -- at over $7 billion since 1975." Also, "South African officials make no bones about their operations inside Angola. Whether or not they choose to call it destabilization, the policy has been to destroy the credibility of dos Santos regime and undermine its economy." The Economist, July 16, 1983, p. 21. More recently, UNITA has resorted to car bombing in large cities, and to taking hostages among foreigners working in Angola. The Economist, April 28, 1984, p. 50.

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area into exploration blocks (see attached article by the Petroleum Economist, titled "Moving Into The Big League") and has been actively encouraging foreign participation. Angola has its own national oil company known as SONANGOL, through which it deals with foreign oil companies.

Several West European and U.S. companies are active in Angolan waters. The Italian AGIP and the French Elf-Aquitaine are very prominent. Among American oil companies Gulf Oil is dominant. Other U.S. companies are: Texaco, Mobil, Getty, Union Texas, Murphy Oil, Marathon, and Cities Service. In the last several years, Gulf was merged with SOCAL, Getty was absorbed by Texaco, Marathon was bought by U.S. Steel, and Cities Service was merged into Occidental.

Gulf's dominant presence as an oil producer in Angola, where oil revenue from taxes and exports has become a major factor in the national income, has become an irritant within the Reagan Administration as reported in the Petroleum Economist (London) of January 1982, p. 17. The magazine noted that critics of Gulf see an American oil company as the single largest contributor, through oil taxes and royalties to the MPLA-Government, indirectly providing financial support to the MPLA's Cuban connection. But U.S. policy has been to encourage a dialogue through "constructive engagement" to achieve a Cuban withdrawal and a Namibia settlement. It is generally recognised that a total UNITA victory is not feasible and would continue the regional destabilization anyway. The paper also pointed out that the Cuban presence is not predicated on oil income anyway, although critics of Gulf's operations in Angola insist that without oil revenue, the present Angolan regime would collapse.

What appears missing from the London report is that international interest in Angola centers on Angolan oil. In addition, Gulf's presence or absence in Angola could hardly stop the flow of oil into world markets and, thus, cripple

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the MPLA. Italy, France, Spain, Portugal, West Germany, Switzerland, Belgium, United Kingdom, Yugoslavia and Brazil are all physically present or negotiating for Angolan oil exploration (and many for oil production) along side the various American oil companies.

An alternative analysis consonant to world petroleum developments, at least since the 1930s, suggests that by forcefully prohibiting Gulf's (or other American oil companies') technological contributions to the exploitation of Angolan oil resources may result in an outcome inimical to Western interests. Should there be any reason for direct Soviet participation in the exploration and production of Angolan hydrocarbons, in the face of denied Western technology, one of the likely consequences could be the loss of the bulk of Angolan oil for direct availability to the Western bloc.

Meanwhile, as most foreign interests continue to participate and expand their Angolan oil operations on the basis of Algerian-type production-sharing contracts with the Angolan government, Angola has opened a marketing office in London with flexible pricing policies aimed at making Angolan oil competitive in world markets. Angolan oil has been sold to North and South America, to West and East Europe, to Asia, and to some African countries.

ANGOLA'S ECONOMY AND FOREIGN TRADE

To provide a rough and limited economic profile of Angola we have assembled from a variety of sources data that, at times, are conflicting and whose quality is questionable. The figures for GNP are especially disturbing, although it should be accepted that a decline in GNP after 1974, the last year Angola was a Portuguese "overseas province," is a distinct possibility. Guerrilla warfare to 1974 and the 1975 civil war disrupted the core of the economy. Subsequent recovery has been slow as the civil war continued to

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ravage many economic activities.

TABLE 1. Some Estimates on Angola's National Income and Foreign Trade from Sources as Indicated, 1974-1984.
(GNP and other figures in US$ billion, per capita figures in US$.)

	1974	1975	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984
Population * (Millions)	6.05	5.47	6.73	6.90	7.30	7.78	7.99	8.21	8.40
GNP/capita *	710	370E	420E	430E	470E	--- Stopped making ---			
GNP *	4.29	2.03E	2.81E	2.97E	3.32E	------ estimates ------			
GNP **	.....						3.50E	--	--
GNP ***	.....		4.03	4.73	6.31	7.01	7.53	7.17	--
GDP ****	.....		2.66E	3.90E	3.90E	4.20E	--	--	--
Imports E #	0.63	0.45	0.66	0.96	1.35	1.59	1.00	0.76	1.00
Imports @	0.63	.....	0.60	0.68	--	--	--	--	--
Imports E ****	.....							1.50	--
Exports E #	1.23	0.91	0.89	1.23	1.90	1.88	1.74	1.98	2.26
Exports @	1.23	.....	0.66	0.67	--	--	--	--	--
Exports E ****	.....							1.60	--
Export income ##	(p = projected)						1.48	1.67	1.99p
Export value ###	.....					1.37	--	--	--
Foreign debt E ##	.....								2.00
Foreign debt &	.....	0.19	0.13	0.20	0.32	0.45	0.55	--	--

E - estimate; NE - Not estimated; -- Not available.

* World Bank Atlas, various issues.

** U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs.

*** OECD, Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries, 1980-1983, p. 272.

**** CIA, The World Factbook, 1985 and prior issues.

IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics, Yearbook, various issues.

EUROPA Publications, Ltd., 1985, Vol 1. Part III, Angola section.

UNCTAD, Handbook of International Trade and Development Statistics, 1984 Supplement, p. 159.

@ U.N. Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, 1982, Vol. 1, p. 72 (table provides its own conversion factors into U.S. dollars).

& OECD, External Debt of Developing Countries, 1983 Survey, p. 86.

NOTE 1. Please note the recent date of publications and the absence of observations for long periods before the cited editions. Also, the substantial discrepancies in the observations purporting to measure the same item is a clear indication of the questionable quality of the data.

NOTE 2. Because Angola is not a member of the IMF there is no consistent historical information on its financial activities in general and official exchange rates in particular. The Angolan government proclaimed a fixed rate of exchange between the kwanza and the U.S. dollar in 1976. Kwanza's commercial exchange rate is published weekly by the Financial Times (London) and, at least

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for late 1984 and late 1985, it has shown a remarkable constancy, just under 30 kwanza per U.S. dollar (29.62 on September 30, 1984, and 29.92 on October 25, 1985). But the kwanza rate given by the CIA for December 1984 is 30.21 to the dollar. This situation complicates representations in U.S. dollars of any Angolan economic activity for international comparison.

NOTE 3. At various stages in the following text there will be some critical analysis of issues relating to the poor quality of the data in Table 1.

The evident disparity in GNP estimates suggests a lack of information about basic segments of the Angolan economy, a situation that probably faces some Angolan officials, given the turmoil in the socio-economic structure of the nation and the almost total loss of the capable Portuguese civil servants since independence.

A plausible question, however, is whether some of the estimators of Angola's GNP take into account value attributable to the regional product controlled by UNITA (a not-insignificant portion of the country). In the absence of such compensatory adjustments, any comparisons of pre-1974 Angola with more recent period are questionable. Although estimating the GNP attributable to a region under a rebel government is clearly not an easy task, it would be incorrect to impute no numerical value to it. It is more than probable that such an adjustment, however rough, would reduce the sharp drop in Angola's economic activities suggested by some of the above estimates.

Some trade estimates also evidence discrepancies that are too large to be justified by whether imports and exports are classified on an f.o.b. or c.i.f. basis. The same trade estimates also suggest an economy that is heavily dependent on exports with some implied barter trade (if the estimated trade data supplied by the IMF and the export earnings furnished by EUROPA are to be accepted). The United Nations made an effort to report on Angolan trade, but gave up. We find the UNCTAD data the most authoritative, but have export data for only one year. Later attempts to report on Angolan foreign trade are of

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questionable validity because they do not report any trade with the Soviet Union and Cuba.

In contrast to the trade surplus suggested by the IMF estimates in Table 1, other information suggests a current trade deficit. Based on data of the Banco Nacional de Angola, and referred to in the 1985 edition of EUROPA (page 1105), "Angola's traditional surplus on trade and current payments ended in 1981, when there was a trade deficit of US$243m." The same Banco Nacional de Angola also provides some information about the service sector of the current account for 1980-82 which shows a consistently large deficit.

Foreign debt information is not available from the World Bank (Angola is not a member). The OECD debt information is questionable because, unless the composition of Angolan debt is clearly described, its value may vary substantially.

TABLE 2. Selected Data on the Direction of Angolan Trade
(In millions of U.S. dollars)

	1980		1984	
	Exports to	Imports from	Exports to	Imports from
World	1,903.3	1,352.8	2,257.7	1,003.1
United States	709.1	122.4	957.7	113.4
Bahamas	474.1	0	426.7	0
United Kingdom	175.6	71.1	192.6	31.4
Spain	29.9	49.1	174.8	83.1
Netherlands	41.9	82.5	157 7	74.6
Brazil	102.6	130.5	122.8	99.0
Italy	0.5	72.1	27.2	50.0
W. Germany	2.6	112.6	8.5	58.9
Algeria	66.5	0	6.8	1.0
France	1.2	102.0	1.4	108.5
Japan	94.5	91.9	0.8	23.4

Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics, Yearbook 1985, p. 80-81.

Note that in the absence of direct data from Angola, most of the figures shown here are estimates derived from reported trade with Angola by the listed selected countries.

The growth in Angola's trade with continental Europe and its decline with

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Japan is evident between 1980 and 1984. More stability prevailed in its trade with the United States, the Bahamas, and the United Kingdom. Angolan exports to the world consist principally of crude petroleum, some refined products, coffee, diamonds (a high percentage of gem-grade stones beside the industrial-grade diamonds), and lesser values of cement, sisal, and fish meal. Generally, most trade, except shipments of oil, are subject to some disruption by UNITA, which then appropriates or smuggles out of Angola some of the intended official exports. The major blow to the Angolan economy by Unita has been the devastation of the fertile central highlands which once accounted for Angola's net export of farm products.

Presently, a large portion of food must be imported. Other imports, according to a 1979 EUROPA Publications' ranking, are mechanical equipment (connected with the oil industry), raw materials, textiles and clothing, consumer goods, farm implements, chemical products, and medical supplies.

A CLOSER LOOK AT ANGOLA'S INCOME FROM MINERAL COMMODITIES

In the late 1970s, exports of Angolan petroleum provided more than 50 percent of foreign exchange; in 1983 that ratio climbed to about 90 percent (according to EUROPA Publications). The volume of oil produced and exported and, hence, its ability to earn foreign exchange has been erratic since independence.

Official U.S. Bureau of the Census trade data for 1984 show that the U.S. imported from Angola $930 million of crude petroleum, $45 million of petroleum products, $32 million of natural or manufactured gas, and minimal amounts of coffee, precious and semiprecious stones, and miscellaneous goods for a total value of $1,010 million. The discrepancy between this official value of U.S. imports from Angola and the IMF estimate contained in table 2 ($958 million) is due to the process of estimating and accounting for differences in

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the timing of trade transactions. An export from country X to country Y may not become an import of country Y from country X on the same day, in the same week and, at times, even in the same month.

The Bureau of Mines of the U.S. Department of the Interior in 1983 (1983 edition of the Minerals Yearbook, Volume III), published a table of mineral commodities produced in Angola. The table reports these by volume for the period 1979-1983. We have converted the respective volumes into values by using the prices of such commodities, as generally reported in typical world markets, to arrive at an estimate of the portion of Angola's GNP attributable the activities of the mineral industries.

TABLE 3. Estimated Value of Major Minerals Produced in Angola in 1980 and in 1983
(In millions of U.S. dollars)

	1980	1983pe
Iron and steel	3.5	3.5
Hydraulic cement	9.6	9.6
Diamonds: gem grade	770.1	220.9
industrial	4.8	2.6
Gypsum	0.2	0.2
Salt	0.7	0.9
Natural asphalt and bitumen	3.5	3.8
Marketable natural gas	5.0	7.5
Crude oil	1,698.9	1,711.7
Total value	2,496.3	1,960.7

pe - preliminary estimate

It should be noted that the above estimates exclude some valuation that could be attributed, although not readily known, to such other mineral commodities as clays, sand and gravel, and broken stone.

But Angola consists of more than its partial mineral production, though oil extraction looms large relative to other activities. The country has an agricultural sector, which although damaged, still accounts for about 60 percent

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restrictions. Most of Angolan commercial relations are with the West, and in line with European interest in Angolan oil, most West European countries trade with Angola and provide some investments and economic assistance.

According to a 1983 estimate cited in EUROPA Publications, capital expenditures on oil production and for further exploration in the Cabinda enclave alone over a three-year period (1984-86) would total US$ 645 million. Such capital is usually syndicated internationally by a large number of participating banks. Syndicates may be headed by a large American or European bank.

Economic aid to Angola has been flowing from Western and Eastern blocs, and it is reviewed in the following table.

TABLE 4. Selected Data on Economic Assistance to Angola
(in rounded millions of U.S. dollars)

	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983
Net ODA disbursements from all sources *	48	47	47	53	61	60	73
Total net disbursements from all sources **	26	42	108	201	298	354	201
Total CMEA disbursements ***	NA	NA	16	5	11	9	5

* Figures show "official development assistance" from the OECD members that comprise the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), from multilateral organizations, and from OPEC members.

** Figures show all aid, official and private, from the same sources as (*).

*** Figures show the gross aid from the Eastern bloc countries.

Source: OECD, Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries, 1980-1983, and direct communication with the OECD office.

According to State Department information, the United States has been contributing under our Food for Peace Program foodgrains to UNICEF to feed displaced persons in central Angola. The International Red Cross participates

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of the two-million-strong work force. Industrial employment, approximating one sixth of the work force, includes oil refining, fisheries, brewing, tobacco, sugar processing, cement processing, building construction, textiles, and food processing.

Other factors entering GNP computations, in addition to industrial output, are the service sector and government itself. Electric power is adequate for the region. Over ten percent of the roads have a hard surface, about 40 percent have improved surfaces. Railroad service exceeds 3,000 kilometers; inland navigable waterways are almost 1,200 kilometers, and oil pipelines exceed 179 kilometers (according to data in the CIA's 1985 Fact Book).

There are three major seaports, and five minor ones with more than adequate facilities to handle expanded volumes of shipping. The Angolan civil air consists of 22 major transport aircraft operating from a dozen airports capable of landing any commercial craft for a total of over 250 usable smaller airfields. All of this coupled with the issue raised earlier, that UNITA's controlled portion is omitted entirely from current national estimates, suggests probable underestimating of GNP. It also makes current comparisons with pre-1975 conditions analytically suspect.

FOREIGN INVESTMENTS, AID, AND DEBT OF ANGOLA

The U.S Department of Commerce occasionally identifies the value of U.S. direct investments in small countries such as Angola. The latest available data (for 1983) show U.S. direct investment in Angola at $178 million (see the November 1984 edition of the Survey of Current Business).

The Export-Import Bank is active with an exposure of $261 million in Angola (according to its 1984 Annual Report). There are no legal prohibitions on U.S. commercial activities with Angola, except for normal export licensing

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in extensive food distribution programs in the same regions as do many European countries and the European Economic Community. Hostilities between MPLA and UNITA forces, however, often disrupt such international relief efforts.

Technical assistance for economic development has been forthcoming from U.S. oil companies, Latin America, Western Europe, some Arab countries and from the UN Development Program.

According to the State Department, Angola's economic dealings with the East center on the Soviet Union for purchase of military equipment and payment for troops and advisers. The combination of rising military expenditures and capital development investments, and declining oil prices has increased Angola's short and long-term debt to Western and Eastern bloc creditors. As a consequence, the current Angolan policy of placing emphasis on expanding the oil sector and adopting a domestic policy of austerity appears to be responsible. Like most LDCs, Angola is also negotiating for the rescheduling of some of its debt payments. Official information on debt payments and the total foreign debt is not available.

AMERICAN CORPORATE PRESENCE IN ANGOLA

No U.S. official agency providing data on trade or finance can release that information on an individual or corporate basis. Under existing laws, information gathered for such statistical purposes is confidential.

American companies sell to Angola mainly oil field and mining equipment, aircraft, and food, all easily available in other international markets. The U.S. primary import --petroleum -- will always have an international market at the right price, if U.S. policy were to prohibit such imports.

In addition to the previously mentioned oil companies, other U.S. corporations involved in Angola and mentioned in the public record reviewed by us

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include: Boeing Corp., General Electric, General Tire and Rubber Company, Morgan Guaranty and Trust Co., Geophysical Services of Dallas, Inc., Marine Contractors, Inc. (New Orleans), and Fluor Oil Field Supply (a subsidiary of Fluor Corporation) in Morgan City, Louisiana (where at least two offshore oil platforms were built for use in Angolan waters). This is not a complete list.

CONCLUDING COMMENTS

According to some analysts, the internal political difficulties of Angola contribute to significant economic and social problems, such as rising inflation, increasing black markets, and illegal currency transactions. The same analysts ponder the future of a state with a Marxist orientation but which has adopted pragmatic economic approaches found in Western market economies, and accommodated itself to Western commercial needs, while at the same time benefiting from Western investments which it encourages.

Because of limited data, this reports cannot provide definite answers on the state of the Angolan economy. It may suggest some areas of further investigation regarding U.S.-Angolan economic and political relations and those with the rest of the world.

With this background, we hope that a perusal of the attached articles and clippings, selected at your request to reflect on broader issues, will assist you in pursuing this topic further. Should you require additional assistance, please do not hesitate to call on us again at 287 7300.

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Mr. WOLPE. Mr. Courter, I will give you the privilege of closing out the panel's testimony today. Mr. Gray has just arrived, if that is all right, in order to permit him to return to that conference committee. He will not be remaining for questions. Mr. Gray.

STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM H. GRAY III, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA

Mr. GRAY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the courtesy that the committee is extending so that we can go back to the Gramm-Rudman conference, which is taking place now.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and committee members, for giving me the opportunity to testify before this subcommittee on the issue of United States aid to National Union for the Total Liberation of Angola, UNITA. UNITA is headed by Dr. Jonas Savimbi and, for almost a decade, has been attempting to topple the present Government of Angola.

Mr. Chairman, I commend you for holding this hearing, since direct or indirect American support for UNITA at this time has strategic implications regionally as well as globally, which must not be overlooked. In view of this, I hope that we will examine this matter in its totality, resisting the pitfalls of oversimplification

Those who advocate American support for UNITA do so primarily in response to the presence of Cuban troops in Angola and because they wish to support anti-Communist forces in southern Africa. On the latter point, however, we must remember that Dr. Savimbi underwent political and military training in China and has long professed a Maoist orientation.

On the issue of Cubans, I too am deeply concerned by the presence of Cuban troops in Angola. I neither condone nor encourage their stay there. However, one should be mindful of what caused the Cubans to be called into Angola in the first place.

In the fall of 1975, Mr. Chairman, South Africa sent several thousand troops into Angola. In an attempt to stave off this massive onslaught, Angola made an international appeal for assistance, resulting in a bilateral agreement with the Cubans. South Africa's key protege and ally at that time, as now, was UNITA. South Africa has armed and advised UNITA from the very beginning of the UNITA-MPLA conflict, and continues to be UNITA's principal sponsor and arms supplier.

South Africa's ground and air forces perform direct combat roles alongside UNITA in Angola and across the African continent and UNITA's financial and logistical coordination with South Africa in their anti-MPLA fight remains a point of profound concern for other African nations. The Organization of African Unity, under the chairmanship of President Diouf of Senegal, who is a close ally of the United States, has in recent months issued a number of statements expressing the OAU's serious concern regarding the possibilities of American support for UNITA. One such statement reads in part:

> The 21st summit of the OAU expresses its profound concern for repeal of the Clark amendment.
>
> The 21st summit recognizes this course of action might undermine the foundation of struggle waged by the Government of the People's Republic of Angola against the armed bandits of UNITA, who continue to benefit from the financial, military and

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logistical support of racist South Africa. The OAU strongly believes that any kind of interference or threat against the sovereignty of the People's Republic of Angola would be taken as a hostile act perpetrated against the Organization of African Unity.

The 21st summit urges that the repeal of the Clark amendment not be understood as support for clandestine activities against the legitimate Government of the People's Republic of Angola.

The 21st summit hopes, therefore, that wisdom and good will will prevail to guarantee better relations between the United States of America and Africa.

American support for UNITA at this time will be seen globally as our entering into a military alliance with South Africa. This we cannot afford. The United States Congress cut CIA funding for UNITA 10 years ago, in part because we could not afford to be part of an American-South African alliance. In 1985, when international rejection of South Africa because of its apartheid policies is at an unprecedented high, we can afford this alliance even less.

South Africa continues its illegal occupation of Namibia, despite many years of international protests plus ongoing resistance by the Namibian people. There are three questions: Do we want increased conflict, war in southern Africa, or do we want reduced conflict and Cuban troop removal, or do we want really to topple a pro-Marxist government a la Nicaragua.

Let me give what I believe are the answers. I don't believe we want to increase the conflict in southern Africa and I don't believe those who are supporting this particular resolution do so either. And I don't believe we seriously want just to make Angola another Nicaragua, for two reasons. I don't believe the American people will support such a military involvement thousands of miles away and not at our backdoor.

Second, if we decide to do this as part of an East-West global struggle, then will we support military movements in other nations, other countries, that are pro-East? We could end up stretched militarily and financially all over the world with little effectiveness following such a policy. Therefore, it seems our policy ought to be to reduce conflict, get foreign troops including the Cubans out of Africa and support democratic institutions.

United States pressure for Namibian independence would in my opinion be a vastly more effective means of reducing regional hostilities than our providing aid to UNITA. Should we successfully pursue this approach, South Africa would be stripped of its rationale for invading Angola, namely, the presence of SWAPO troops, and Angola would be denied its rationale for its reliance on Cuban troops, namely, South Africa's repeated invasions. Through bilateral channels, Namibian independence, Cuban troop withdrawal, and Angolan elections must be made the regional top priorities.

I want a reduced Soviet and Cuban role in southern Africa, like those who are sponsoring the legislation, but providing aid to UNITA will certainly intensify the Soviet role. I would like us to remind this body that in 1975, the CIA predicted that the entry of South African troops into Angola would result in a major expansion of Angola's reliance on Cuba. This prediction has been borne out, and I am certain that United States assistance to UNITA at this time, whether overt or covert, whether it be military aid or so-called humanitarian aid, would be similarly ill advised, again re-

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sulting in a further expansion of the Cuban-Soviet role in southern Africa.

In a word, if you want to strengthen the Cuban and Soviet presence, provide military aid to UNITA. If you want to reduce Cuban and Soviet presence, then get rid of the cause of their presence, South African invasions.

Finally, I do not believe that any of our colleagues wish us to enter into a military alliance with South Africa against the Government of Angola, which is what our involvement at this time would amount to, and I hope that they would recognize that.

I also do not believe that any of us wish an expanded role for the Cubans or the Soviets in southern Africa. Certainly this Congressman certainly does not. This however, would certainly, be the outcome of our entering the conflict at this juncture by providing financial aid to UNITA.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to testify before the subcommittee.

Mr. WOLPE. Thank you very much.

Mr. KEMP. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. WOLPE. Mr. Kemp, I was just about to recess and then we will be returning.

Mr. KEMP. I won't be able to come back, and I was struck by the eloquence of our friend from Philadelphia. I wonder if I could just make one brief comment, because I too have to leave and I will not be able to come back.

Mr. WOLPE. Mr. Courter has not had an opportunity to testify.

Mr. KEMP. Isn't he going to come back after the vote?

Mr. COURTER. I might as well because there is probably only 6 minutes left.

Mr. KEMP. Since my name was so prominently in his testimony, let me just clear it up for the record. It may come as a shock to my friend from New York, but this country is providing support for freedom fighters in Central America. Mr. Solarz is in favor of some humanitarian assistance in Kampuchea, to the rebels fighting the Communist government there. I also support the liberation of Grenada and do not equate it with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. I do support aid to Afghan freedom fighters and Ethiopian freedom fighters. I can probably think about some others.

Mr. WEISS. How about the Poles?

Mr. KEMP. They are the only ones who have asked, and they have asked on bended knee, for some support as freedom-loving men and women for some support.

Mr. WEISS. How about the Poles?

Mr. KEMP. Could I finish my statement?

Mr. WEISS. You left out the Poles.

Mr. KEMP. Mr. Chairman, may I finish my statement?

Mr. WOLPE. Please finish your statement.

Mr. KEMP. I want to say, though, in response to my Chairman Bill Gray's comments, that he is the first one that I have heard in opposition to any assistance to UNITA; he expressed, and I know very sincerely, his desire to get the Cuban-Soviet presence out of Angola and I appreciate that because that is the one unifying theme that we all share.

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Mr. WOLPE. Mr. Kemp, let me say you have not heard very well because that has been the basic theme of all of the opposition to our proposal that we would be playing directly into the hands of the Soviets.

Mr. GRAY. Could I add one thing that wasn't in my testimony, Mr. Chairman, that is, I would say to my colleague Mr. Kemp and others, 2 years ago I had an opportunity to have some indepth talks in Europe at a conference with representatives of the Angolan Government. I think that they have consistently made it very consistently clear that they would like the Cuban troops out also.

It seems to me we have got to remember what brought the Cuban troops there, and then, if the Cuban troops are not removed after we deal with the cause, which was the invasion of Angola by South Africa and the illegal occupation of Namibia by South Africans. If that does not occur, then I think the gentleman has very good grounds to talk about potential aid to UNITA.

Mr. KEMP. That is progress, Mr. Chairman, that is progress.

Mr. WOLPE. We will recess.

[Recess.]

Mr. WOLPE. The hearing will resume.

I apologize to Mr. Courter for the delay and appreciate your willingness to let Mr. Gray precede you.

STATEMENT OF HON. JIM COURTER, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY

Mr. COURTER. I understand that. I have no problems with that. It was important to have Chairman Gray get back to that conference.

I would like to ask unanimous consent that my entire statement be included in the record.

Mr. WOLPE. Without objection.

Mr. COURTER. Thank you very much.

I enjoyed being the last one to testify. I heard a lot more testimony, I suppose, than I otherwise would have heard. I equate the situation in Angola similar in a sense to the policies of our government in South Africa as strange as that may seem. I think the Congress took a lead and I was one of those Republicans that was in the forefront early this year in recognizing the fact that our policy in South Africa of constructive engagement was flawed in that it did not create the internal changes in that country that we thought they would.

I want to pay tribute to the House and Members of the Senate who were in the forefront of making the administration change to a degree its policy with respect to South Africa. The case now is Angola and the same policy of constructive engagement has failed, I believe, in Angola as it has in South Africa, and again it has been the Congress of the United States that has taken the lead more so than the administration by repeal of the Clark amendment.

I think the Congress should take the second step of giving humanitarian or military aid to the democratic freedom fighters, UNITA, in Angola. The situation there, I think, is quite clear. The issue in Angola, I don't think as some portray it to be, the fact that there are 1,500 South African troops, or the fact that South African troops are in Namibia. I see the problem in Angola with 35,000

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Cuban troops from a different continent. The fact that the Soviet Union has supported suppressive regimes in Angola at the level of $2 billion over time and we understand almost a billion dollars in the last year or year and a half.

I think that is the fundamental problem. I believe there was—earlier someone asked unanimous consent that a letter dated October 5, 1985, which was signed by Jeremias Chitunda, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs of UNITA signing for Jonas Savimbi, be included in the record. If that is not the case, I ask unanimous consent that that be included.

Mr. WOLPE. If it has not already been included, it will be included.

Mr. COURTER. It has been said that American interests would be harmed if we were to give assistance to UNITA to resist the Cuban Army's maneuver through Angola. I fail to see how this possibly could be the case. Since we support various goals in Angola, some of those goals being self-government, individual rights, the end to foreign involvement and peaceful negotiated settlement, I would like to examine how each of these is affected by the United States involvement in that area.

American inaction, I think, would hardly serve the goal of an end to foreign involvement in Angola. That is basically Mr. Solarz's argument. He says if we support Savimbi in Angola, the Cubans will stay.

I point to the historical record, during the time the Clark amendment was there, Cuban troups increased from 12,000 to 35,000. I don't believe that the Cubans will leave if we say please. Many people have indicated that if the South Africans will leave Angola, the 1,300 that are there from time to time, then two-thirds of the Cubans will go back to Cuba.

It seems to me that if you withdraw two-thirds of the Cuban troops, I think that is a gigantic leap in fate. The Cubans have not necessarily complied with their statements in the past with regard to troop removals and I know that the Soviet Union and the United States in negotiations for 14 or 15 years on the mutual imbalance, the force reductions in Europe, have a disagreement as to how many Soviet troops there are in Europe.

We can certainly have a disagreement as to how many Cuban troops remain in Angola, but my main point is I don't think merely because two-thirds of the Cuban troops are withdrawn from Angola that Angola is going to be two-thirds freer. I think it is the fact that the Angolan Government [MPLA] is suggesting that 12,000 Cuban troops remain in Angola is recognition of the fact that they need the out and exterior support of Cuba in order to subjugate the Angola people themselves.

I could go on, but I wanted basically to end once again with the position that the United States has to do something here. We have a clear opportunity. The debate is interesting because it underlies, I think, the fundamental differences that we have in this democracy and in this Congress as to what is going on in the world.

I believe that there are very powerful enemies of freedom and democracy and human rights. I believe one of those is indeed Cuba and the Soviet Union. They are playing very aggressively in Angola at the present time and to suggest that if we give some

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modicum of help to the Democrats, to Jonas Savimbi in Angola, we have to give it to every regime that is struggling against a suppressive regime, I don't think that is true.

You have unique situations in Angola. You have internal dynamics in Angola and a history that is unique and you have 35,000 Cuban troops from a different continent, in Angola. If you can get a situation where there is a foreign power that is subjugating people as Mr. Solarz will point out in Cambodia, I would suggest that 35,000 Cuban troops in Angola indicate to me that there are foreign troops there as well.

I thank the Chair for coming back. I know you didn't have to do that. I appreciate your attention.

Mr. WOLPE. Thank you. I appreciate receiving your testimony.

[Mr. Courter's prepared statement follows:]

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PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JIM COURTER, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Subcommittee, I appreciate this opportunity to present you with a brief statement of my views on US policy in southern Africa, and specifically in regard to Angola.

In recent months, led by Congressional initiatives, the United States government gradually reached the conclusion that the policy of constructive engagement had failed in moving the South African government to abandon its racist system of apartheid. The President's actions, while often criticized as being too mild, did represent an admission that constructive engagement had failed to give South Africa the incentives it needed to bring about the change that so many of us viewed as morally just and necessary.

Now, in the case of Angola, the same policy of constructive engagement has failed, and Congress has again taken the first step in creating a new policy by repealing the Clark amendment which prohibited American aid to the pro-democratic forces in Angola. We should now take the second step, by considering and approving aid to the forces of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola, known as UNITA.

Because of our intense focus on South Africa, it is easy to look at Angola and miss the forest for the trees. The central issue in Angola is not 1500 South African troops in that country. The central issue is the presence of 35,000 Cuban troops in Angola, the fact that these troops are supported by Soviet advisers, commanders and over $1 billion in military aid in the last year alone, the fact that these forces are waging war, and the fact that the Angolan government would not exist were it not for the support it receives from the Soviet Union and its Cuban proxies.

The Soviet bloc has mobilized these forces to defeat UNITA, which is a democratic movement that seeks an independent, nonaligned Angola free of the forces that have come from other continents to impose a second colonization on the Angolan nation. Some allege that UNITA, led by Dr. Jonas Savimbi, is not loyal to the democratic ideal. I would like to submit at this point in

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the record a letter written by Dr, Savimbi to the Secretary General of the United Nations, in which he outlines the goals of his struggle and his desire not to acquire complete power in Angola, but to free his country of foreign troops so that a dialogue of indigenous political forces can take place, leading to the establishment of a democratic government. I urge the Subcommittee to consider this letter carefully.

[The letter follows:]

It has been said that American interests would be harmed if we were to give assistance to UNITA to resist the Cuban army's march through Angola. I fail to see how this could be the case. Since we all support the goals of self-government, individual rights, an end to foreign involvement and a peaceful negotiated settlement in Angola, I would like to examine how each of these goals would be served by a policy that withholds American assistance from UNITA.

American inaction would hardly serve the goal of an end to foreign involvement in Angola. The Soviets and Cubans, to judge by the enormous human and material resources they have sent to Angola, are there to stay. To judge by their recent offensive, they are there to win. In the absence of strong military opposition, their only incentive is to remain in Angola in pursuit of military victory so that the Communist regime can be consolidated in power, unchallenged by indigenous pro-democratic forces.

By the same token, the goal of a negotiated settlement among the indigenous parties aspiring to political power is hardly served by a policy which gives the pro-Soviet forces a clear field on which to pursue military victory.

Lastly, it is hard to believe that the ideal of self-government and individual rights would be served by the consolidation of a government that governs with the backing of Soviet bloc troops.

Another objection is raised when aid to UNITA is proposed: this is the contention that settlement of the Namibia dispute would be more difficult if the United States takes sides in the Angolan conflict. However, it is clear that the South Africans will not leave Namibia as long as Namibia faces 35,000 Cuban troops on its northern border, giving SWAPO guerrillas material aid and sanctuary in Angolan territory. It is time to recognize that the key to Namibia is in Angola -- until Cuban troops are removed from Angola, there will be no incentive for South Africa to leave Namibia, and we will lack the leverage we need to accomplish this worthy goal.

Mr. Chairman, we face difficult and complex problems in southern Africa. We all agree on the basic goals of US policy --

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the defense and expansion of democratic government -- and we share a common view of the vital strategic importance of this region. In my opinion, the United States should not take military involvement in foreign conflicts, even indirect involvement, lightly. In this case, I believe it is clear that the risks of inaction outweigh the risks we assume by aiding a friendly, pro-Western liberation movement in Angola.

I commend the Subcommittee for convening these hearings, and I hope that the Subcommittee will soon move ahead to consider the legislation on Angola that has been introduced by Representatives Siljander, McCollum and Pepper. Just as we reached the limits of constructive engagement in South Africa, so have we reached the limits of this policy as it applies to Angola. It is time to assume a more active role by standing in support of UNITA in its effort to achieve an independent, nonaligned Angola.

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UNIAO NACIONAL PARA A INDEPENDENCIA TOTAL DE ANGOLA

UNITA

Jamba, Angola, October 5, 1985

QUARTEL GENERAL
DA TERRA LIVRE
DE ANGOLA

His Excellency
Dr. Xavier Perez de Cuellar
Secretary-General
The United Nations
New York, New York
U.S.A.

Excellency:

The conflict in our country of Angola continues relentlessly, engendering upon our people untold suffering, misery and death. Armed foreign intervention which began ten years ago is at the origin of Angola's plight. By refusing to condemn this aggressive foreign intervention; by arbitrarily encouraging the Soviet-Cuban intervention while limiting its condemnation to South Africa's; and by refusing to encourage Angolans to reconcile with one another, the attitude of the international community indeed continues to aggravate Angola's agony, instead of helping us to find solutions. Nevertheless, we think it is imperative for us to continue to seek understanding in this international community where leaders of sincere goodwill toward Angola can still be found and must be counted upon in our national quest for peace and justice.

Allow me, Your Excellency, to briefly review the situation beginning in the 1960's when three national liberation movements in Angola (FNLA, MPLA and UNITA) launched the armed struggle against the Portuguese colonial rule. From 1961 onward, these liberation movements fought against colonial rule and gained in strength.

In 1974, following the April 25 coup in Portugal, the new government in Lisbon signalled its intention to end its colonial rule in Africa. We of the leadership of UNITA seized the opportunity to initiate and carry out a political campaign that culminated successively in a cease-fire between the Portuguese and the three Angolan nationalist groups, the holding of the Mombassa (Kenya) Conference under the auspices of the late President Jomo Kenyata where FNLA, MPLA and UNITA were effectively reconciled with one another and worked out a common platform for independence negotiations with Portugal and, finally, the holding of the Alvor Conference in early 1975 in Portugal with the Portuguese government.

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The conference ended with the signing, by the four participants, of the historic Alvor Agreement which had stipulated, inter alia, (1) the establishment on January 31, 1975 of an interim (Portugal-FNLA-MPLA-UNITA coalition) government to run Angola until the proclamation of independence, (2) the holding of free elections for a Constituent Assembly in October, 1975, and (3) the proclamation of independence on November 11, 1975.

Given the historical circumstances of Angola with three legitimate national liberation movements, the Alvor Agreement obviously provided for the safest framework for Angola's transition to independence. Pluralist democracy was the only way for our country to enter sovereignty peacefully, harmoniously and durably.

Unfortunately, many of our compatriots could not hide for long their aversion to sharing power. This attitude was readily and strongly boosted by external influences. The Soviet Union (the long time ally of the MPLA), for example, was quick to resume the arming of the MPLA's guerrilla army, at a time when the three guerrilla armies were, by the Alvor Agreement, to be transformed into what would have become Angola's national army. As early as March 1975, Cubans were seen training at the MPLA's Massangano base South of Luanda and elsewhere. Skirmishes and shooting between MPLA and FNLA began in March, 1975, and rapidly intensified.

UNITA resisted, at first, getting involved in the fighting and tried, instead, to promote peace to salvage the Alvor Agreement. In June we persuaded President Jomo Kenyata to convene the Nakuru (Kenya) summit conference where the three Angolan leaders met and signed a cease-fire agreement. Unfortunately, two weeks after its signing, the Nakuru Agreement was broken and fighting resumed across the whole country.

By August 5, 1975, the interim government in Luanda collapsed amidst increasing insecurity and total paralysis.

Our neutrality had also come under increasing challenge and provocations from both MPLA and FNLA: each side sought our cooperation to fight the other. And finally, physical attacks by the MPLA against us in Luanda and Bie had swept UNITA into the armed conflict.

In our first battles in late August, 1975, in Benguela, we already encountered Cubans fighting side by side with the MPLA. Soviet-made armament arrived in large quantities in Angolan ports and airports.

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Concerned about the increasing Soviet-Cuban involvement, I flew in early September, 1975, to several African countries where I discussed with heads of State the seriousness of armed foreign intervention in the country: the conflict had become internationalized; Angolans alone might no longer be able to find a solution.

South Africa subsequently appeared on the scene in October, 1975, partly in response to Western and African leaders who had advised her to intervene to counter the Cubans, and partly based on her own reaction to Soviet-Cuban build-up in a neighboring country (Angola).

In retrospect, it doesn't matter which foreign power intervened first in Angola. But it is totally inaccurate for anyone to assert that "the Cubans were invited by the Angolan government to help repel a South African invasion," as the MPLA alleges. The undisputable chronology of events shows that the South Africans intervened precisely in response to the Cuban invasion; and the only government in place at the time of the Cuban arrival in our country was the Interim Transition Government of which we all were a part. The Interim Government invited no foreign force to intervene. The Cubans were neither invited by the Angolan government nor did they come to help repel South African aggression.

It remains nevertheless irrefutably clear that armed foreign intervention has been at the root of Angola's plight. In fact, the Organization of the African Unity's Extraordinary Conference held in Abbis Ababa (Ethiopia) on January 22, 1976, had recommended the immediate and total withdrawal of all foreign forces -- the Cubans and the South Africans, that is -- from Angola as the only way to bring about peace. By February, 1976, the South Africans had withdrawn; but the Cubans remained and increased in number. There are now (1985) over 35,000 Cuban troops, compared with about 12,000 Cubans by February, 1976.

We continue our search for a total withdrawal of all foreign forces from our country, national reconciliation of all Angolans, formation of a government of national unity and free elections. Our national independence has been aborted by massive foreign intervention. The Angolan people are yet to enjoy the basic rights for which they fought foreign dominations, from the Portuguese colonial days to the present-day Soviet-Cuban occupation.

The international community is called upon to help bring about an end to the ongoing tragedy and to achieve peace, stability and justice in Angola and the region. At the same time, we feel we have a duty and a right to inform and to be

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heard in this international forum, especially in the United Nations, to enable the international community to realistically and objectively assess the situation and to find ways to help Angolans.

It should be abundantly clear by now to all observers and decision-makers that no solution is possible without taking into account the wishes and aspirations of the majority of the Angolan people.

The MPLA regime, unelected and illegitimate to the eyes of Angolans, has enjoyed the exclusive privilege of presenting its version of the story of the Angola conflict to the United Nations, thereby depriving this prestigious organization of understanding and effective contribution to solution.

We are therefore ready to accept any opportunity you may give us to explain in the United Nations' forum our national problem.

In conclusion, we are convinced that a military solution to Angola's conflict is neither possible or desirable. Efforts must be increased towards peaceful, lasting solutions. Dialogue and national reconciliation are essential steps to any process leading to peace and stability. The withdrawal of all foreign forces is of paramount importance, lest the bloodshed continue and national reconciliation remain unachievable. Failure by the United Nations to listen to all legitimate parties to our national problems will inevitably lead to prolongation of tragedy in Angola. And we of UNITA are ready and willing to present our case to this world body thereby enabling it to have a wholesome view of the situation and to enhance its efforts in the search for solution.

With highest regards,

Sincerely,

Jeremias K. Chitunda
by direction of

Jonas Malheiro Savimbi
President
THE NATIONAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
The National Union for Total
Independence of Angola (UNITA)

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Mr. WOLPE. Let me ask our panelists one question related to the dimension of this whole debate that I don't think has received much attention up to this point. How much weight in your view should we give the opinion of African States themselves and African leaders? Is it relevant and if so, how important? Mr. McHugh entered into the record and of course in his testimony this statement unanimously made by African States indicating the strongest possible opposition to American intervention in Angola in the form of assistance to Mr. Savimbi saying that such an action will be viewed as a hostile at to the Organization of African Unity.

My question to you is, how much weight are you prepared to give that expression of opinion?

Mr. COURTER. A similar question can be asked, for example, in Central America, how much weight do you give the Organization of American States, how much weight do you give the Contradoran countries? How much weight do you give to those countries fronting Nicaragua at the present time there?

My answer is indeed you give some weight, but there is a fundamental decision I think that has to be made by this democracy, and that is whether we really believe in our own constitution.

I am not suggesting that we enter wars of liberation regardless of whether they may be or that we aid whoever feels that they are suppressed. I think in certain areas of the world where there is clear Soviet and Cuban suppression of basic democratic rights and you have a very viable organization like Jonas Savimbi's that controls much of the land, for us to deny giving personal, philosophical, emotional and material assistance to that organization would be denying our own constitution, would be denying the fundamental premise on which our country and our Constitution was founded. ed.

Mr. WOLPE. Is it your view that African leaders and peoples are less concerned about external manipulation by external forces than are we?

Mr. COURTER. I think that people unfortunately look at the world as not controlled but influenced by two great powers. Particularly I would suggest the Soviet Union, because they are much more adept, I think, at infiltrating and training guerrillas, et cetera, than we are, and many of the public statements made by countries around the world are quite different than their private statements. Many of those public statements are made because of intimidation.

Mr. WOLPE. On that point, let there be no misunderstanding, that those of us who have been working in the African area for years in private conversations as well as in public pronouncements, there is no issue that African States feel more strongly about and are more united about than the invisibility of American intervention in Angola right now.

Mr. COURTER. I don't know. I haven't spoken to those leaders. I understand that there is a difference of opinion. Obviously——

Mr. WOLPE. Let me ask and if you can submit for the record a single African leader outside of Mr. Savimbi himself who thinks this makes sense, I think that would be important information for the Congress.

Mr. MCCOLLUM. It seems to me that one of the problems we have in Africa, whether it is stated by the leaders and their views with

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regard to our presence in Angola or not, is what Mr. Courter, I think, was leading up to, that is that the Soviet presence there is such that without our doing anything that looks responsible in response to their presence, it seems to me it is only going to lead to a tendency to be more involved with the Soviets on the part of other African States and that we will have an even lesser presence in the future, because I think we look like fools there right now by letting the Soviets and their presence get to the point they are in Angola and stay there unconfronted.

Mr. WOLPE. That viewpoint has a large body of sentiment in the Congress and with the American public. It is interesting when you sit down with African leaders and African people to discover some things that are not always apparent when we talk about these issues in the United States.

African leaders have come to a realization that the Soviet Union has very little to offer African states and while the focus of discussion in this country about Africa tends to be on Angola and Ethiopia where Cuban troops are present, African states have kicked the Soviets out of probably a dozen countries, they were kicked out by Africans, not by Americans.

I think this discussion has been very helpful in making clear the unity of purpose in terms of no one wants to see the continuance of Cuban troops in Angola.

The issue is how do we get from point A to point B and the concern that I have is that unintentionally some of the efforts being advanced now may well come across to African states as a kind of paternalism that actually undermines our influence in Africa and places directly into the hands of the Soviets and the Cubans.

Mr. COURTER. I disagree. I find it strange to say that $25 million or $35 million—of course, you may argue that is where it starts—but $35 million of aid to Savimbi is heavyhanded and $2 billion of aid from the Soviet Union and 35,000 Soviet troops is not.

Mr. WOLPE. By being heavyhanded, we are going to disregard African opinion. It is the African states that are most on the front line in terms of consequences of these issues with them. When they are telling us we are making a mistake, we should respect them enough to give them credibility?

Mr. COURTER. I am more familiar with the Central American situation. I lived there for a couple of years in Venezuela and have traveled extensively through Central America. I know for a fact that the public statements of some of the leaders in Central and South America are quite different than what they would say behind closed doors and also quite substantially different than a lot of opinions held by the people in those countries as well.

Mr. WOLPE. Mr. Weiss.

Mr. WEISS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Let me answer the question first in the way that you posed it and then beyond. I think that as you posed it, it seems that the response has to be that ultimately although we pay a great deal of weight to the opinions of the countries and the leaders, the African governments, and that we do so within the context of international law in our treaty commitments and obligations and our own constitution, ultimately we have to make that judgment for ourselves, but obviously we ought to be paying a tremendous amount of

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weight to the people who are even more directly affected than we are.

Mr. WOLPE. Thank you very much.

Mr. Siljander.

Mr. SILJANDER. Just pursuing the same line of questioning, I think there is also an understanding needed similar to the point of view espoused by Jim, and that is that in Central America the leaders are pressured to say certain things by internal factions and also by some of their neighboring countries. The Middle East is a precise example of this. How many times have we heard the leaders of an Arab nation say one thing and when we talk to them privately they say, "I must say these things. I have to respond to all these pressures," and the truth is other African countries are in fact morally, politically and financially and militarily assisting Savimbi in Angola.

At least eight African nations have privately indicated that they are supportive and hopeful for a victory by UNITA. I wouldn't want to place a name in the record——

Mr. WOLPE. I was going to ask the gentleman to do so, it would be helpful to the debate.

Mr. SILJANDER. As in any type of covert operation and with the radical members of the Organization of African Unity and the pressure they have on the less affluent states and participants in the OAU, it is clear that no one would want to put anyone's name in the record in a public forum.

The second element to consider, the Cubans are predictable. In South Yemen and Ethiopia, they are not fighting against apartheid there. That is not why they are present in those two nations. The Cubans are predictable, their brutality is predictable their retaliation is predictable, the fact that they won't leave until they have accomplished their goals or are kicked out is also predictable but the United States is not.

The Clark amendment was repealed, and I am thankful for the repeal, but the divergent foreign policy and democracy is less consistent than the autocratic dictatorship of a Communist country.

Therefore, the pressure of retaliation is on many countries not to overtly assist Savimbi, but there is, in fact, aid to Savimbi by at least eight African nations covertly and under the table.

Mr. COURTER. If the gentleman would yield to me, I appreciate those comments. Also I am glad he brought up the Middle East because the rhetorical question I have to the chairman I suppose or the panel is when was the last time we took a poll of Arab States before we decided our policy with regard to Israel?

Mr. WOLPE. Is that a rhetorical question?

Mr. COURTER. The point is we are backing Israel because of a moral imperative and because it is the right thing to do, and the same thing with respect to Savimbi, but you can't say that we always follow what the polling would say with regard to neighboring countries because we certainly don't do that in the Middle East.

Mr. WOLPE. I was not suggesting for a moment that we ought to let our foreign policy be dependent on polls of other countries. I was suggesting that if indeed the argument is that we are somehow advancing American interests by intervention in Angola in the

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fashion which the gentleman advocates, I submit that the opposite would be the case and that it is in that context that African opinion becomes relevant, because if the consequences of American support for Savimbi is to reinforce a perception in the continent that we are allied with South Africa, then indeed we are losing our influence and prestige and our ability to maintain our position in the continent. That is the point.

Mr. COURTER. May I ask the Chair a question?

I suppose the fundamental question I have is do you really think the Cubans will leave if South Africa pulls out of Angola?

Mr. WOLPE. I think they certainly should be put to the test and I also know that we have already have advanced in the course of the negotiations a very specific proposal for a phased withdrawal of the Cuban combat troops.

The South Africans have not been cooperative in that effort to try to secure a final resolution of the Namibia dispute or the Cuban withdrawal, but the Angolans have been saying for some years that privately and publicly they have indicated a desire to draw down Cuban troops because they are having to pay for them. They are costing them severely, which leads to the final point.

There is a direct relationship if you take a look at the history of the presence of Cuban troops in Angola with South African combat presence in Angola. I guess the question we need to be asking ourselves is what would we advise the Angolan Government? How should they be resisting South African occupation and South African military within their borders?

Mr. SILJANDER. Reclaiming my time, it is pretty clear after 10 years of discussions and attempts at negotiations and absolutely no aid whatsoever, covert, overt, military, or humanitarian aid to UNITA, it is clear that the Cubans have decided rather than maintaining the troops at 12,000, they decided to triple those troop levels in the last 10 years to 35,000 plus another 1,200 East bloc, Soviets, North Koreans, et cetera, so it seems pretty clear that we have had an adequate decade of testing.

Now I argue, let us attempt to engage pressure on the Government of Angola to engage in fruitful negotiations fulfilling a commitment, a treaty that they signed as well as UNITA signed several years ago to engage in freedom of democracy and discussions of power sharing through the democratic process. We have had a decade of testing and now we need to fulfill a commitment that we have with freedom fighters elsewhere in the world, applying the pressure where it counts.

I don't think the Cubans are going to sit down and listen to negotiations. It is clear they haven't in the last decade.

Mr. WEISS. May I respond? It seems to me though that the Secretary of State for one disagrees with that proposition and in the now famous letter to Mr. Michel he says quite clearly that we have finally gotten both the Angolans and the South Africans to agree to allow us to try to mediate this thing to a resolution and says that now would be the worst time ever for us in essence to become an ally of one of the participants of that negotiation.

So the disagreement that you have is not just with the chairman and myself. The disagreement that you have is with the Secretary of State. I understand that the Secretary of State is waging a very

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difficult fight that is being assaulted both within the administration and outside the administration, but nonetheless, that is the position that he has taken, reaffirmed by Mr. Crocker at this very table a week and a half or so ago.

Mr. SILJANDER. I find it an interesting opportunity to hear you so supportive of Mr. Crocker and so supportive of our Secretary of State. The record should indicate such because this is one of the few times I have ever seen you using the Secretary of State's arguments and his position in support of your own.

Mr. WEISS. I call them as I see them.

Mr. SILJANDER. Well, it certainly leads me to wonder.

Mr. WEISS. Mr. Courter says I should tell you that this time he happens to be right. That is my position, not his.

Mr. WOLPE. Mr. Burton.

Mr. BURTON. I would like to comment that I really disagreed with the Secretary of State when he wrote that letter to Mr. Michel as did many of my colleagues and your support of that letter reinforces my position.

I would just like to make a couple of real brief comments. You know, we should do what is right, and we should be more concerned with what is right and what is in our national interest and in the interest of our allies than what popular world opinion might be at a particular time, and Winston Churchill, I think, said that any politician that goes around with his ear to the ground cannot expect to get respect from the people he represents, and I think that is right.

We have to do the right thing and what is right is to help people who are fighting against oppression, in this case communism, because we know that communism really is a horrible system under which to live.

My daughter brought me this week an article which I am going to read into the Congressional Record tomorrow, and it is from Teen Magazine. It is a story written by a 16-year-old girl who left Cambodia about 3 years ago and she talks in that about the horrible situation under which she and her family had to live.

There were 8 million people there 10 years ago. Now there are somewhere around 4 million people left alive because of the horrible atrocities that have taken place there under Communist repression.

We know of Communist repression in the Soviet Union, 40 million to 50 million people being killed over a 30-year period. We know under the cultural revolution in China, somewhere between 15 million and 30 million people were killed, but every place where the Communists get firm control the repression increases and there is a great deal of genocide that takes place.

In Africa, Mozambique, right next door to Angola, we have heard testimony that Mr. Machel has systematically killed over 70,000 of his countrymen. 200,000 to 300,000 people have been put in reeducation camps and this is supported by the Soviet Union, who have put $1 billion in military aid in there in the last 18 months and they have Soviet advisors there.

In Angola, we know repression exists not to the degree that it does in Mozambique, but in my view because the UNITA forces have been so successful over the last decade. He has had so much

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opposition he hasn't been able to perpetrate these types of atrocities. But make no mistake about it, if they solidify their position and eradicate all the opposition, the repression will grow and there will be genocide to the degree that we have seen in all these other Communist countries. That is the way they work, eradicate all opposition.

If we agree with some of the suggestions that have been made, in my view, and that is for South Africa to pull out, and we all abhor apartheid, but if South Africa pulls out and those elections are supposed to take place, there will be a vacuum created and the SWAPO forces in all probability will prevail.

The Cubans will step up their activities, because if you look at a map, you will see there is a saddle that will be across the South African continent and that will put South Africa between pincers and they will not long survive if this takes place, and that is what the Soviets are after.

The bottom line is strategic minerals that we must have come from that part of the world. There are five minerals absolutely essential to the security of the United States and the free world that come from the southern tip of Africa and the Soviet Union. If that country goes Communist and the Soviets control those ports within a short period of time, they will have us in a very untenable situation as they will the rest of the free world.

I think it is imperative that we look at all these things when we decide whether we should come to the aid of the freedom fighters anyplace.

First of all, what is right; second, what is in our national interest; and if we keep those two things in the forefront of our thinking, then I think we will be doing the right thing and the Communists will not be as successful as they have been in the past.

Mr. McCollum. I think you struck the nail on the head when you asked a question of who do we trust there. If the South Africans pull out, I think we are in real trouble over there. It has come to my attention and I happen to believe it, that in the latest offensive if the South Africans hadn't provided air cover, UNITA might not be a force to be reckoned with so much so today, that there was a point in time when the forces of the Soviets and the Cubans and so on with the Angolans had them on the ropes. I don't trust the Government of Angola today, the MPLA, the Soviets and the Cubans. To leave them alone to wipe this UNITA force out—they haven't excepted human rights and I think that we are doing something that is immoral and indefensible not only in providing the economic support we have to the MPLA, but we would be doing even more if we left it up to the UNITA forces to stand defenseless by not providing any relief if the South Africans pull out.

Mr. Weiss. May I also comment very briefly?

Mr. Burton. I would be happy to yield to my colleague from New York.

Mr. Weiss. I thank the gentleman.

It seems to me that the problem that we face—and this is sort of tied into the exchange that I had with my colleague from New York, Mr. Kemp. I don't know why he got so upset with me. I was reading verbatim from his statement. The concern that I have is the kind of blanket jamming or pulling together of all Communists

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and Communist governments leaves us, the United States Government and people in it in a very, very difficult position.

It is one thing, it seems to me, to take the case of Afghanistan where people are brutally invaded and for us to say we are going to support the people in fact who have been invaded.

I was one of those who supported the grain embargo against the Soviet Union. I supported Carter's boycott of the Olympics. So it seems to me that you have to pick and choose and I am concerned when Mr. Kemp, for example, you blanket everyone together and so he throws all the nations that he mentions, also the polls. He didn't want to respond to the polls because you know we tried that once in 1956. We had in essence let the Hungarians believe that if they revolted against the Soviet Union that we would be there and we weren't.

So we really ought to pick and choose where in fact it is right for us to get involved. Throw the Ethiopians in when the people who are moving for secession in that country are Marxists themselves and have been seeking to secede before the time that the current government came in—I don't think it makes sense to do that. We ought to do it case by case.

Angola provided potential to gulf oil when Savimbi and his people wanted to destroy the oil fields in Angola. I think we have to judge on the basis of what is actually happening rather than our fantasy fears of what the word "communism" may mean generally. We need to go on a case-by-case basis.

Mr. BURTON. I agree with the gentleman. We need to pick and choose and Angola is one place where we should choose now.

Mr. WOLPE. Let me close with a brief observation.

Mr. Courter, you made reference early in your remarks to the role you had played with respect to the development of support for sanctions legislation in the Congress which in the end generated the President's executive order. I want to commend you and a number of your Republican colleagues for the letter that was sent to the South African Ambassador. I think that was a very significant contribution to our debate on South Africa and enhanced our ability to deal with this issue in a nonpartisan way where it became an American issue.

My deep concern is that much of the advancement that was made in American policy toward South Africa as it evolved in the debate on economic sanctions will in fact be eroded by this effort supporting Savimbi in Angola. The reason is no matter how we may see it on this end, from an African perspective that assistance will clearly place the United States in a military relationship in alliance with South Africa. It may not be widely known in this Congress, but in the past 4 years, Angola has been subject to military invasions by up to 10,000 troops each year.

There has been a 3-year occupation of Southern Angola by South Africa. South African forces, particularly the 32d Battalion and other irregulars, have fought alongside UNITA for years. South African air strikes have been brought to bear in favor of UNITA. The point is that whether we like it or not it is South Africa that has been the key to UNITA's military operations within Angola and for us now to throw our support to the South African military effort will so substantially erode the advancement that we made in

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our policymaking of disassociation from apartheid and our desire to join in the international community's efforts pressing for the elimination of apartheid, I think it would be terribly unfortunate in terms of the American national interest.

Mr. SILJANDER. We are all so worried about South Africa, what about the 35,000 Cubans that are there?

Mr. COURTER. I appreciate the chairman's comment, but I am hopeful and I believe that people can distinguish between aid to South Africa and aid to a black democrat freedom fighter in Africa. As a matter of fact, I would argue that if Savimbi could go elsewhere for his material assistance, he would lean less on South Africa. He has to go someplace for support. He has got it from South Africa at the present time. If he could go to other true democratic states in the world, he would lean much less on South Africa.

Mr. WOLPE. Let me ask, if it can be demonstrated that Mr. Savimbi depending upon the information at the moment, he has portrayed himself as a Maoist, a Socialist, anti-American, would you feel quite so inclined to characterize this individual and his movement as synonymous with that of being freedom fighters?

Mr. MCCOLLUM. Let me respond to this degree: The fact is that supposedly most of the leadership on the African Continent rebelling against colonialism over a period of time have characterized themselves in some fashion that is related to Marxism and Leninism, Maoism, or something. The fact of the matter is that Savimbi of recent has at least had sense to be the opponent to the Soviet-Cuban presence that is there.

I think there is hope for Savimbi. I think that he is someone who could be a leader inside his country. He could have popular support. He could do a lot of good things. I see no sign that the government is or can or is willing to do that, and it seems to me that we are confusing the issue on the South African thing. If they happen to be on the right side in this particular case, why should we be on the wrong side just because they happen to be on the right side and we don't like what they do otherwise?

Mr. WOLPE. I think Mr. Savimbi has a constituency. As Dr. Bender testified recently, there has never been a public opinion poll in Angola. This is not a democratic regime. If you were to ask the people what they thought about UNITA or the MPLA, there would be a plague on both their houses, because this is a country that has been economically and militarily devastated for several years now.

My point is when we start characterizing terms as sharply as these are, the freedom fighters and these are the Marxists when in fact both are Marxists, with sharp undemocratic tendencies within their own organizations and they can be demonstrated, I think we distort the reality in a way that is counterproductive in terms of American understanding and therefore American interests.

These issues are not quite as stark in terms of black and white, good guys, bad guys, as some of the political rhetoric and our effort of trying to communicate to the broader public, I think, sometimes leads us to believe. I think this discussion has been very helpful and I thank you all for your contribution.

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Mr. COURTER. Thank you very much. I appreciate it. I enjoyed it very much.

[Whereupon, at 5:10 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]

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APPENDIX

THE QUINTESSENTIAL SAVIMBI

by

Gerald J. Bender

June 1984

PREFACE

As a student of Angola for nearly two decades, I continue to be amazed (and disturbed) by the consistency with which Angolan realities are either misperceived or misrepresented by both "outsiders" and "insiders." And I continue to ask myself how many generations of Angolans will have to bear the scars which the damage of these endemic distortions has inflicted upon them.

Myopic views of Angola were legion during colonial times and persistent to the very end. Only months before the April 1974 coup in Lisbon, most Portuguese remained convinced that they would rule Angola forever, as were (it seems quite clear) the United States and the Soviet Union. In December 1973, Henry Kissinger offered to help the Portuguese break the arms boycott in order to procure offensive weapons to use in Africa; while the Soviets, believing that Portugal had finally neutralized the MPLA as an effective force, dropped all support for that party in March 1974. (The Soviets did not resume their support of the MPLA until about six months year after the coup.)

Misconceptions about the nature of the Angolan civil war and the stakes involved were equally persistent, leading many foreign nations to intervene militarily in the Angolan imbroglio. While some officials in Washington (e.g. President Ford, Henry Kissinger and James Schlesinger) forcefully argued that an MPLA victory would be disastrous for U.S. political and economic interests in southern Africa, others, such as the CIA, assured some members of congress that it would make absolutely no difference to the U.S. who won the war. Just days before independence (11 November 1975), the Soviets urged the MPLA, who were

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surrounded in Luanda at the time, that the only way out was to form a coalition government with UNITA and the FNLA.

Since the end of the civil war in early 1976, Angola has continued to attract considerable attention, and attendant misperceptions. Within Angola, the MPLA and UNITA accuse each other of being both tribalists and "puppets" of outside powers, all at the same time. The MPLA (and its foreign supporters) asserts that UNITA is a puppet of South Africa and a tribalist movement dominated by the Ovimbundu. UNITA (and its foreign supporters) insists that the MPLA is a puppet of the Soviets and Cubans and is dominated by Kimbundus, mesticos, and whites. Sadly, the foreign supporters as well as the two internal forces focus on the misperceptions which divide Angolans, instead of on the realities which unite them.

In recent years, I have written a considerable amount about the MPLA, but very little about UNITA, in part because I know much more about the former. Yet, a day rarely passes when I am not asked for a comment on Jonas Savimbi or UNITA, or for my assessment of how "Savimbi's position" will affect this or that outcome. In spite of twenty years of reading statements by and about Mr. Savimbi, I have not always been able to point with confidence to what his position is or would be on a variety of issues.

In frustration with myself and as a didactic exercise for my students at USC, I began last year to pull together quotations by Jonas Savimbi, or summarizing others' views of his positions or leadership, from the multitude of materials I had gathered over time. Eventually, as with so many of life's endeavors, the "exercise" got out of hand.

The roughly 125 quotes comprising the present document were selected as a representative sample of the 1000+ which I was able

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to catalogue.[1] The fact that most of them tend either to overestimate or underestimate UNITA's military and political strength and potential simply underscores, most unfortunately, the (apparently inescapable) contradictions between reality and perception with respect to current Angolan history.

Gerald J. Bender

Los Angeles,
June 1984.

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1. With the hope that what began as a didactic exercise will both contribute to a better understanding of Angolan realities and be a continuing effort, I welcome additional quotes or suggestions from interested readers. Please send your suggestions to me c/o School of International Relations, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA. 90089-0043. Your participation will be most gratefully acknowledged.

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AMERICAN VIEWS OF SAVIMBI

LEON DASH

"Savimbi is an enigma, a man on whom many labels can stick — brilliant, charismatic, affable, unyielding, forgiving, temporizing, Machiaveilian, opportunistic, lying, nationalistic, Marxist, Maoist, pro-Western and socialist."

Leon Dash, "Savimbi, Lifeblood of UNITA, Is a Man of Many Labels," The Washington Post, 13 August 1977.

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JOHN STOCKWELL

"Savimbi was too proud to turn to the Portuguese, but otherwise he had no prejudice. And no profound ideology. He was neither Marxist nor capitalist, nor even a black revolutionary. He was an Angolan patriot, fighting for the freedom of the Ovimbundu people. He had accepted North Korean training for his men, and Chinese money and arms. He liked Americans. If South Africa would give him the help he needed, he would accept."

John Stockwell, In Search of Enemies, (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1978), p. 154.

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"He has no ideology. He believes in nothing but his own selfish ambitions and fighting has become his way of life. Over the years in Central Angola he has fought against the Portuguese, the MPLA, the FNLA, SWAPO, and the Cubans. A perennial loser, he has held his own only against the FNLA."

John Stockwell, "The Angolans' Perennial Loser Without a Cause" The New York Times, 22 Nov. 1979.

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GERALD J. BENDER

"Savimbi's appeal is undeniable. A remarkable man, he has impressed practically all who have met him, from Mao Zedong to Malcolm X to Jesse Helms."

Gerald J. Bender, "Angola: Left, Right & Wrong," Foreign Policy, No. 43 (Summer 1981), p. 58.

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JOHN MARCUM

"Intelligent, intuitive, and gifted with great personal charm, [Savimbi offered] the anxious multitudes the reassuring words they so [wanted] to hear."

John Marcum, The Angolan Revolution, Vol. II, (1978), p. 247.

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WILLIAM SAFIRE

"Dr. Savimbi is a unique personage: he is the only guerrilla leader in the world fighting and winning a war against communists."

William Safire, "Voice From The Bush," New York Times, 8 November 1979.

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SMITH HEMPSTONE

"While Savimbi feels an affinity toward the West and has a predisposition toward free enterprise, he believes that successful African institutions must be based on African realities. Were he to come to power, he would favor a mixture of capitalism and socialism. Savimbi is, in short, a pragmatic nationalist who takes his friends where he can find them."

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Smith Hempstone, "Angola: Where the West Can Still Win," Reader's Digest, February 1981, p. 108.

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HOWARD WOLPE

"Jonas Savimbi is portrayed as a strong, anti-communist figure who is very supportive of American interests. The reality is that there is very little difference ideologically between the various factions that comprise the nationalist movement in Angola. Holden Roberto, Jonas Savimbi, Agostinho Neto previously, and now dos Santos were all socialist in their orientation to varying degrees. Savimbi in the past used to talk about 'those American imperialists.' He is obviously a rather pragmatic individual who now finds it convenient to be anti-communist, to receive support from South Africa."

Congressman Howard Wolpe, "Angola Interview," Anthony J. Hughes, Africa Report, November-December 1981.

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JACK FOISE

"At the rally [30 March 1984], Savimbi outlined his economic policies--support of free enterprise, although he has been known as an as an 'African socialist'--and promised nonalignment for Angola in foreign policy, although he said he would retain friendly relations with South Africa. Support from South Africa, ruled by its white minority, is something of an embarrassment to a black nationalist such as Savimbi.

Jack Foisie, Los Angeles Times, 1 April 1984.

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ALAN COWELL

"The National Union and its leader, Jonas Savimbi, have been portrayed by some Western analysts as standard-bearers of Western interests in Angola whose existence results not from South African support but from popular backing. From Luanda and other African capitals the perspective is different; Mr. Savimbi is termed a "bandit" and a "puppet" whose tactics are those of terror.

Alan Cowell, "Angolans Barter as Economy Totters," The New York Times, 23, July 1982.

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JAMES POTTS

"The Most successful anti-communist resistance movement in the world in the past decade has been the Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) in Angola....UNITA has resisted efforts of the Soviet and Cuban backed regime in Luanda to crush it, now controls one third of Angola and has placed guerrillas in nearly every province. Nowhere can the Soviets, Cubans, and their Angolan wards feel safe."

James Potts, "Angola and the U.S.: The Shape of a Prudent Compromise," The Heritage Foundation Backgrounder, 2 May 1984. [During the Angolan Civil war of 1975-1976, Potts served as CIA Africa Division Chief.]

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HOLDEN ROBERTO

"The attempt to paint Jonas Savimbi as an advocate of wild-eyed socialism is to know nothing of him. Other attacks on him are as a collaborator, a fierce anti-mulatto partisan, a darling of the U.S. black power movement....Savimbi does not need any exculpation from me; he can handle his own affairs."

Holden Roberto, "Letter to the Editor," The Wall Street Journal, 30 March 1984.

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FOREIGN COMPANIES AND NATIONALIZATION

"I am against nationalization; it is a disease which saps the strength of a national economy. The real question is the renegotiation of allowable profits. Foreign companies need their profits, they would not invest without them. But the people of Angola need their share. When Angola is independent the investors must know that the people will have a greater share."

Jonas Savimbi, quoted in Robin Wright, Men at War: Angola's Liberation Leaders. New York: Alicia Patterson Foundation, (December 1975), p. 7.

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"The state, on the other hand, should be the referee--or like a policeman directing traffic where everyone is driving his own car. The state has to have a share in the large businesses like oil or diamonds so it will have the money to make loans to smaller private businesses. The state must also set the basic economic priorities."

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A UNITA pamphlet says that while it encourages free enterprise, the market would not allow "individual buyers and sellers to control the price of goods and services."

Timothy Belknap, "Angola; Marxism, Capitalism Run Together," Detroit Free Press, 29 January 1984.

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"Nationalization would not be my ultimate nor immediate aim. Foreign companies will not bring the technical know-how to Angola without something in return. You must be honest with the company, however, and tell them that the wealth will be returned to the country."

Jonas Savimbi quoted in Leon Dash, "Savimbi, Lifeblood of UNITA, Is a Man of Many Labels," The Washington Post, 13 August 1977.

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"He [Savimbi] is also considered by some Americans as pro-Western champion of free enterprise. Jonas Savimbi has consistently declared himself an exponent of African socialism.

John A Marcum, "The Politics of Survival: UNITA in Angola," CSIS Africa Notes, no.8, (February 18, 1983), p. 2.

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"He says Angola's government should control the oil industry, railroads, the airline company and a share of the nation's big mines....But Mr. Savimbi says, 'Existing contracts with U.S. companies [partially nationalized by the MPLA] have to be respected.'"

Steve Mufson, "Angolan Rebel Leader Courts U.S. Aid," The Wall Street Journal, 17 December 1981

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"He (Savimbi) criticized Angola's nationalization of 'enterprises that don't work.' He said some of the large coffee plantations, once the source of the country's main export, should be broken up and others turned over to large private companies."

"Angolan Rebel Leader Courts U.S. Aid," The Wall Street Journal, 17 December 1981, p. 27.

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"In large part, the American-Angolan ventures have survived the transition from colonialism because the various liberation groups who fought the independence struggle and the wars that have followed it left the oil facilities alone."

Jay Ross, "U.S. Oil Firms in Angola Cooperate With a Regime Washington Won't Recognize," Los Angeles Times, 17 December 1981.

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"Mr. Savimbi said oil companies operating in Angola, including the American Gulf and Texaco organizations, would be viewed as targets for attack if they did not cease what he called 'lobbying' against his organization in foreign capitals."

Alan Cowell, "Rebel Leader to Angola: Talk Peace or Fight in Cities," The New York Times 1 April 1984. (Filed from Jamba, Angola which is 50 miles north of the Namibian border and 50 miles west of Zambia).

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"The South African-backed National Union for the Total Independence of Angola took responsibility for the raid [on Angola's only refinery]. Western diplomats who examined evidence presented by the Angolan authorities the day after the raid say they believe the National Union, using white mercenaries did carry out the attack."

"Attack Angolan Refinery Raised Peril of Poison Cloud," New York Times, 13 December 1981.

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THE ROLE & IMPORTANCE OF RACE

The FNLA and UNITA are rooted in rural constituencies where grievances have been seen more simply in terms of African versus European, or black versus white. The FNLA and UNITA have been essentially uniracial, or Afrocentric. They share a general distrust of African assimilados and mesticos because, as they see it, these groups achieved a collective advantage by serving European interests at African expense. They have often seen African assimilados along with mesticos as extensions of European rule, thus in as sense as "whites."

John A. Marcum, "The Anguish of Angola: On Becom- ing Independent in the Last Quarter of the Twentieth Century." Issue, Vol.5, No.4 (Winter 1975), p. 7.

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"Savimbi showed much more animosity toward other rebel groups in Angola than he did against the Portuguese. In particular, he showed dislike for the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola [MPLA]. He made it a point to tell me that the leaders of this group were mulattos who had accepted Portuguese citizenship and were disliked by most Angolans."

Written by U.S. charge d'affaires of American embassy in Bern Switzerland on his first meeting with Savimbi during the spring of 1961—where he was introduced to Savimbi as "the future president of Angola." Cited in Gerald J. Bender, "Angola: Left, Right & Wrong," Foreign Policy, No. 43 (Summer 1981), p. 59.

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"There is no way of predicting how Savimbi's 'black power' attitude toward the influence of whites and mesticos in Angola would manifest itself were he to gain power, but the prospect does frighten most whites in Luanda."

Gerald J. Bender, "Hearing before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on International Relations," House of Representatives, United States-Angolan Relations, (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978), p. 7.

***

"UNITA will never allow Angola to become another Brazil where millions of our soul brothers are nothing else but instruments for football and Samba Dance, while the real political power lies in the hands of white people."

"Editorial" in Kwacha-Angola (1968) [UNITA official organ].

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"The mestico who is raised by his white father will grow up thinking he is white. But usually the Portuguese man will leave the African woman as soon as she gets pregnant."

Jonas Savimbi quoted in Leon Dash, "Black Roots in Angola," The Washington Post, 26 December 1973.

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"Savimbi [said] that UNITA has whites and mestico members and that 'our unity, compassion and love must embrace all racial categories.'"

Fred Bridgland, "Inside Savimbi's Angola," Sunday Tribune, (Johannesburg), 25 July 1981.

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CAPITALISM/SOCIALISM/IDEOLOGY

"No progressive action is possible with men who serve American interests...the notorious agents of imperialism."

Jonas Savimbi, outlining his reasons for breaking with Holden Roberto's FNLA in 1964, published in Remarques Congolaises et Africaines (Brussels), Vol. 6, No. 21 (25 November 1964), pp. 489-493.

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"Our struggle is the consecration of the thesis of the People's war, and the People's Army of the great Revolutionaries such as Mao Tse Tung, General Giap, Ho Chi Minh, Che Guevara, and many others."

Kwacha-Angola (official UNITA organ), 19 August 1970.

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"Unita and the whole Angolan people have long since admired the courageous traditions of the Vietnamese people in opposing foreign domination and in fighting dauntlessly American imperialism and their lackeys."

Miguel Puna, Secretary General UNITA, on behalf of the UNITA Central Committee, Kwacha-Angola, 19 August 1970, p. 7.

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"UNITA is aware that the struggle against U.S.-led imperialism in Angola is a vital key to the heart of the entire Southern African problem."

Jorge Sangumba, UNITA Secretary for External Affairs, Open Letter to OSPAAAL (Organization of Solidarity of the Peoples of Africa, Asia, and Latin

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America, Tricontinental, 6 April 1970.

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"The conspiracy by international imperialism led by USA imperialism is backing directly the regimes in Portugal, South Africa and Rhodesia."

Miguel Puna, Secretary General on behalf of the UNITA Central Committee, Kwacha-Angola [UNITA official organ], 19 August 1970.

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"I have no capital. No one in Angola has any capital. So I am not a capitalist."

Jonas Savimbi, quoted in "Angola's Struggle From Within," The Washington Post, 12 December 1981.

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"We in UNITA want to be capitalists." A UNITA supporter told an AP correspondent visiting UNITA headquarters in Jamba Angola.

Tom Baldwin, AP, 29 May 1984, 07:07.

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"I am not communist because it serves no purpose. Nor am I a capitalist. Socialism in this country is the only answer. Those who led the country to independence cannot become the exploiters of the people. We want a socialist system, but which? There is the orthodox one and the extremist one. We want the democratic one, social democracy."

Jonas Savimbi, quoted in Wright, Robin, Men at War: Angola's Liberation Leaders. New York: Alicia Patterson Foundation, (December 1975).

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"When we created UNITA, we created UNITA within the Marxism/Leninism lines."

Interview with UNITA Secretary of Information and Foreign Secretary, Black World, October 1974.

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"Wolpe taxed him [Savimbi] about ideological differences with Angola's ruling Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola [MPLA]. Savimbi's tory fans on Capitol Hill might have been saddened to hear him say that, while he is indeed anti-Soviet and pro-western, he favors socialism, a form modeled on Chinese and Tanzanian collective villages."

Mary McGrory, "Republicans Discover Better Part of Valor in Angolan Question," Washington Post, 10 December 1981.

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"Over the past fifteen years he has been able to switch to whatever rhetoric he feels will best suit the moment. At first, Mao seemed the master. As late as 1976, when South Africa was already his chief supplier, he still used some Maoist jargon."

Xan Smiley, "Inside Angola," The New York Review of Books 17 February 1983.

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"UNITA tended...to adopt a pragmatic form of Afro-centric populism, which was at once aggregative and demagogic."

John Marcum, "The Politics of Survival: UNITA in Angola," CSIS Africa Notes, 18 February 1983.

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"Neto said he is going to teach Marxist-Leninism in primary school here. He is a fanatic, a European colonizer. To bring Russian law here is another

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type of colonization. Marx must be kept in his place. We should take from Marx only that which applies to our situation."

Jonas Savimbi quoted in Leon Dash, "Savimbi, Lifeblood of UNITA, Is a Man of Many Labels," The Washington Post, 13 August 1977.

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"Jonas Savimbi has long displayed a talent for discerning and telling people what they want to hear. As early as 1962, he wrote to American friends coupling pleas for financial aid with a pledge to help push communism out of Africa. In 1974-5 he proved to be a spellbinding orator, effectively tailoring his remarks to his audience. On the one hand, Savimbi soothed the anxieties of Portuguese Angolans with assurances that he considered all those who had settled, let alone been born, in Angola to be bona fide Angolans. On the other hand, he promise black Angolans a new order under majority rule, free from domination by Portuguese-educated whites and mesticos."

John A. Marcum, "The Politics of Survival: UNITA in Angola," CSIS Africa Notes, no.8, (February 18, 1983), p. 2.

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"When I went to Russia in 1964, I came back cured for life. If you are not a Marxist when you are 20, you are not too bright. And if you are still a Marxist at 40, you're not too bright either."

Jonas Savimbi, quoted in Arnaud de Borchgrave, "Savimbi Asks for Help," Newsweek, November 12, 1979, p. 68.

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"To begin with Russian socialism is just the exportation of poverty. The Marxist economic model has failed everywhere it has been applied. It is important for everyone in a society to have a personal incentive, to be free to earn his own living

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and pay his own way, to feel he is productive and not being given something for nothing."

Timothy Belknap, "Angola; Marxism, Capitalism Run Together," The Detroit Free Press, 29 January 1984.

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"Don't speak about images. I have been to the Soviet Union, I have been to China. There is no progress there. There is no progress in Angola."

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"Mr. Savimbi's stated policies don't offer much that is different from the policies of the present Angolan government. He says he believes in 'socialism, but in an African way.'"

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"You can't apply capitalism in Africa," says Savimbi.

Jonas Savimbi, quoted in Steven Mufson, "Angolan Rebel Leader Courts U.S. Aid," The Wall Street Journal, 17 December 1981.

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"Savimbi's ideology, indeed is largely determined by his need for arms and money. His earliest mentors were the Chinese, with whom he retains contacts... In fact he would probably espouse any doctrine, perhaps short of hardline Marxism, if it would effect an accommodation with the MPLA."

Xan Smiley, "The Bull in Luanda's China Shop," The Times (London), 28 August 1982.

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"I am not a capitalist. Some of my American friends were puzzled when I told them I was not a capitalist and I don't intend to become one. So friends of mine, like Senator Jesse Helms, were absolutely shocked. But it is frank. I don't want to be a capitalist. To exploit who? My own people? It is not worth fighting for."

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Jonas Savimbi in "Rebel Leader wages War on Two Fronts," The New York Times, 5 December 1982.

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"Savimbi still carried political flexibility to the point of gross inconsistency, if not transparent deceit, in desperate efforts to survive."

John Marcum, The Angolan Revolution, Vol. II, (1978), p. 276.

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QUESTION OF RECONCILIATION

"Although both the PDA and Savimbi's faction within the UPA [in 1963] were predisposed to favor an association with the MPLA if this could curtail Roberto's power without leading to MPLA hegemony, the MPLA made no apparent efforts to contact and gain the confidence of these two allies. Instead the MPLA relied upon public proximity pressure by independent African states and public petitions by Angolans calling for the creation of a new national front."

John Marcum, The Angolan Revolution, Vol. II, (1978), p. 60.

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Savimbi went to Brazzaville in 1964 "for talks with Agostinho Neto, Daniel Chipenda and other MPLA officials, who invited him to join their movement. Relishing his autonomy and ambition, Savimbi stalled."

John Marcum, The Angolan Revolution, Vol. II, (1978), p. 161.

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"We used to cooperate with the MPLA without being members of that party. We no longer do because the MPLA complained that we did not fully cooperate, especially in Zambia where our brother Jonas Savimbi demobilized some [MPLA] members. Since the MPLA demanded that we take a clear stand on cooperation, i.e., sign MPLA party cards, we...ceased to cooperate."

Amigos do Manifesto Angolano, "Amangola Open Letter," 14 July 1965, quoted in John Marcum, The Angolan Revolution, Vol. II, (1978), p. 162.

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"[In Zambia] Savimbi found himself under pressure from Zambian authorities to join forces with the MPLA, which had outpaced him in establishing a local organization. Savimbi and his supporters, however would have no part of what they considered an interloping movement of assimilados and mesticos."

John Marcum, The Angolan Revolution, Vol. II, (1978), p. 169.

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"There were numerous signs [in 1975] that UNITA and the MPLA could work together; they were really the natural allies in the struggle. I'm convinced that if UNITA had been well armed by the middle of 1975 (when our intelligence revealed that they still had only 3,000 weapons in their army) the MPLA would have formed a coalition with them rather than fight them. Moreover, since the arms we finally sent to UNITA did not arrive until almost September, we contributed to UNITA's decision to seek military aid from South Africa, which ultimately proved to be Savimbi's Achilles heel."

U.S. State Department official paraphrased in Gerald Bender, "Kissinger in Angola: Anatomy of Failure," American Policy in Southern Africa, Rene Lemarchand (ed.), (University Press of America, 1978), p. 79.

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"On August 20, 1975, Savimbi told the chief of the CIA's Angola task force that 'the ultimate hope for Angola still lay at the conference table rather than on the battlefield.' But the CIA, determined to take a hard line, had not planned on negotiations. The CIA urged Savimbi toward military confrontation, even though it had calculated that whereas UNITA could raise the number of Cuban and MPLA casualties, it could never win the war.
"Undeterred by the CIA pressure, Savimbi sent representatives to meet with the MPLA in Lisbon

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and to explore a reconciliation. In August 1975 a cease-fire between UNITA and the MPLA was announced and plans were nearly finalized for an official alliance between the two rivals. However, the CIA promptly dispatched its Kinshasa station chief to Angola. The CIA official called Savimbi on the carpet to let him know the United States wanted no 'soft' allies in its war against the MPLA."

Gerald J. Bender, "Angola: Left, Right & Wrong," Foreign Policy, No. 43 (Summer 1981), pp. 56-57.

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"We are fighting to liberate our country from Soviet and Cuban domination. We got rid of Portuguese colonialism only to fall under new colonial masters. That is what we are fighting and in the process we are fighting communism. Does that not deserve the support of the West?"

Jonas Savimbi, quoted in "Rebel Goal: An End to Foreign Control," The Washington Post, 20 July 1981.

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"We can think about making a reconciliation only when the Cubans and Russians are gone. Not before. No. Never."

Jonas Savimbi, quoted in [illegible] Dash, "Savimbi, Lifeblood of UNITA, Is a Man of Many Labels," The Washington Post, 13 August 1977.

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"A Namibian settlement, Savimbi said, should remove the excuse for the presence of Cuban troops in Angola....If Namibian independence can be achieved. Savimbi said, the Angolan government will have to find a new rationale for the continual presence of the Cubans."

"Savimbi Vows Cooperation With U.S. on Namibia," Washington Post 5 December 1981.

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"If the Cubans leave, the MPLA would have no basis whatsoever to be in power.' He assured Wolpe, however, that he seeks political reconciliation with the MPLA. Rather surprisingly, Savimbi said such a reconciliation should not be undertaken under U.S. auspices. He believes that other African nations should be the mediators."

Mary McGrory, "Republicans Discover Better Part of Valor in Angolan Question," Washington Post, 10 December 1981.

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"[Savimbi] said there was no fundamental ideological conflict between the two parties and that a coalition between them was 'the only solution.'"

Joseph Lelyveld, "Angola Rebels Yield 2 Soviet Captives," New York Times, 16 November 1982.

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"Far beyond the ideologies, Angola is one country and someday the same nationalism will unite them all."

Jonas Savimbi, quoted in Al Venter, "Angola--Castro's Vietnam," Soldier of Fortune, (September 1978), p. 65.

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"The Ovimbundu are underrepresented in top leadership positions in both the government and the party. Not a single Ovimbundu is on the 11-man MPLA Political Bureau, and only a few are among the Central Committee's 65 members. Only one Ovimbundu minister sits in the cabinet.

"Political or economic stability will be difficult to obtain in Angola while such a sizable minority is underrepresented. Yet even if UNITA won a military victory, minority problems in Angola would persist, as the ethnic groups that strongly support

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the MPLA today--the Kimbundu, Kikongo, whites, and mulattos--fell into disfavor."

Gerald J. Bender, "Angola: Left, Right & Wrong," Foreign Policy, No. 43 (Summer 1981), p. 64.

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"In a 1973 interview with Charles Cobb of Africa News, Savimbi referred to the MPLA as "patriots" who also "fought for the independence of our country" and indicated that he would not even make the withdrawal of Cuban troops a precondition for negotiations with the MPLA."

John A. Marcum, "The Politics of Survival: UNITA in Angola," CSIS Africa Notes, February 18, 1983.

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"A guerrilla army itself cannot defeat a regular army. The government is a puppet government of the Soviet Union and the Cubans, but it is an Angolan government. They will not give up, like the Portuguese."

Jonas Savimbi, quoted in Leon Dash, "UNITA: Self-Criticism Deep in a Hidden Forest," The Washington Post, 13 August 1977.

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"Mr. Savimbi said his men controlled a third of Angola--the southeastern part called Cuando Cubango, which the Portuguese used to call the end of the world. It is thinly populated, out of range of Government air strikes and difficult to traverse except by foot."

Alan Cowell, "Rebel Leader to Angola: Talk Peace or Fight in Cities," The New York 1 April 1984. Filed from Jamba, Angola.

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"Our aim is Luanda, our commandos are within a few miles from the capital."

Jonas Savimbi quoted in Thibaut d'Oiron, "Savimbi Threatens Angolan Oil," The London Observer News Service, 12 March 1984.

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"The Cubans and Russians don't know how to fight an anti-guerrilla war," Savimbi chuckled. "The bigger the [military] machine, the easier it is to escape. They should use smaller groups, but they don't have the morale. The Cubans will not accept 20 of their men to be dropped here in the bush [on a search and destroy mission.] The [MPLA] soldiers are too poorly trained to do it."

Jonas Savimbi quoted in Leon Dash, "War Without Frontiers, Battle Lines," Washington Post, 8 August 1977.

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"It is not possible. The MPLA is a very minority Government. They have no support at all. Even if it is tried, it can't work. In Angola, peace has to be achieved through sincere and honest negotiations between the MPLA and UNITA."

Jonas Savimbi, quoted in "Rebel Leader Wages War On Two Fronts, At Least," The New York Times, 5 December 1982.

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"There will be reconciliation. The day the Cubans leave. Really, I'm not boasting my troops are much better (than the MPLA's). If the Cubans leave, the MPLA will negotiate."

Jonas Savimbi, quoted in "Rebel Leader Wages War on Two Fronts, At Least." The New York Times, 5 December 1982.

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"I think there can be only a political solution. No military solution is realistic."

Jonas Savimbi, quoted in Wright, Robin, Men at war: Angola's Liberation Leaders. (New York: Alicia Patterson Foundation, December 1975), p. 8.

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"We are seeking a democratic Angolan government, chosen in free elections. No elections have ever been held in this country. The MPLA was not elected. It was put in power by the Soviet Union and its Cuban mercenaries. There are now 36,000 Cubans in Angola. Their only purpose is to keep this government in power. If that is not the case, why will they not agree to elections?

Jonas Savimbi, quoted in "Rebel Goal: An End To Foreign Control," The Washington Post, 20 July 1981.

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"Our forces are growing Stronger but in the end, a military solution is not part of our strategy. Eventually, the MPLA must negotiate. There will be a political solution."

Jonas Savimbi quoted in Richard Harwood, "Rebel Goal: An End to Foreign Control," The Washington Post, 20 July 1981.

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"Dr. Savimbi's nationalists declare they seek a military victory."

"Why Not Victory?" The Wall Street Journal, 30 November 1983.

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"Neto was in the process of talking with us," he said. "At the O.A.U. he told the Senghor Government he was prepared to talk with us. If Neto did not die, we could see some light."

Jonas Savimbi, quoted in Bernard D. Nossiter, "Angola Rebel Leader Says His Forces Are Beating Cubans," The New York Times, 8 November 1979.

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"These problems [of reconciliation] were discussed at the September meeting of the [MPLA] Central Committee. The MPLA radicals asked for a compromise that would give them until March [1984] to annihilate the UNITA puppets. If that is not done by the end of March they will negotiate."

Jonas Savimbi quoted in Thibaut d'Oiron, "Savimbi Threatens Angolan Oil," The London Observer News Service, 12 March 1984.

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"Speaking of Angolan President Dos Santos, Savimbi said: 'He's got to talk to us this year or early next year. Otherwise, something is going to happen.' He indicated that UNITA's forces are now so strong and self-sufficient that they will eventually be able to overrun the entire country and dictate terms of surrender to the Luanda government."

Jack Foise, Los Angeles Times, 1 April 1984. Filed from Jamba, Angola (50 miles north of the Namibian border and 50 miles west of Zambia).

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"Savimbi is deluding himself if he thinks the Angolan government would ever negotiate with an organisation which is, in effect part of the South African army and which with its South African friends, has caused the deaths of hundreds of civilians. There is no military reason why Angola should negotiate with this man and there is certainly no moral one."

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Coim Foy, "Rebel Leader's Claims Are Hollow," The Sunday Times (London), 25 July 1981.

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"None of them [the MPLA leaders], irrespective of differences on other issues, could be expected to regard with equanimity the idea of inviting into their midst an opponent who, apart from having fought against the MPLA with South African aid for eight years, has a strong political base among the country's largest ethnic group, the Ovimbundu, a powerful well organized army and, by all accounts, political ambitions of Mobutuist proportions. To all MPLA factions, sharing power with Savimbi would, sooner rather than later, mean risking losing power completely."

"Quarterly Economic Review of Angola, Guinea Bissau, Cape Verde, Sao Tome and Principe," The Economist Intelligence Unit (London), No. 4, (1983), p. 9.

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ON SOUTH AFRICA AND SOUTH AFRICAN AID TO UNITA

"[UNITA] thinks that any recognition of the South African regime is nothing more...than to pursue a policy of conciliation with imperialism."

Kwacha-Angola [UNITA official organ] 19 August 1970.

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"[Jonas Savimbi] had cited Prime Minister Vorster as 'a responsible leader' and 'a man of 'realism' and pronounced against the need for armed struggle in Namibia and Rhodesia."

John Marcum, The Angolan Revolution, Vol. II, (1978), p. 268.

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"Savimbi denies he's opposed to SWAPO, despite earlier reports to the contrary. Being opposed to SWAPO would put him on the same side as South Africa, which is where many of his opponents... say he is. And he says he isn't."

Henry Allen, Washington Post, 12 December 1981.

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"I hope the future leader of this country will be realistic. We have a dam at Cunene (a power course for South Africa). We have investments involving South Africa. Should we ostracize them? I hope that a leader here will be realistic enough to cooperate with any country despite differences in political systems."

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Jonas Savimbi, quoted in Robin Wright, Men at War: Angola's Liberation Leaders. New York: Alicia Patterson Foundation (December 1975), p. 7.

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"The situation there appears to be changing for the better since (P.W.) Botha became Prime Minister."

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"Of course, a black man like me will not say that apartheid is a good thing. How are we going to get rid of the mistreatment of blacks in South Africa? I don't know because I'm busy with my own problems."

Jonas Savimbi, quoted in Jack Foise, "UNITA Leader Lives With His Men," Los Angeles Times, 4 June 1980.

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"Anyone who tries to deal this gifted brave and unshakeably dedicated man out of the southern African settlement is either deliberately blind to the real power he exercises, or careless towards the true interests of the West."

Tertius Myburgh, a South African journalist, quoted in Patrick Laurence, "S. A. May Push for Savimbi in Angola," The Guardian (U.K.), 2 September 1982.

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"The South Africans have said they want an internationally recognized role for Jonas Savimbi's Unita and may intend to create a Unita-controlled buffer zone along the northern Namibia border to help prevent infiltration from Angola by the Namibian insurgents SWAPO."

"Bigger role for Unita sought by Pretoria," compiled by Facts and Report from: The Financial Times, 9/14/81; London Observer, 9/6&13/81; Luanda Radio, 9/10/81; Johannesburg Star, 9/5/81; Africa Report, 11/12/81).

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"SWAPO, which allied itself with the Popular Movement government last year [1975] after UNITA collaborated with the South Africans, "would have been wiser if they did not attack us and just had a political alliance with the government. We would not have bothered them."

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"'Now, we will never let them [SWAPO] operate against the South Africans in Namibia again,' said UNITA's Savimbi heatedly in a rare display of anger. 'Never! Not unless we are, defeated.' SWAPO guerrillas, who formerly had good relations with the UNITA guerrillas, use Southern Angola as a refuge in between attacks on South African forces in neighboring Namibia."

Leon Dash, "War Without Frontiers, Battle Lines," The Washington Post, 8 August 1977.

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"The South Africans were in Angola on our side, we are not ashamed they were sent in."

Jonas Savimbi, quoted in Bernard D. Nossiter, "Angola Rebel Leader Says His Forces are Beating the Cubans," The New York Times, 8 November 1979.

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"The South African intervention in 1975 was totally beyond the control of UNITA. South Africa was not invited by UNITA to come into Angola. South Africa was not in Angola in our behalf. So many factors compelled South Africa to point its guns at the very same targets as ours during the 1975 civil war. South Africa came into Angola, invited by Western powers. The Western powers didn't really have to be accountable to UNITA at all. They had made their decision to ask South Africa to go into Angola to fight the Cubans, so South Africa did. It was also in South Africa's own interest to flex her

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muscles at Communist aggression in a neighboring country. Later Western orders were to force South Africans to get out of Angola. So South Africans did."

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"The South African forces during the intervention in Angola never fought with our men, never fought with our people...We fought with our own funds, with our own resources, with our own means...."

Jeremias Chitunda, Secretary of the External Coordination Activities of UNITA, interview with Irving Brown, "Angola's Struggle for Independence," in Free Trade Union News, (Washington D.C.: Department of International Affairs, AFL-CIO, Oct. 1980), p. 5-6.

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"Some people are saying 'Why don't the South Africans come and fight for us, so we will pay them later?' That is wrong. If they fight for you, you will be colonized again. You must fight for yourself."

Jonas Savimbi, quoted in "UNITA: Self-Criticism Deep in a Hidden Forest," The Washington Post, 13 August 1977.

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"What matters to me is who gives me arms and ammunition. We trade with South Africa."

Jonas Savimbi, quoted in "Angola Rebel Leader Says Children Are Sent to Cuba," Washington Star, 8 November 1979.

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"We get no equipment and no training from them. Since 1978 we have had an open border. We trade with them. We have a market. We sell them diamonds and ivory."

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Jonas Savimbi, quoted in "Angola's Struggle From Within," The Washington Post, 12 December 1981.

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"If I am getting support from the U.S., it doesn't mean I support the U.S., I will get support where I can get it. Chinese support for UNITA doesn't mean I am pro-Chinese. Now people say I'm pro-South African. Guns don't drop from the skies. I have to get them where I can."

Jonas Savimbi, quoted in Steve Mufson, "Angolan Rebel Leader Courts U.S. Aid," The Wall Street Journal, 17 December 1981.

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"Savimbi himself has denied that South African aid is crucial to his effort."

Jay Ross, "Angola Sees Rebel Forces as Puppets of Pretoria," Washington Post, 21 September 1981.

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"South African regular troops and mercenaries fight alongside Unita bands, as testified by Captain Jose Ricardo Belmundo, ex-Buffalo Battalion officer."

Colm Foy, "Rebel Leader's Claims are Hollow," Letter to the Editor The Sunday Times (London), 26 July 1981.

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"Savimbi and his aids gloss over assertions that they are supported by white ruled and anti-Marxist South Africa. But evidence abounds. Truck tires say 'Made in South Africa.' Visitors enjoy wine from Cape Town. Beer from Johannesburg. UNITA officers smoke South African cigarettes."

Tom Baldwin, AP, 29 May 1984, 07:07. Filed from UNITA headquarters in Jamba, Angola.

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In 1979, appearing rather defensive on this issue, Mr. Savimbi is reported to have said that his forces had no link with South Africa, but that UNITA did attain arms from them. Yet, in 1981, he is said to have admitted that South Africa was helping his UNITA guerrillas against the MPLA, but he is said to have denied the involvement of any South African military aid.

Bernard Nossiter, "Angola Rebel Leader Says His Forces Are Beating Cubans," The New York Times, 8 November 1979; "Anatomy of an Invasion," The Economist, 29 August 1981.

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"His forces are largely supplied from South-West Africa...Some South African commentators say that if South Africa granted independence to South-West Africa or reached a rapprochement with the Angolan leadership, as it has done with Mozambique, Mr. Savimbi's position would be in jeopardy since South African support is vital to him."

Alan Cowell, "Rebel Leader to Angola: Talk Peace or Fight in Cities," The New York Times, 1 April 1984. (Filed from Jamba, Angola--50 miles north of the Namibian border and 50 miles west of Zambia.)

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FOREIGN FINANCIAL SUPPORT (OTHER THAN SOUTH AFRICA)

"When the Ford administration first officially approved covert aid to forces in Angola in January 1975, it preferred the FNLA to UNITA. CIA documents show that the United States turned to Savimbi only in the final months of the war, after it had become obvious that the FNLA was little more than a paper tiger. The documents also show that the CIA knew that the weapons it was supplying could not prevent the collapse of UNITA's small, untrained army. UNITA's value was primarily as cannon fodder in a proxy struggle with the Soviet Union."

Gerald J. Bender, "Angola: Left, Right & Wrong," Foreign Policy, No. 43 (Summer 1981), p. 60.

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"What I can say is that from 1977 to 1979-80 we received a total of about $10 million from several sources outside. From the end of 1979 and through 1980 and 1981 we did not receive any really substantial money, but we have been managing. The minor ones are still there but it is $500,000 or $250,000, not those (Arabs), who used to give us millions. They cut us off because they had no encouragement from any major power. But it is true that many people have given money... independent African countries (Morocco, Senegal, the Ivory Coast), Arab countries (Saudi Arabia, Qatar) and others not money to buy weapons, but to buy medicines and various other things. No Western European governments have given money; in Europe only individual friends and some companies."

Jonas Savimbi, quoted in "Savimbi Defends Links With South Africans," The Washington Post, 24 July 1981.

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"We have support. We are supported by Morocco, we get military training in Morocco. There's Senegal, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Togo... We got support from France until Mitterrand came in."

Jonas Savimbi, quoted in "Angola's Struggle From Within," The Washington Post, 12 December 1981.

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"We must distinguish between countries which support us openly, like the Sudan, Egypt, and Morocco, who train our officers, and those whom I call 'friends of the night.'"

Jonas Savimbi quoted in Thibaut d'Oiron, "Savimbi Threatens Angolan Oil," The London Observer News Service, 12 March 1984.

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"Dr. Savimbi said that when UNITA began its guerrilla operations in 1978, Saudi Arabia, Iran (under the Shah) and some large oil companies gave several million dollars and arms. The South Africans allowed UNITA to ship the arms through Walvis Bay, in Namibia."

Thibaut d'Oiron, "Savimbi Threatens Angolan Oil," The London Observer News Service, 12 March 1984.

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"Diplomatically, UNITA is holding ground. Relations with Senegal, chief purveyor of passports are less cosy under Abdou Diouf, but Morocco, Tunisia and Zaire remain firm backers. Saudi money and a Zambian blind eye to activity along Angola's eastern border are also important. The Nigerians are quietly pragmatic, with UNITA foreign affairs secretary, Jeremias Chitunda, paying a discreet visit to Lagos in April.

"Angola: The UNITA Structure," Africa Confidential, Vol. 24, No. 11, 25 May 1983.

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NUMBER OF UNITA TROOPS

"Jonas Savimbi made some exaggerated claims for his movement: 2900 party branches and 66 military detachments as of 1967; control over 1 million Angolans by 1970."

John Marcum, The Angolan Revolution, Vol. II, (1978), p. 196.

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(August 1980)

"[UNITA has] 15,000 fully trained and equipped troops, organized to battalion strength in key areas."

Frances X. Maier, "Voice from the Wilderness," National Review, 22 August 1980.

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(July 1981)

UNITA leaders claim they have 8,000 guerrillas and 9-12,000 militiamen.

Fred Bridgland, "Inside Savimbi's Angola," Sunday Tribune, (Johannesburg), 26 July 1981.

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(July 1981)

"UNITA claimed to have] 15,000 guerrilla's fighting in groups of 15-30 in every province up to the 10th parallel [and] 10 conventional combat battalions.

Richard Harwood, "Rebel Goal: An End to Foreign Control," The Washington Post, 20 July 1981.

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(August 1981)

UNITA claimed to have 16,000 Regulars and 5,000 militamen as well as Claiming to control one-third of all Angola.

Smith Hempstone, "The War the World Forgot," Soldier of Fortune, (August 1981).

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(August 1981)

Savimbi claims by year end he will field 15 battalions of more than 10,000 men. He currently claims 80,000 guerrillas and militiamen.

Foreign Report, 6 August 1981.

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(December 1981)

"The limited prospects for a UNITA military victory came as a surprise to many in the administration of Ronald Reagan once they probed Angola's internal realities. The most sobering appraisal of all came from none other than UNITA's Savimbi himself who, in December, 1981, shocked then Secretary of State Alexander Haig, Jr. when he stated that his troops could not military defeat the governing MPLA 'with or without the Cubans."

Gerald J. Bender, "The Continuing Crisis in Angola," Current History, Vol. 82, No. 482 (March 1983), p. 128.

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(December 1983)

"UNITA has some 30,000 guerrilla troops. It receives weapons, ammunition and some logistical support from South Africa."

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Edward Giradet, "Angola Rebel Offensive Prompts Government-Cuban Response" The Christian Science Monitor, 7 December 1983.

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"Mr. Jerimias Chitunda (UNITA Foreign Affairs Secretary) said UNITA claimed an area of control approaching half of Angola and an Army of insurgents numbering 50,000."

Roy Gutman, "Russia in Angola Warning to SA," Manchester Guardian, 2 January 1984.

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(April 1984)

"Savimbi says UNITA has as many as 35,000 men in semi-regular and guerrilla units, and that they control one-third of Angola. They conduct military operations in another one-third, and the Luanda government is unchallenged only in the remaining third."

Jack Foise, Los Angeles Times, 1 April 1984.

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(May 1984)

"According to Colonel [Wambu] Kaeitu [a UNITA intelligence officer who gave a military briefing in Jamba], UNITA now deploys 20,000 guerrillas and 20,000 'semi-regulars' operating in battalion and brigade strength."

Michael Hornsby, "The Man Who Would Rule Angola," The Times (London), 17 May 1984.

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(April 1984)

"Diplomats in Europe recently estimated Mr. Savimbi's forces as totaling 5,000 well-trained guerrillas and perhaps 20,000 poorly armed followers ....interviews with Filipino and Portuguese prisoners here indicated the huge military problems facing both sides in the conflict."

Alan Cowell, "Rebel Leader to Angola: Talk Peace or Fight in Cities," The New York Times, 1 April 1984. (Filed from Jamba, Angola, 50 miles north of the Namibian border and 50 miles west of Zambia.)

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